<ol> <li>AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA</li> <li>MICHAEL T. RISHER (191627) (MRISHER@ACLUNC.ORG)</li> <li>RAUL L. MACIAS (293208)</li> </ol>	
2 MICHAEL T. RISHER (191627) (MRISHER@ACLUNC.ORG) 3 RAUL L. MACIAS (293208)	
3 RAUL L. MACIAS (293208)	
$\Pi = (D M A C (A S (a) A C (A A C) D C))$	
4 (RMACIAS@ACLUCA.ORG) 39 Drumm Street, 2nd Floor San Francisco, CA 94111	
5 Telephone: (415) 621-2493 Facsimile: (415) 255-8437	
6	
<ul> <li>AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION</li> <li>JULIE A. EBENSTEIN (<i>To Be Admitted Pro Hac Vice</i>)</li> </ul>	
(JEBENSTEIN@ACLU.ORG) 125 Broad Street, 17th Floor New York DIV 08164	
<ul> <li>New York, NY 98164</li> <li>Telephone: (212) 549-2500</li> <li>Facsimile: (212) 549-2651</li> </ul>	
10 Facsimile: (212) 549-2651	
11 COOLEY LLP WILLIAM P. DONOVAN, JR. (155881)	
12 (WDONOVAN@COOLEY.COM) REBECCA L. TARNEJA (293461)	
13 (RTARNEJA@COOLEY.COM) 1333 2nd Street, Suite 400	
14         Santa Monica, CA 90401           Telephone:         (310) 883-6400	
15 Facsimile: (310) 883-6500	
16 Attorneys for Plaintiffs	
17	
18         SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFOR	DRNIA
19     COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO	
20PETER LA FOLLETTE; and THENo. CPF 17-51593	l
21 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA,	
22 Plaintiffs, PLAINTIFFS' MI	EMORANDUM OF
	THORITIES IN DTION FOR WRIT
24 ALEX PADILLA, in his official capacity as OF MANDATE	
25 Secretary of State of the State of California; and WILLIAM F. ROUSSEAU, in his official Time: 9:30 a.m.	
26 capacity as Clerk-Recorder-Assessor- Registrar of Voters for the County of Sonoma, Judge: Hon. Har	
27 Defendants.	
28	

1					
1				TABLE OF CONTENTS	
2					Page
3	I.	INTRO	DUCTION	[	6
4	II.	LEGA	l And Fa	ACTUAL BACKGROUND	6
5	III.	LEGA	L STANDA	ARD	10
6	IV.	Discu	JSSION		11
7		A.	-	ng Ballots Without Notice And Opportunity To Cure Violates Due Process Rights	11
8			1.	Federal Due Process	11
9			2.	California Due Process	12
10		В.	•	ng Ballots Without Notice And Opportunity To Cure Violates Equal	13
11				The Government Cannot Treat Ballots With Supposedly Mismatched Signatures Worse Than It Treats Unsigned Ballots	14
12 13				The Government Cannot Selectively Disenfranchise Voters Whose Signatures It Does Not Recognize	16
14		C.		ng Ballots Without Notice And Opportunity To Cure Violates Rights Under Article II, Section 2.5 Of The California	
15			Constit	ution	17
16		D.		Must Be Given Individualized Notice And An Opportunity To	18
17			1.	Due Process Requires Individualized Pre-Deprivation Notice	18
18 19				Equal Protection Requires That Voters Be Allowed To Cure Until Eight Days After The Election, As Is Allowed For No-Signature	10
	V.	Conc		Ballots	19
20	۷.	CONC	LUSION		19
21					
22					
23					
24					
25					
26					
27					
28					
COOLEY LLP TTORNEYS AT LAW				2.	

Attorneys At Law Los Angeles

1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2	Page(s)
3	Cases
4	Action NC v. Strach, 216  E Sump $24507 (M  D  N  C 2016)$
5	216 F. Supp. 3d 597 (M.D.N.C. 2016)
6 7	Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992)
8	Castro v. State of Cal., 2 Cal. 3d 223 (1970)16
9 10	<i>Charfauros v. Bd. of Elections</i> , 249 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2001)15
11	<i>Collier v. Menzel</i> , 176 Cal. App. 3d 24 (1985)13
12 13	Common Cause S. Christian Leadership Conference of Greater L.A. v. Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
14	<i>Communist Party of U.S. of Am. v. Peek,</i> 20 Cal. 2d 536 (1942)
15 16	<i>Dunn v. Blumstein</i> , 405 U.S. 330 (1972)
17 18	<i>Field v. Bowen,</i> 199 Cal. App. 4th 346 (2011)
19 20	Fla. Democratic Party v. Detzner, No. 4:16CV607-MW/CAS, 2016 WL 6090943 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 16, 2016) passim
20	<i>Gould v. Grubb</i> , 14 Cal. 3d 661 (1975)13, 14
22 23	<i>Gray v. Sanders</i> , 372 U.S. 368 (1963)11
23 24	Gresher v. Anderson,
25	127 Cal. App. 4th 88 (2005)
26	Johnson v. Alma Inv. Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 155 (1975)
27 28	<i>Jolicoeur v. Mihaly</i> , 5 Cal. 3d 565 (1971)9, 10
I	3.

COOLEY LLP Attorneys At Law Los Angeles

# Page(s)

1	<i>In re Large</i> , 41 Cal. 4th 538 (2007)13
2	
3	League of Women Voters of Cal. v. McPherson, 145 Cal. App. 4th 1469 (2006)11, 20
4 5	<i>McCluskey v. Belford High Sch.</i> , No. 2:09-14345, 2010 WL 2696599 (E.D. Mich. June 24, 2010)
6 7	<i>Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams</i> , 462 U.S. 791 (1983)18
8	<i>Minor v. Mun. Court,</i> 219 Cal. App. 3d 1541 (1990)18
9 10	Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)11, 12, 18
11	Ne. Ohio Coal. for Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012)15
12	People v. Arroyo,
13 14	62 Cal. 4th 589 (2016)
15	25 Cal. 3d 260 (1979)
16	Peterson v. City of San Diego, 34 Cal. 3d 225 (1983)11
17 18	Raetzel v. Parks/Bellemont Absentee Elec. Bd., 762 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Ariz. 1990)6, 11, 12
19	<i>Reynolds v. Sims</i> , 377 U.S. 533 (1964)19
20 21	Ross v. Superior Court,
22	19 Cal. 3d 899 (1977)
23	Silicon Valley Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cty. Open Space Auth., 44 Cal. 4th 431 (2008)
24 25	Taxpayers for Accountable Sch. Bond Spending v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist.,215 Cal. App. 4th 1013 (2013)
25 26	<i>Taylor v. Louisiana,</i> 419 U.S. 522 (1975)16
27	Today's Fresh Start, Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Office of Educ.,
28	57 Cal. 4th 197 (2013)

# Page(s)

1 2	United States v. State of Tex., 252 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd sub nom. Texas v. United States, 384 U.S. 155 (1966)
3 4	Woods v. Horton, 167 Cal. App. 4th 658 (2008)16
5	Young v. Gnoss, 7 Cal. 3d 18 (1972)
6	Zessar v. Helander,
7	No. 05-C-1917, 2006 WL 642646 (N.D. Ill. 2006), vacated as moot sub. nom. Zessar v. Keith, 536 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2008)6, 11, 12, 19
8 9	Statutes
9	
10	California Elections Code § 3547
11	§ 3001
12	§ 3003
13	§ 3005
14	§ 3007
	§ 3011
15	§ 3017
16	§ 3020
17	§§ 3200-3206
18	\$\$ 4000-4002
	§ 4007
19	§ 14216
20	§ 14278
21	§ 15372
22	California Government Code § 12172.5(a)7, 8, 20
23	Other Authorities
24	California Constitution12, 13, 17
25	art. 1, § 7
26	art. 2, § 2.5
27	U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 111, 14
28	
20	5.

1

I.

#### INTRODUCTION

California Elections Code Section 3019(c)(2) requires elections officials to reject vote-bymail ballots if they subjectively decide that the signature on a ballot envelope does not match a signature on file for the voter. Elections officials need not, and generally do not, notify voters that their ballots were rejected. Nor does the Code permit voters to cure the perceived signature mismatch so that their votes can count. As a result, tens of thousands of eligible voters' ballots are rejected and left uncounted each election cycle—a number set to increase substantially in light of the 2016 California Voter's Choice Act's authorization of widespread all-mailed-ballot elections.

9 This wholesale disenfranchisement of California voters, without providing voters notice
and an opportunity to show that their ballots are proper, violates due process, equal protection, and
the California constitutional right to have a properly cast vote counted. *See Fla. Democratic Party*v. *Detzner*, No. 4:16CV607-MW/CAS, 2016 WL 6090943 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 16, 2016); *Zessar v. Helander*, No. 05-C-1917, 2006 WL 642646 (N.D. Ill. 2006), *vacated as moot sub. nom. Zessar v. Keith*, 536 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2008); *Raetzel v. Parks/Bellemont Absentee Elec. Bd.*, 762 F. Supp.
1354 (D. Ariz. 1990) (all invalidating similar statutes).

Plaintiffs therefore ask this Court to (1) hold that Section 3019(c)(2) is facially unconstitutional and that no ballot may be rejected based on a mismatched signature without providing the voter with notice and an opportunity to cure within eight days after the election, (2) issue a writ of mandate prohibiting Defendants and their agents from rejecting vote-by-mail ballots for purportedly mismatched signatures without providing the voter with this notice and an opportunity to show that the ballot is proper, and (3) direct the Secretary of State to inform elections officials of this ruling.

23

### II. LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND<sup>1</sup>

More than half of California voters cast their ballots by mail. (RJN Ex. C at 28.) Any properly registered voter may use this process, either permanently or on a one-time basis. Cal. //

27

6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> <sup>1</sup> These facts are further detailed in Plaintiffs' Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate.

Elec. Code §§ 3001, 3003, 3200-3206.<sup>2</sup> In either case, elections officials send voters ballots and supplies for returning these ballots, including identification envelopes. §§ 3010, 3011. Voters must sign the identification envelopes in their own handwriting, but need not sign in any particular manner. § 3011(a)(2), (7). They must then mail their ballots by election day, and the ballots must arrive at the elections official's office within three days after the election. § 3020(b). Officials can begin the process of counting vote-by-mail ballots 29 days before election day and have 30 days after the election to count the ballots and certify the results. §§ 15101, 15372.

8 When elections officials receive the ballots, they must compare the signatures on the 9 identification envelopes with the voters' signatures on their affidavits of registration or other 10 official forms in their registration records. § 3019(a), (b). The only statutory guidance for this 11 process is that officials (i) must not invalidate ballots when voters substitute their initials for their 12 first or middle names, and (ii) cannot reject a ballot without visually examining it. § 3019(d), (e). 13 This signature comparison results in one of two outcomes: If the elections official 14 determines that the signatures match, the ballot will be counted. § 3019(c)(1). However,

15

16

[i]f upon conducting the comparison of signatures pursuant to subdivision (a) the elections official determines that the signatures do not compare, the identification envelope shall not be opened and the ballot shall not be counted.

§ 3019(c)(2). The use of "shall" means that these ballots must be rejected and not counted. *See*§ 354. There is no requirement that voters receive individualized notice that their votes will be
rejected for signature mismatch, let alone that they will receive any notice before the election results
are certified and it is too late to count their votes. *See* § 3019.

The State's automatic invalidation of mismatch-signature ballots contrasts with its treatment of ballots that lack a signature altogether; these voters have until eight days after the election to cure that violation. \$\$ 3019(f), 4006; *see* \$ IV(D)(IV.D.2), below. Data from 4 California counties show that 62% of voters given a chance to cure a signature on a vote-by-mail ballot in the 2016 general election cured the problem. (Declaration of Kim Alexander ("Alexander Decl.") ¶ 21.) Voters who vote in person, meanwhile, are not subject to any sort of signature

27

<sup>2</sup> Statutory references are to the California Elections Code unless otherwise specified.

1

comparison. §§ 14216, 14278.

Plaintiff La Follette properly cast a vote-by-mail ballot—and properly signed the ballot envelope—in Sonoma County in the 2016 general election, but elections officials rejected his ballot for purported signature mismatch without giving him any notice or opportunity to cure. (Declaration of Peter La Follette ("La Follette Decl.") ¶¶ 4-7 & Exs. A, C.) He only learned of this rejection long after the election results were certified, when he looked up the status of his ballot online. (*Id.* ¶ 5.) Had he been given a chance to show that he had properly cast his ballot so that his vote would have been counted, he would have done so. (*Id.* ¶ 8.)

9 Plaintiff American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California ("ACLU-NC") is a nonpartisan organization dedicated to the principles of liberty and equality embodied in both the 10 11 United States and California Constitutions, with nearly 137,000 members who live in Northern California. (Declaration of Beverly Tucker ("Tucker Decl.") ¶ 6.) Ms. Tucker has been an ACLU-12 13 NC member since 1988 and was the chair of the board from 2015 through 2016. (Id.  $\P$  2.) She 14 resides and owns real property in California and has paid taxes on that property, as well as other 15 state and local taxes, for several years. (Id. ¶¶ 3-5.) Undoubtedly, at least some of the nearly 137,000 other ACLU-NC members also pay California state and local taxes, including income and 16 17 property taxes, and are among the more-than half of California voters who cast their ballots by mail 18 and are therefore directly subject to the disenfranchising provisions of § 3019. (See RJN, Ex. C at 19 28.) The ACLU-NC thus has taxpayer, citizen, and direct standing to bring this action. See 20 Taxpayers for Accountable Sch. Bond Spending v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 215 Cal. App. 4th 1013, 1031-33 (2013), and cases cited. 21

Defendant Secretary of State Padilla is the State's chief elections official with the authority to see that the elections laws are properly enforced. Cal. Gov. Code § 12172.5(a) (Secretary's duties and authority to see that elections laws are enforced); *see* Cal. Elec. Code § 3026 (Secretary "shall promulgate regulations establishing guidelines for county elections officials relating to the processing of vote by mail ballots"); (*see also* RJN, Exs. A-B (Advisories to County Elections Officials ("CCROVs") and California Uniform Vote Counting Standards published by the Secretary of State)). He is the proper defendant in a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of a 8.

provision of the Election Code. Young, 7 Cal. 3d at 21 n.5. An order against him will bind local elections officials. Common Cause S. Christian Leadership Conference of Greater L.A. v. Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2001); see Ross v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 899, 905-09 (1977). Defendant Registrar Rousseau is responsible for conducting all elections in Sonoma 5 County and is also a proper defendant. See Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565, 570 (1971).

Experts estimate that between 33,000 and 45,000 ballots were rejected in the 2016 general 6 election alone for alleged mismatched signatures.<sup>3</sup> In about one third of California counties, this is 7 8 the most common cause of ballot rejection. (Declaration of Mindy Romero ("Romero Decl.") ¶ 9 23.) There is no evidence to suggest that a significant number of rejected vote-by-mail ballots result from attempted voter fraud. (Mitchell Decl. ¶ 14.) Rather, ballots generally are rejected 10 11 because an official subjectively determines that a voter's envelope signature did not compare to a signature on file for the same voter. (RJN, Ex. G at 59 & Ex. H at 62; Romero Decl. ¶¶ 30-31; 12 13 Alexander Decl. ¶ 12-13.) Many circumstances can cause a voter's signature to appear different. For example, physical disabilities, injuries, primary languages that do not use Roman characters, 14 15 or simply the passage of time are some of the many reasons signatures may change. (Declaration of Linton A. Mohammed ("Mohammed Decl.") ¶¶ 21, 30-31; Alexander Decl. ¶ 13.) Californians 16 17 may also sign on a touchpad when registering to vote, resulting in a signature on file that looks 18 different from one they put on the ballot envelope by hand. (RJN Ex. G at 59; Mohammed Decl. ¶ 19 39; Alexander Decl. ¶ 12.)

20 For these and other reasons, people with no handwriting-identification training are likely to erroneously conclude that two signatures from the same voter do not match. Indeed, one study in 21 22 which untrained participants compared sets of signatures found that laypersons incorrectly 23 determined that at least one signature made by the same person did not match in 26.1% of the cases.

24

1

2

3

<sup>25</sup> <sup>3</sup> A leading voter-file company found that 0.54% of vote-by-mail ballots were rejected for signature mismatch in 29 counties in the November 2016 election (Declaration of Paul Mitchell ("Mitchell 26 Decl.") ¶ 13), while Asian Americans Advancing Justice found that 0.39% of ballots were rejected for signature mismatch in 4 counties in the same election (Declaration of Michael T. Risher 27 ("Risher Decl."), Ex. A at 4, 6 (showing that 0.89% of all vote-by-mail ballots were rejected, and 44% of these were rejected for signature mismatch)). The exact number of rejected ballots, 28 undisputedly in the tens of thousands, is irrelevant to Plaintiffs' facial challenge.

(Mohammed Decl. ¶ 33.) And laypersons are much more likely to wrongly believe that a genuine signature does not match than to believe that a forged signature is genuine. (*Id.* ¶¶ 20, 34.)

3 Rejection rates also differ widely based on the county and demographics of the voter. Data 4 from 29 California counties show that in the 2016 general election the percentage of vote-by-mail 5 ballots rejected for signature mismatch ranged from a low of 0.15% in Mariposa County to a high 6 of 1.67% in Yuba County, with an average rate of 0.54%. (Mitchell Decl., Ex. A.) Latino and 7 Asian-American voters' ballots were rejected for signature mismatch at rates higher than for other 8 voters: 0.88% for Latino voters and 0.61% for Asian-American voters, versus the 0.45% for non-9 Latino, non-Asian votes statewide. (Id.; see also Romero Decl. ¶ 26-29, 32-38 (discussing other disparities); Alexander Decl. ¶¶ 8-10 (discussing disparities between counties); Risher Decl., Ex. 10 11 A (Issue Brief: Asian American Face Higher than Average Vote-by-Mail Rejection Rates in 12 California (Asian American Advancing Justice 2017)). These percentages can be greater than the 13 margin of victory in close races. (E.g., RJN, Ex. E at 37 (showing that Rep. Darrell Issa won U.S. Representative District 49 by 0.6%); Risher Decl., Ex. B (*Editorial: Bay Area races where one vote* 14 15 made a difference, San Jose Mercury News, Dec. 31, 2017) (describing several elections in which "one or just a few votes made the difference").) 16

17 Overall, California has the third highest mail-ballot rejection rate in the United States. 18 (Romero Decl. ¶ 20.) This is significant given that over half of California voters already vote by mail. (RJN, Ex. C at 28 (51.16% to 69.40% of California voters voted by mail in the 2012 to 2016 19 20 elections).) The net result is that tens of thousands of vote-by-mail ballots are discarded every election cycle, as noted above. And the percentage of vote-by-mail voters—and the number of 21 rejected vote-by-mail ballots-will likely increase in the coming elections, in part because many 22 23 Californians will be required to vote by mail under the 2016 Voter's Choice Act. §§ 4005(a), 4007; (see RJN, Ex. F; Romero Decl. ¶¶ 46-50.) 24

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A writ of mandate is the proper remedy to "challeng[e] the constitutionality or validity of statutes or official acts." *Jolicoeur*, 5 Cal. 3d at 570 n.2; *see, e.g., Young v. Gnoss*, 7 Cal. 3d 18,

COOLEY LLP Attorneys At Law Los Angeles

25

26

27

28

1

20-21 & nn. 1-2 (1972) (constitutionality of California elections statute); *League of Women Voters* of *Cal. v. McPherson*, 145 Cal. App. 4th 1469, 1475 (2006) (constitutionality of Secretary of State's
 interpretation of a California elections provision).

- IV. DISCUSSION
- 5 6

7

8

4

#### A. Rejecting Ballots Without Notice And Opportunity To Cure Violates Voters' Due Process Rights.

Section 3019(c)(2)'s failure to provide notice and an opportunity to cure deprives California voters whose signatures are deemed not to "compare" of due process under both the federal and state Constitutions. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST., art. 1, § 7.

9 10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

### 1. Federal Due Process.

The "right to vote is one of the fundamental personal rights included within the concept of liberty as protected by the due process clause." *United States v. State of Tex.*, 252 F. Supp. 234, 250 (W.D. Tex. 1966), *aff'd sub nom. Texas v. United States*, 384 U.S. 155 (1966); *Peterson v. City of San Diego*, 34 Cal. 3d 225, 229 (1983) ("The right to vote is, of course, fundamental."). And the right to vote includes the right to have one's vote counted. *Gray v. Sanders*, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963); *Detzner*, 2016 WL 6090943, at \*1.

Although a state need not create vote-by-mail procedures, once it does so it must administer them in a way that affords voters due process. *Zessar*, 2006 WL 642646, at \*6; *Raetzel*, 762 F. Supp. at 1358 ("the state ... cannot disqualify [absentee] ballots, and thus disenfranchise voters, without affording the individual appropriate due process"). By creating vote-by-mail procedures, "the state has enabled a qualified individual to exercise her fundamental right to vote" through those procedures, and cannot "alter the rights of those electors who participate." *Zessar*, 2006 WL 642646, at \*6; *see also Action NC v. Strach*, 216 F. Supp. 3d 597, 648 (M.D.N.C. 2016) ("Voter enfranchisement cannot be sacrificed when a citizen provides the state the necessary information to register to vote but the state turns its own procedures into a vehicle to burden that right.").

Due process requires that before depriving a person of a protected interest, such as the right

to vote, the government must provide notice and opportunity to contest the deprivation. Mullane

v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). These two essentials are

"elementary and fundamental"—the absolute minimum that due process requires. *Id.* at 314-15; *see Today's Fresh Start, Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Office of Educ.*, 57 Cal. 4th 197, 212 (2013).

3 Courts have therefore held that due process prohibits elections officials from rejecting vote-4 by-mail ballots without providing timely notice and opportunity to cure. For example, in Zessar, a 5 voter challenged Illinois laws that permitted state elections officials to reject mail-in ballots if the 6 signature on the ballot application did not match the signature on other records. 2006 WL 642646, 7 at \*2. Although the law required notice to be sent to voters whose ballots were rejected, it did not 8 require that this happen before the vote was rejected or provide a way for voters to challenge the 9 rejection. Id. at \*2-3. The court held that the scheme violated federal due process by failing to 10 provide absentee voters with an opportunity "to remedy the loss of [their] vote in that election." Id. at \*6-7, \*10. 11

Likewise, in *Raetzel*, absentee voters challenged Arizona's procedures for processing absentee ballots because they permitted elections officials to reject absentee ballots in response to ballot challenges without providing notice to the voters. 762 F. Supp. at 1357. The court held that Arizona's procedures denied absentee voters due process because they failed to provide "notice ... so that any defect ... can be cured and the individual is not continually and repeatedly denied so fundamental a right."<sup>4</sup> *Id*. at 1358.

California law suffers from the same constitutional defects. Section 3019(c)(2) deprives California voters of due process by requiring or even allowing officials to reject vote-by-mail ballots without providing notice or opportunity to cure. California was not obligated to create a vote-by-mail scheme; but because it did, it may not disenfranchise those who avail themselves of the scheme without due process. As *Raetzel* warned, without proper notice, California voters may never be apprised of the deprivation, which may repeat *ad infinitum*.

24

25

26

27

1

2

### 2. California Due Process.

"[P]rocedural due process under the California Constitution is much more inclusive and

12.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> In *Raetzel*, the ballot rejections were in response to ballot challenges *after* the votes were counted, when it was too late to allow voters to cure for the same election. 762 F. Supp. at 1357-58.

protects a broader range of interests than under the federal Constitution." *Gresher v. Anderson*,
127 Cal. App. 4th 88, 104-05 (2005) (quotations omitted); *see People v. Ramirez*, 25 Cal. 3d 260,
266-70 (1979). This broader approach means that Californians are entitled to due process whenever
the government moves to deprive them of a fundamental right *or* a right, interest, or benefit
protected by a statutory or constitutional provision. *See Ramirez*, 25 Cal. 3d at 264, 267-68; *see also Gresher*, 127 Cal. App. 4th at 105 ("when an individual is subjected to deprivatory
governmental action, he always has a due process liberty interest" under the state Constitution).

8 Here, the rights to vote and to have that vote counted are both fundamental (as discussed 9 above) and protected by specific statutory and constitutional provisions. The right to vote and the 10 right to have a properly cast vote counted are expressly protected by the California Constitution. 11 See CAL. CONST., art. 2, §§ 2, 2.5. And the Elections Code specifically gives all eligible voters the 12 right to cast their ballots by mail: "The vote by mail ballot shall be available to any registered 13 voter." § 3003; see, e.g., §§ 3006(b)(3), 3010, 3017, 3200, 3203, 3206. Indeed, some voters have 14 no other option. See §§ 3005, 4000-4002, 4005(a), 4007 (mandatory vote-by-mail). California due 15 process therefore protects the right to vote by mail and the right to have that vote counted.

The irreducible minimum of due process under the state Constitution, as under the federal charter, is pre-deprivation notice and an opportunity to cure. *Today's Fresh Start*, 57 Cal. 4th at 212; *In re Large*, 41 Cal. 4th 538, 551-52 (2007); *Gresher*, 127 Cal. App. 4th at 106. Section 3019(c)(2) is therefore unconstitutional under the California due process clause, because it deprives voters of their right to have their votes counted, without providing them with notice or an opportunity to show their ballots were properly cast.

22 23

24

25

26

27

28

# B. Rejecting Ballots Without Notice And Opportunity To Cure Violates Equal Protection.

Because the right to vote is a fundamental right, strict scrutiny applies to laws that impose a severe burden on it. *Gould v. Grubb*, 14 Cal. 3d 661, 669-70 (1975); *see, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi*, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992); *Dunn v. Blumstein*, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); *Field v. Bowen*, 199 Cal. App. 4th 346, 356 (2011); *Collier v. Menzel*, 176 Cal. App. 3d 24, 32 (1985). Here, Section 3019(c)(2) imposes a severe burden on voting: it completely disenfranchises tens of thousands of

Californians in a single election without providing notice or an opportunity to cure, based on elections officials' subjective determinations that voters' signatures do not match (even though nothing in the law requires voters to sign their name in any specific way). As one federal court stated in overturning a nearly identical statute: "If disenfranchising thousands of eligible voters does not amount to a severe burden on the right to vote, then this Court is at a loss as to what does." *Detzner*, 2016 WL 6090943, at \*6 (Florida's statute, although subject to strict scrutiny, failed even rational basis review). Strict scrutiny therefore applies.

8 Under strict scrutiny, § 3019(c)(2)'s restriction on the right to vote is unconstitutional unless 9 the government can show it is "necessary to achieve a compelling state interest." *Gould*, 14 Cal. 10 3d at 672; *see Dunn*, 405 U.S. at 336-37, 360 (state law prohibiting new residents from voting was 11 not "necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest"). As discussed below, 12 disenfranchising signature-mismatch voters without notice or opportunity to cure is not narrowly 13 tailored to any legitimate government interest.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

# 1. The Government Cannot Treat Ballots With Supposedly Mismatched Signatures Worse Than It Treats Unsigned Ballots.

Section 3019(c)(2) violates federal and state equal protection guarantees because it disenfranchises voters who have properly signed their ballots—but whose signatures officials deem not to match—while providing voters who have failed to sign their ballots an opportunity to cure that problem. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST., art. 1, § 7. As discussed above, while § 3019 requires vote-by-mail ballots with signatures deemed not to match to be flatly rejected, vote-by-mail ballots that lack a signature altogether are not automatically rejected, but may be cured until eight days after the election. §§ 3019(f), 4006; *see* § IV(D)(2), below. This differential treatment violates federal and state equal protection.

First, it is "illogical, irrational, and patently bizarre" for the government to "withhold the opportunity to cure from mismatched-signature voters while providing that same opportunity to no-signature voters" and thus "categorically disenfranchise[] thousands of voters arguably for no reason other than they have poor handwriting or their handwriting has changed over time." *Detzner*, 2016 WL 6090943 at \*7; (*see* Mohammed Decl. ¶¶ 19-41 (discussing reasons that officials

COOLEY LLP Attorneys At Law Los Angeles 14.

may erroneously determine that signatures do not match); RJN, Ex. G at 59 & Ex. H at 62
(discussing the same in legislative reports on AB 1135, a 2013 bill amending the signature
verification process for vote-by-mail ballots)). Indeed, rejecting a ballot because of errors not
attributable to the voter constitutes an equal-protection violation. *See Ne. Ohio Coal. for Homeless v. Husted*, 696 F.3d 580, 593-94 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting ballot due to poll worker error likely an
equal protection violation).

7 Second, disqualifying signature-mismatch ballots without an opportunity to cure is not necessary to prevent voter fraud. To the contrary, doing so "has no rational relationship (let alone 8 9 narrow tailoring) to" preventing fraud. Detzner, 2016 WL 6090943, at \*7; see also Dunn, 405 U.S. 10 at 349-51 (durational residency statute that reflected an "administratively useful presumption" of 11 fraud created a crude classification that improperly excluded eligible voters). There is no reason to 12 believe that mismatched ballots are even the result of attempted voter fraud. (Mitchell Decl. ¶ 14; 13 RJN, Ex. G at 59; Ex. H at 62); see Detzner, 2016 WL 6090943, at \*7. But even if there were, that 14 would not matter because Plaintiffs do not argue that elections officials should just accept 15 mismatched ballots, but that voters must have an opportunity to show the ballot-envelope signatures are theirs. See Detzner, 2016 WL 6090943, at \*7 (discarding ballots without opportunity to cure 16 17 would be unconstitutional even if, contrary to the evidence, "voter fraud ran rampant").

18 There is a simple less-restrictive alternative—which the state already employs in another 19 context—to advance any purported interest in preventing fraud: allowing mismatched-signature 20 voters an opportunity to show their ballots are proper before their votes are denied, as is already 21 done with no-signature ballots. This in itself shows that the current system of simply rejecting the ballots is unnecessary and fails strict scrutiny. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 347-53 (residency 22 23 requirements were not necessary to prevent voter fraud when less restrictive means were adequate, 24 as evidenced by the three-month in-county residency requirement versus the one-year in-state 25 residency requirement); Charfauros v. Bd. of Elections, 249 F.3d 941, 945, 950-53 (9th Cir. 2001) 26 (hearing one party's voter-qualification challenges pre-election and another party's challenges 27 post-election violated federal equal protection because separate treatment was not necessary to

COOLEY LLP Attorneys At Law Los Angeles

ensure voters were qualified); *Woods v. Horton*, 167 Cal. App. 4th 658, 675 (2008) (availability of alternatives to challenged distinction is "fatal" under strict scrutiny).

3 Finally, that providing mismatch-signature voters with notice and an opportunity to cure 4 may impose some costs on local elections officials does not matter under strict scrutiny: "avoidance 5 or recoupment of administrative costs ... cannot justify imposition of an otherwise improper 6 classification" affecting voting rights. Castro v. State of Cal., 2 Cal. 3d 223, 242 (1970) (state 7 provision conditioning right to vote upon ability to read English violated federal equal protection); 8 see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535 (1975) ("administrative convenience" cannot justify 9 deprivation of a constitutional right); Woods, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 675; Detzner, 2016 WL 6090943, 10 at \*7. Other states are able to provide notice and an opportunity to cure. See Pet. ¶¶ 53-58; (RJN, 11 Exs. I-N (Washington, Oregon, Montana, Massachusetts, and Arizona laws providing notice and 12 an opportunity to cure mismatch for mailed-in ballots)). California should be able to do the same. Section 3019 therefore violates equal protection. Detzner, 2016 WL 6090943, at \*6 n.10 & \*7 13 (invalidating parallel provision). 14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

28

1

2

# 2. The Government Cannot Selectively Disenfranchise Voters Whose Signatures It Does Not Recognize.

Section 3019(c)(2) violates equal protection for another, more basic reason: it causes elections officials to accept ballots when they subjectively believe the identification-envelope signatures match those on file, but to reject ballots (without an opportunity to show they are proper) when the officials subjectively believe the envelope signatures do not match those on file. The two groups are virtually identical: both have cast vote-by-mail ballots and have personally signed their envelopes. The only difference is that for one group, elections officials possess and consult a signature on file that they believe resembles the one on the envelope; for the other, the officials either do not have or do not consult a signature on file that they believe matches. § 3019; (*see* Mohammed Decl. ¶¶ 21, 30-31 (describing reasons officials may make erroneous determinations).)

26 27

COOLEY LLP Attorneys At Law Los Angeles disenfranchisement of mismatched-signature voters is neither necessary nor narrowly tailored.

This subjective distinction by elections officials fails strict scrutiny, because the

*Supra* at § I.A. Rather than simply discarding the ballots, the government can provide notice and an opportunity to cure, as discussed above.

С.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

### Rejecting Ballots Without Notice And Opportunity To Cure Violates Voters' Rights Under Article II, Section 2.5 Of The California Constitution.

California voters have a constitutional right to have their votes counted: "A voter who casts a vote in an election in accordance with the laws of this State *shall have that vote counted*." CAL. CONST., art. II, § 2.5 (emphasis added). Section 2.5 was adopted by California voters in 2002 via Proposition 43, and is unambiguous on its face. Every vote lawfully cast in California must count. Because the Constitution's language is "clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning governs." *Silicon Valley Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cty. Open Space Auth.*, 44 Cal. 4th 431, 444 (2008). But even if there were some ambiguity, the ballot materials confirm this meaning. *See People v. Arroyo*, 62 Cal. 4th 589, 593 (2016) ("the analyses and arguments contained in the official ballot pamphlet" are particular indicia of the voters' intent). Both the Legislative Analyst and proponents of Proposition 43 emphasized that the new provision would ensure that "*every legally cast vote is counted*." (RJN, Ex. D at 31-34.) The proponents further stated that Proposition 43 would mean that "you have a constitutional right to have your vote counted" because "[e]lections shouldn't be decided by courts or government officials" but "by the citizens who vote." (*Id.* at 33.)

California law requires vote-by-mail voters to sign their ballot envelope in their own handwriting, but does not require them to sign in any particular way, much less to ensure the signature matches those on record. § 3011(2), (7). Voters who sign their envelopes and otherwise comply with the legal requirements for submitting ballots thus have a constitutional right to have their votes counted, regardless of whether elections officials believe that the signatures do not match those on file or whether they appear similar. But tens of thousands of Californians' votes did not count in November 2016 alone because elections officials discarded these lawful votes under § 3019(c)(2) without providing notice or an opportunity to cure, based on a belief that the signatures did not match. This is exactly what Section 2.5 prohibits. The government must provide notice and an opportunity to show the ballots are proper before rejecting a vote.

D.

1

2

3

4

## Voters Must Be Given Individualized Notice And An Opportunity To Cure.

Although the Secretary of State and local elections officials have discretion as to how to remedy these constitutional violations, the Court should order that they comply with the following minimal requirements for a constitutional system of providing notice and an opportunity to cure.

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

### 1. Due Process Requires Individualized Pre-Deprivation Notice.

Due process generally requires that the government provide individualized notice prior to an action that will adversely affect an individual's protected interests. *See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams*, 462 U.S. 791, 798-800 (1983); *Today's Fresh Start*, 57 Cal. 4th at 212 (state and federal due process). This means that when the affected person's "name and address are reasonably ascertainable" or actually known, due process requires the government to provide notice by mail or by personal service; publication or other "constructive notice" is not enough. *Id.* at 798-800. "Only when the address is unknown and cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence will a publication in lieu of mailing satisfy the constitutional requirements." *Johnson v. Alma Inv. Co.*, 47 Cal. App. 3d 155, 162 (1975). Although mail has traditionally referred to physical letters, notice by email is also sufficient. *See McCluskey v. Belford High Sch.*, No. 2:09-14345, 2010 WL 2696599, at \*3, \*5 (E.D. Mich. June 24, 2010).

- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20

21222324

25

26

27

28

use to mail ballots in the first place), and may have voters' email addresses and/or telephone numbers. *See, e.g.*, §§ 3006(a)(2), 3007.5(b)(2), 3011(a)(3). Elections officials must therefore notify voters whose ballots are rejected for signature mismatch by mail, email, or telephone.

Here, elections officials have records showing the voters' mailing addresses (which they

However given, notice must inform the voters of the problem that will affect their rights (i.e., the identification-envelope signature does not match one on file) and how the voters can cure the problem. *See Minor v. Mun. Court*, 219 Cal. App. 3d 1541, 1549-50 (1990); *Ramirez*, 25 Cal. 3d at 275. In addition, the notice "must afford a reasonable time for those interested" to contest the government action. *Mullane*, 339 U.S. at 314; *see Ramirez*, 25 Cal.3d at 276 (holding that three days' notice of right to appeal exclusion from a civil rehabilitation program was inadequate). Voters must therefore be notified in a way that provides them a reasonable amount of time to cure the signature mismatch, either in person or otherwise. *See Zessar*, 2006 WL 642646, at \*9.

2 3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

1

### 2. Equal Protection Requires That Voters Be Allowed To Cure Until Eight Days After The Election, As Is Allowed For No-Signature Ballots.

Finally, equal protection requires that signature-mismatch voters be given the same opportunity to cure afforded to voters who completely failed to sign their ballot envelopes. *See*, *e.g.*, *Detzner*, 2016 WL 6090943, at \*9 (ordering Florida to permit mismatched-signature ballots to be cured in "the same fashion as currently provided for non-signature ballots"). California law allows no-signature voters to cure their missing signatures by (1) signing the identification envelope at an elections office within eight days of the election, (2) signing under penalty of perjury and returning to an elections office a separate "unsigned ballot statement" form within eight days of the election, or (3) submitting at the polls an "unsigned ballot statement" on election day. *See* § 3019(f). Elections officials then compare the signatures on these new documents with those on file for the voter and, if they match, count the vote. *See* § 3019(f)(1)(b). Mismatch-signature voters should similarly be permitted to cure (1) in-person at the elections office within eight days of the election, (2) by mail or in-person at the elections office within eight days of the election, or (3) at the polls on election day—for example, by submitting an affidavit.

## V. CONCLUSION.

The right to vote and have that vote counted lies at "the heart of representative government." *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964); *see Dunn*, 405 U.S. at 336 (right to vote is "preservative of all rights"). For this reason, the California Supreme Court has long recognized that "before the constitutional right to vote may be taken away from a citizen, he must be given an opportunity to be heard in his own behalf." *Communist Party of U.S. of Am. v. Peek*, 20 Cal. 2d 536, 555 (1942).

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiffs therefore ask the Court to:

(i) hold that § 3019(c)(2) is facially unconstitutional, and that state and local elections officials cannot reject a ballot on the ground that signatures do not "compare" without providing timely notice and opportunity to cure within eight days after the election, or in any event before the results are certified;

1	(ii) issue a peremptory writ of mandate prohibiting Defendants, and local elections officials as
2	agents of Defendant Secretary of State, from rejecting any vote-by-mail ballots on the
3	ground that signatures do not "compare" without providing this notice and opportunity to
4	cure within eight days after the election; and
5	(iii) direct the Secretary of State to inform elections officials of this ruling and that they are
6	bound by it; see CAL. GOV. CODE § 12172.5(a); McPherson, 145 Cal. App. 4th at 1475
7	(granting writ of mandate and directing the secretary to inform county clerks, superior court
8	clerks, and registrars as to the permissible administration of elections).
9	
10	Dated: January 19, 2018 COOLEY LLP
11	
12	By: /s/ William P. Donovan, Jr. William P. Donovan, Jr. (155881)
13	Rebecca L. Tarneja (293461) 1333 2nd Street, Suite 400
14	Santa Monica, CA 90401 Telephone: (310) 883-6400
15	Facsimile: (310) 883-6500
16	Deted. January 10, 2019
17	Dated: January 19, 2018AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
18	
19	By: /s/ Michael T. Risher Michael T. Risher (191627)
20	Raul L. Macias (293208) 39 Drumm Street, 2nd Floor
21	San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 621-2493
22	Facsimile: (415) 255-8437
23	American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
24	Julie A. Ebenstein <sup>+</sup> 125 Broad Street, 17th Floor
25	New York, New York 98164 Telephone: (212) 549-2500
26	Facsimile: (212) 549-2651
27	Attorneys for Plaintiffs <sup>+</sup> To Be Admitted Pro Hac Vice
28	
COOLEY LLP	20.