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16	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
17	SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION		
18	AUDLEY BARRINGTON LYON,	)	
19	JR., et al.,	) No. 3:13-cv-05878-EMC	
20	Plaintiffs,	DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO FIRST	
21	170	SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT	
22	VS.	<i>)</i> )	
23	U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, et al.,	)	
24	, ,	) )	
25	Defendants.	)	
26		,	
27			
28	DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL		
	No. 3:13-cv-05878-EMC		

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Defendants U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"); Sarah Saldaña, Director, ICE<sup>1</sup>; U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"); Jeh Johnson ("Johnson"), Secretary of DHS; and Timothy Aitken ("Aitken"), Field Office Director for the ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations ("ERO") Field Office in San Francisco (collectively, "Defendants"), without waiving affirmative defenses, hereby assert their ANSWER to the First Supplemental Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief filed by Plaintiffs Audley Barrington Lyon, Jr. ("Lyon"); José Elizandro Astorga-Cervantes ("Astorga-Cervantes"); and Nancy Neria-Garcia ("Neria-Garcia") on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (collectively, "Plaintiffs"). See ECF No. 99 (hereinafter, "Complaint").

#### INTRODUCTION<sup>2</sup>

Defendants state as follows in response to each of the numbered paragraphs

1. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. The first sentence of Paragraph 1 is a summary of the relief Plaintiffs seek on behalf of the class, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required to the first sentence of Paragraph 1, Defendants admit only that Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and declaratory relief on behalf of a class, and that the Court certified a class in this litigation on April 16, 2014 (ECF No. 31), and modified the class definition

in Plaintiffs' Complaint:

Sarah Saldaña, Director of ICE, is substituted for former Acting Director Sandweg under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Defendants repeat the headings from the Complaint for ease of reference only, and do not admit (and specifically deny) any allegations contained therein.

by written order on July 27, 2015 (ECF No. 98). Defendants deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to such relief, and specifically deny any allegation of "ongoing violations of the constitutional and statutory rights of immigrants held in government custody pending deportation proceedings." With respect to the second and third sentences of Paragraph 1, these sentences contain Plaintiffs' theory of the case and legal conclusions, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit that aliens in removal proceedings have certain procedural and substantive rights afforded by the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes, but deny Plaintiffs' characterization of the law to the extent it is inconsistent with binding legal authority. Defendants further deny the remainder of the allegations in the second and third sentences of Paragraph 1, and specifically deny that "[t]hose rights (and others) are systematically denied by defendants."

- 2. DENIED. Paragraph 2 is a broad summary of Plaintiffs' allegations in this litigation, including Plaintiffs' reasoning for filing this litigation, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the allegations, and specifically deny that any DHS or ICE "policies or practices . . . deny and severely restrict [Plaintiffs'] ability to make telephone calls." Indeed, Plaintiffs' Complaint does not identify or otherwise challenge as insufficient or otherwise violative of Plaintiffs' rights any DHS or ICE policy governing ICE detainees who are held in government custody pending deportation proceedings.
- 3. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. With respect to the first sentence of Paragraph 3, Defendants admit that one of the three named Plaintiffs DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL.

Neria-Garcia – remains in ICE custody pending resolution of her removal proceedings. Defendants deny that Astorga-Cervantes remains in ICE custody pending resolution of his removal proceedings. Defendants also deny that Lyon remains in ICE custody pending resolution of his removal proceedings. Defendants admit that the Court certified a class of "all current and future immigration detainees who are or will be held by ICE in Contra Costa, Sacramento, and Yuba Counties," see ECF No. 31, and has modified that class to include detainees who are or will be held by ICE in Kern County (where the Mesa Verde Facility is located), see ECF No. 98. Defendants deny, however, that the class certified consists only of aliens detained by ICE "pending" their removal proceedings. With respect to the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 3, Defendants admit only that – with the exception of certain mentally incompetent aliens who are within the class certified in Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, Case No. 10-cv-02211-DMG (DTBx) – aliens in removal proceedings are not entitled to appointed counsel. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 3, and, therefore, deny them.

- 4. DENIED.
- 5. DENIED. Additionally, Defendants note that Plaintiffs' Complaint does not identify any DHS or ICE policy that allegedly denies or restricts telephone access.
- 6. DENIED. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny that aliens in removal proceedings are "forced to seek continuances" or the DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL.

numerous causes for continuances sought by Plaintiffs or other aliens in their removal proceedings, and, therefore, deny Plaintiffs' allegations regarding the causes of such continuances. Additionally, Plaintiffs' allegation regarding "some [aliens] who would accept a removal order much earlier in the process" appears to be pure speculation, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny this allegation. Defendants deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 6.

7. Paragraph 7 contains Plaintiffs' proposed class definition and request to certify a class action, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit that the Court certified a class of "all current and future immigration detainees who are or will be held by ICE in Contra Costa, Sacramento, and Yuba Counties," see ECF No. 31, and has modified that class to include detainees who are or will be held by ICE in Kern County (where the Mesa Verde Facility), see ECF No. 98. Defendants deny the remainder of Paragraph 7, and specifically deny any implication that Defendants have violated any law or constitutional provision or that Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek in this action.

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#### **JURISDICTION**

8. The allegations in Paragraph 8 contain legal conclusions as to jurisdiction, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny any allegation of independent jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950).

#### **VENUE**

9. The allegations contained in Paragraph 9 contain legal conclusions as to venue, which do not require a response.

#### INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT

10. The allegations in Paragraph 10 contain legal conclusions as to Local Rule 3-2(d) regarding assignment to the San Francisco Division of this Court, to which no response is required.

#### **PARTIES**

11. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit the allegations contained in the first sentence of Paragraph 11. With respect to the second sentence of Paragraph 11, Defendants admit that Lyon was granted a bond on April 17, 2015; he was released on bond on April 23, 2015; and his removal proceedings are still pending in the San Francisco Immigration Court. With respect to the third sentence of Paragraph 11, Defendants cannot admit or deny whether Lyon is seeking a U-Visa as disclosure of such information is barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2) and 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(e). Defendants also cannot admit or deny whether DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL.

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Lyon is seeking protection relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) as disclosure of such information is barred by 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6, 1208.6. Defendants deny the remainder of the allegations contained in Paragraph 11.

- 12. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit the allegations in the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth sentences of Paragraph 12, except that Defendants deny that Astorga-Cervantes was re-arrested on June 12, 2014; Astorga-Cervantes was re-arrested on June 11, 2014. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations in the sixth sentence of Paragraph 12 and, therefore, deny them. Defendants deny the allegations contained in the seventh sentence of Paragraph 12.
- 13. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit the allegations in the first sentence of Paragraph 13. With respect to the second sentence of Paragraph 13, Defendants admit that Neria-Garcia was initially detained at the Yuba County Jail ("Yuba Facility"), was subsequently transferred to the newly-opened Mesa Verde Facility on March 26, 2015, and was then transferred to the West County Detention Facility ("Contra Costa Facility") on June 3, 2015. With respect to the third sentence of Paragraph 13, Defendants admit that Neria-Garcia was in removal proceedings in the San Francisco Immigration Court, but Defendants cannot admit or deny that Neria-Garcia applied for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture as release of such information is barred by 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6, 1208.6. Defendants admit the allegations contained in the fourth sentence of Paragraph 13. With respect to the DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL.

fifth sentence of Paragraph 13, Defendants admit only that the Board of Immigration Appeals remanded her case to the San Francisco Immigration Court, and deny any characterizations of that decision inconsistent with its text.

Defendants admit that Neria-Garcia sought a bond hearing in Immigration Court, but lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations in the sixth sentence of Paragraph 13 and, therefore, deny those allegations.

Defendants deny the remainder of the allegations contained in Paragraph 13.

14. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit that ICE is a federal law enforcement agency within DHS. Defendants admit that ICE is responsible for the criminal and civil enforcement of U.S. immigration laws; Defendants deny any implication that ICE is the sole government agency responsible for the criminal and civil enforcement of U.S. immigration laws. Defendants admit that ICE is responsible for detaining certain aliens in removal proceedings or subject to final orders of removal. Defendants deny any implication in Paragraph 14 that ICE is responsible for the detention of all aliens, including all aliens in removal proceedings. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny Plaintiffs' allegation that ICE is responsible for the "incarceration" of aliens, which Plaintiffs appear to distinguish from detention; Defendants therefore deny this allegation. Defendants admit that ICE is responsible for the removal of certain aliens subject to final removal orders, but deny any implication that ICE is responsible for the removal of all aliens. Defendants admit that Enforcement and Removal Operations ("ERO"), a division of ICE, manages and oversees ICE's DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL.

detention system. Defendants admit that ICE promulgates detention standards to

be followed in the facilities that detain aliens subject to pre- and post-final removal

orders. Defendants further admit that ICE contracts with other government

entities and private corporations to detain those aliens subject to immigration

ICE has with detention facilities that house ICE detainees.

detention, but denies any implication that these are the only types of relationships

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15. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit that ICE pays a fixed rate per night to house detainees in accordance with applicable ICE detention standards. Defendants deny that the detention of all ICE detainees at the four detention facilities at issue in this litigation – the Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center ("RCCC"), the Contra Costa Facility, the Yuba Facility, and the Mesa Verde Facility – are governed by the same ICE Detention Standards. Defendants deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 15, and specifically deny: (i) that ICE is responsible for the incarceration of aliens, which Plaintiffs appear to distinguish from civil detention; and (ii) that ICE directly contracts with Contra Costa County for the detention of aliens at the Contra Costa Facility.

DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants deny any

implication in Paragraph 16 that the 2011 Performance-Based National Detention

Defendants admit that the 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards

Standards are applicable to all of the facilities at issue in this litigation.

are the most recent detention standards promulgated by ICE.

- 17. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit the allegations in the first sentence of Paragraph 17. With respect to the second sentence, Defendants admit only that Director Saldaña has general oversight responsibilities for ICE and its components, but otherwise deny the allegations. Defendants note that Plaintiffs have failed to identify any ICE policy for which the Director of ICE is responsible that allegedly contributes or contributed to the harm alleged by Plaintiffs.
- 18. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants deny any implication in Paragraph 18 that DHS is the only arm of the federal government responsible for the enforcement and administration of the immigration laws. Defendants admit that DHS is one arm of the federal government responsible for the enforcement and administration of the immigration laws. Defendants admit that ICE, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") are component agencies of DHS. Defendants deny any implication in Paragraph 18 that ICE, USCIS, and CBP are the only component agencies of DHS. Defendants further note that USCIS and CBP are not parties in this action, and therefore deny Plaintiffs characterization of these agencies' responsibilities within the U.S. immigration system as irrelevant to this litigation.
- 19. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit the allegations in the first sentence of Paragraph 19. With respect to the second sentence, Defendants admit only that Secretary Johnson has general oversight

responsibilities for DHS and its components, including ICE, but otherwise deny the allegations.

- 20. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants deny that Aitken is the Field Office Director for the San Francisco Field Office; Aitken is the Field Office Director for the ICE ERO Field Office in San Francisco. Defendants also deny any implication in Paragraph 20 that the San Francisco ERO Field Office promulgates its own detention standards. Defendants admit the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 20.
- 21. Paragraph 21 contains Plaintiffs' assertion that the named Federal officials are sued in their official capacities only, to which no response is required.

#### ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

#### Background on Removal Proceedings

22. Paragraph 22 contains Plaintiffs' characterization of removal proceedings before the U.S. Immigration Courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), including the way in which removal proceedings are initiated, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny that all removal proceedings proceed in the manner described by Plaintiffs. Defendants admit that the Immigration Courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals are part of the Executive Office for Immigration Review within the U.S. Department of Justice. Defendants further note that the named Plaintiffs do not challenge the decision to place them into removal proceedings or place them in immigration detention pending their removal proceedings.

- DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. To the extent that 23. Paragraph 23 is a recitation of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, Immigration Judge Benchbook, that document speaks for itself and no response is required. Furthermore, Defendants deny that all removal proceedings take place in the manner described. With respect to the first sentence of Paragraph 23, Defendants admit that in removal proceedings before the Immigration Court, an initial appearance occurs at a master calendar hearing, but Defendants deny any implication in Paragraph 23 that a master calendar hearing is only held for purposes of entering an initial appearance. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 23 include Plaintiffs' characterization of removal proceedings and how such proceedings typically proceed, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny that all removal proceedings in Immigration Court proceed as summarized by Plaintiffs; each removal proceeding requires an individual and independent review of all charges as to removability or inadmissibility and any defenses to those charges or requests for relief or protection from removal put forth by the alien. Defendants deny that removal proceedings can be summarized *in toto* as Plaintiffs attempt to do in Paragraph 23.
- 24. Paragraph 24 contains Plaintiffs' hypothetical characterization of the ways in which an alien may contest any charges of removability or inadmissibility in his or her removal proceedings, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit that certain respondents in Immigration Court may be able to challenge the charges of inadmissibility or removability, and DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL.

that, if not one charge of removability or inadmissibility is ultimately sustained, removal proceedings will be terminated.

- 25. DENIED. Paragraph 25 contains Plaintiffs' characterization of relief or protection from removal that aliens may seek under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 & 1229b, each of which speaks for itself and to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny Plaintiffs' characterization of the types of "relief" or "protection" from removal, including any implication in Paragraph 25 that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) or 8 C.F.R. § 208.16-208.18 provides any relief from the issuance of a removal order, and specifically deny any suggestion that all forms of relief or protection from removal require the presentation of affidavits, testimony, and documents.
- 26. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants deny any implication in Paragraph 26 that all "forms of statutory relief from removal" not previously mentioned in Plaintiffs' Complaint "are granted by CIS." Defendants admit that USCIS is the component of DHS that determines whether an alien in removal proceedings is eligible to receive a visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U), and that the grant of such a visa results in the termination of removal proceedings without the issuance of a removal order. Defendants further state that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its contents.
- 27. Paragraph 27 is Plaintiffs' characterization of custody redetermination hearings, which Plaintiffs concede are not available to all aliens held in ICE custody, to which no response is required.

- 28. DENIED. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations in Paragraph 28, and, therefore, deny them.
- 29. DENIED. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations in Paragraph 29, and, therefore, deny them.

#### Immigration Detention in Northern and Central California

- 30. DENIED. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations in Paragraph 30, and, therefore, deny them.
- 31. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants deny that ICE contracts with Contra Costa County; the U.S. Marshals Service contracts with Contra Costa County but recognizes ICE as an authorized user, allowing for the detention of ICE detainees in the Contra Costa Facility. Defendants admit that ICE has entered into Intergovernmental Service Agreements with Yuba and Sacramento Counties to house ICE detainees. Defendants deny the implication that the contracts limit the use of the facilities to house ICE detainees with cases venued in San Francisco.
- 32. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit only that ICE contracted with the City of McFarland, California to house ICE detainees in the Mesa Verde Facility on January 23, 2015, and otherwise deny the allegations in Paragraph 32. Defendants deny the implication that the contract limits the use of the facility to house ICE detainees with cases venued in San Francisco.
- 33. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit the following: the Contra Costa facility is approximately 21 miles driving distance from DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL.

San Francisco; RCCC is approximately 83 miles driving distance from San Francisco; the Yuba Facility is approximately 123 miles driving distance from San Francisco; and the Mesa Verde Facility is approximately 282 miles driving distance from San Francisco. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations on Paragraph 33, and, therefore, deny them.

- 34. DENIED. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations in Paragraph 34, and, therefore, deny them.
- 35. DENIED. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations in Paragraph 35, and, therefore, deny them; Defendants cannot determine how the term "transfer" and "detention facilities" are defined in this sentence.
- 36. DENIED. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations in Paragraph 36, and, therefore, deny them. Defendants especially lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegation in Paragraph 36 that "all of the immigration detainees" at RCCC and the Contra Costa, Yuba, and Mesa Verde facilities "have, have had, or may have proceedings in the San Francisco Immigration Court," and, therefore, deny that allegation. (Emphasis added).
- Defendants' Denial and Restrict of Telephone Access Results in a Dramatic Disparity of Outcomes.<sup>3</sup>
  - 37. DENIED.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Although this is a heading to which no response is required, Defendants deny the allegations contained in this heading.

38. DENIED. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations in Paragraph 38, and, therefore, deny them. Furthermore, Defendants deny any implication in Paragraph 38 that an alien's detention pending his or her removal proceedings is the sole determinative factor as to whether that alien is able to retain counsel. Defendants further deny any implication in Paragraph 38 that an alien's detention pending his or her removal proceedings is the sole determinative factor as to whether that alien can successfully challenge his or her charges of removability or successfully secure relief from removal.

#### Defendants' Denial and Restriction of Telephone Access.<sup>4</sup>

- 39. DENIED. Defendants deny the entirety of Plaintiffs' allegations in Paragraph 39. Defendants further note that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to identify any specific or particular ICE detention standard as allegedly "deficient."

  Defendants also specifically deny the implication that all three versions of ICE

  Detention Standards apply to each of the four facilities at issue.
- 40. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit that ICE's National Detention Standards provide that the facility shall permit an ICE detainee to make direct calls to (1) the local Immigration Court and the BIA; (2) to Federal and State courts where the detainee is or may become involved in a legal proceeding; (3) to consular officials; (4) to legal service providers; (5) to a government office, to obtain documents relevant to his or her immigration case; and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Although this is a heading to which no response is required, Defendants deny the allegations contained in this heading.

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(6) in a personal or family emergency, or when the ICE detainee can otherwise demonstrate a compelling need. Defendants further admit that the 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards provide that indigent detainees "are afforded the same telephone access and privileges as other detainees." Defendants deny the allegation in the first sentence that ICE's detention standards require a system that permits ICE detainees to leave voicemail messages. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 41, and, therefore, deny them. With respect to the allegations contained in Footnote 1 of the Complaint, Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny Plaintiffs' allegations that "the majority of immigration attorneys [and] all local, state and federal government offices outside of DHS" are not pre-programmed into the telephone system at any of the facilities at issue in this litigation, and therefore deny those allegations. Defendants further deny any implication in Footnote 1 that ICE has any obligation to provide its detainees with free telephone calls to "private parties."

41. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants deny any implication in Paragraph 41 that the methods for placing telephone calls described in Paragraph 41 are the only methods by which an immigration detainee could place a call at the Contra Costa Facility, the Yuba Facility, the Mesa Verde Facility, or RCCC. Defendants further deny that the Mesa Verde Facility uses "calling cards." Defendants admit the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 41.

- DENIED. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the 42. allegations in the first sentence of Paragraph 42, and, therefore, deny them. Defendants further deny that any of the named Plaintiffs claims to be a language minority or have a disability. Defendants deny the allegations contained in the second and third sentences of Paragraph 42.
- 43. ADMITTED in part and DENIED in part. With respect to the first, second, third, and fourth sentences of Paragraph 43, Defendants admit that the telephone systems generally available to detainees in the housing units at RCCC and the Yuba, Mesa Verde, and Contra Costa Facilities, with some exceptions, require a live person to answer and accept any call; this feature is deemed necessary to ensure that the caller or recipient is not charged for a call until the call connects to the recipient, as well as to prevent detainees, including criminal inmates not in ICE custody but housed at the same facilities, from calling any crime victims or leaving threatening messages. Defendants deny that calls made from the Pro Bono Platform on the housing unit phones require a live person to answer and accept any call, and deny any implication that the housing unit phones are the only telephones available to detainees at the four facilities. With respect to the fifth sentence of Paragraph 43, Defendants admit that three-way calls are not permitted from the telephone systems generally available to detainees in the housing units at RCCC, and the Yuba, Mesa Verde, and Contra Costa Facilities, but deny the allegations with respect to calls made from the Pro Bono Platform, and deny any implication that the housing unit phones are the only telephones available to DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL.

detainees at the four facilities. Defendants deny the allegations contained in the sixth and seventh sentences of Paragraph 43.

- 44. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit that the applicable ICE National Detention Standards require that ICE detainees have reasonable and equitable access to telephones during established facility waking hours, subject to certain restrictions. Defendants deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 44.
- 45. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants deny the allegations contained in the first sentence of Paragraph 45. With respect to the second sentence of Paragraph 45, Defendants admit that applicable ICE National Detention Standards require that ICE detainees are ensured a reasonable degree of privacy for telephone calls regarding legal matters. Defendants deny the remainder of the allegations in the second sentence of Paragraph 45. With respect to the allegations in the third sentence of Paragraph 45, Defendants deny the allegations, and specifically deny that the cost of telephone calls from the Yuba Facility, the Contra Costa Facility, and RCCC is "unreasonably" or "prohibitively" expensive. With respect to the fourth sentence of Paragraph 45, Defendants admit that the cost of an intrastate, long distance call from the Contra Costa facility is \$3.00 to connect the call plus \$0.25 per minute, but deny the allegation that the cost is "prohibitively expensive," and deny the implication that this is the only type of call available to indigent detainees. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations in the fifth sentence of Paragraph 45, and, therefore, deny them. With DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL. No. 3:13-cv-05878-EMC Page 18

respect to the sixth sentence of Paragraph 45, Defendants admit that the 2011 National Detention Standards cited by Plaintiffs in Paragraph 45 contain the quoted language. Defendants also admit that, at the time this lawsuit was filed, a call placed from the housing unit phones at the Yuba facility or RCCC would be cut off after fifteen minutes in order to ensure equitable access and prevent ICE detainees and criminal inmates housed at the facilities from monopolizing the phones, but deny any implication that housing unit phones were the only phones available to ICE detainees housed at these facilities.

46. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit that the housing unit telephones at the four facilities do not receive incoming telephone calls, but otherwise deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 46 of the Complaint. With respect to the allegations in footnote 2 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that RCCC permits incoming messages via an online system, but deny that this system can never be used for confidential communications. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny whether such messages to RCCC are reviewed or recorded, and therefore deny that allegation.

### Defendants' Modifications to Plaintiffs' Telephone Access in Response to Litigation

47. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit that, since the filing of this lawsuit, there have been some enhancements and changes to telephone access for ICE detainees housed at the Yuba Facility, the Contra Costa Facility, and RCCC, but deny Plaintiffs' characterization of those changes.

- 48. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit that calls from the housing unit telephones at RCCC no longer disconnect after 15 minutes, and that they now disconnect after 20 minutes. Defendants admit that detainees are required to pay a connection fee for paid calls from the housing unit telephones from RCCC and for paid, intrastate calls from the Yuba Facility. Defendants deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 48, and deny any implication that the housing unit telephones are the only telephones available to ICE detainees housed at these facilities.
- 49. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit that, after the lawsuit was filed, both the Yuba Facility and the Contra Costa Facility made additional options available for detainees to obtain free, unmonitored calls by setting up enclosed telephone rooms for use by ICE detainees, and that the Contra Costa Facility set up an email messaging system to contact ICE detainees housed at that facility. Defendants deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 49, and specifically deny any implication that ICE detainees at these two facilities were not able to obtain free, unmonitored legal calls, or that ICE detainees at the Contra Costa Facility were unable to receive messages prior to these changes.
- 50. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit that, in each housing unit that houses ICE detainees at the Contra Costa Facility, there is an enclosed room containing a telephone from which ICE detainees at the Contra Costa Facility may make telephone calls relating to their immigration proceedings. Defendants deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 50, and specifically DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL.

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deny any implication that this is the only method for a detainee housed at Contra Costa Facility to obtain free, unmonitored telephone calls.

- 51. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit that, at the Yuba County Jail, there is an enclosed room containing two telephones from which ICE detainees may make free, unmonitored telephone calls upon request. Defendants further admit that, due to high demand and to ensure equitable access for the making of legal calls, the Yuba County Jail may limit the use of this room, but deny that use of the room is in all circumstances limited to phone calls to attorneys or law offices. Defendants admit that, unless the detainee or his or her attorney requests a specific time for a scheduled telephone call, ICE detainees who have requested to use these telephones are given notice that a telephone is available at or near the time the telephone becomes available. Defendants admit that detainees may share the room with another detainee while making a telephone call, but deny that they are required to do so, and deny that the telephones "do not offer privacy." Defendants admit the allegations in the sixth sentence of Paragraph 51. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 51, and therefore deny them. Defendants also deny any implication that these are the only phones that have been available for detainees at the Yuba County Jail to make free, unmonitored legal calls.
- 52. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. With respect to the first sentence of Paragraph 52, Defendants admit that officers at the Yuba Facility and the Contra Costa Facility accept messages by telephone and email, respectively, to DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL.

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be delivered to ICE detainees, but deny that the facilities did not accept any messages for ICE detainees prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny the allegations in the second sentence of Paragraph 52, and therefore deny them.

- 53. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. With respect to the first sentence of Paragraph 53, Defendants admit that, in March 2015, ICE began housing ICE detainees who did not have immigration cases currently pending with the San Francisco Immigration Court at the newly-opened Mesa Verde Facility in Bakersfield, Kern County, California. Defendants admit that they have transferred detainees from RCCC, the Yuba Facility, and the Contra Costa Facility to the Mesa Verde Facility, but deny that these detainees were "Plaintiffs" in this action. Defendants admit the allegations in the second sentence of Paragraph 53.
- 54. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants deny the allegations contained in the first sentence of Paragraph 54. With respect to the second sentence of Paragraph 54, Defendants admit that the telephone system generally available to detainees in the housing units at the Mesa Verde Facility requires a live person to answer and accept the call; this feature is necessary to help ensure that detainees cannot contact individuals via telephone who do not want to speak with them or whom they are not permitted to contact, such as crime victims, victims of harassment, or those who possess valid orders of protection or no-contact orders against the detainee making the call. Defendants deny that calls made from the Pro Bono Platform on the housing unit phones require a live person to answer

and accept any call, and deny that detainees are unable to leave voicemail messages or penetrate voicemail trees when using the Pro Bono Platform.

- 55. DENIED.
- 56. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit that the housing unit telephones at the Mesa Verde Facility are located in open areas of dormitory-style rooms. Defendants deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 56.
- 57. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit that the Mesa Verde Facility has at least four enclosed rooms with telephones from which ICE detainees may make free, unmonitored phone calls. Defendants deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 57, and specifically deny that detainees may only use the enclosed rooms to make calls to attorneys.
- 58. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit only that enclosed rooms that may be used for detainee telephone calls may also be used for attorney visitation and videoteleconference hearings, but deny that this places any limitations on the availability of free, unmonitored telephone calls. Defendants deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 58.
- 59. Paragraph 59 contains Plaintiffs' characterization of their case, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 59. Additionally, Defendants note that the Complaint does not identify any DHS or ICE policy that allegedly denies or restricts telephone access.

Paragraph 60 contains Plaintiffs' characterization of their case, to which no

response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants lack

sufficient information to admit or deny whether "there are few immigration

Defendants deny the remainder of the allegations. Defendants admit the

detainees at the Mesa Verde Facility and their counsel may schedule

allegations in the second sentence of Paragraph 60. With respect to the third

sentence of Paragraph 60, ICE admits that it does not typically transport detainees

from the Mesa Verde Facility to meet with counsel in San Francisco, but states that

attorneys nearby" the Mesa Verde Facility, and, therefore, deny this allegation;

DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. The first sentence of

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#### Denial of Right to Legal Representation<sup>5</sup>

videoteleconference meetings.

- 61. DENIED. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations in Paragraph 61, and, therefore, deny the allegations.
- 62. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit that, as described above, the telephone systems generally available to detainees from the housing unit phones at the four facilities at issue (with some exceptions and outside the Pro Bono Platform) require a live person to answer and accept any call; this feature is deemed necessary to prevent detainees, including criminal inmates not in ICE custody but housed at the same facilities, from calling any crime victims or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Although this is a heading to which no response is required, Defendants deny the allegations contained in this heading.

leaving threatening messages. Defendants deny Plaintiffs' allegations that ICE detainees are confined to their cells for most of the day and that it is difficult or impossible for attorneys to arrange calls with ICE detainees. Defendants also deny Plaintiffs' allegations that aliens without sufficient funds are unable to make any telephone calls. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 62, and, therefore, deny them.

- 63. DENIED. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations in Paragraph 63, and, therefore, deny them.
- 64. DENIED. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations in Paragraph 64, and, therefore, deny them.
- 65. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants deny the allegations in the first and second sentence of Paragraph 65, and specifically deny any implication in Paragraph 65 that ICE detainees in removal proceedings who are housed at any of the four facilities at issue in this litigation are unreasonably and unnecessarily restricted or denied access to a telephone in any way that violates their statutory or constitutional rights. Defendants lack sufficient information and knowledge to admit or deny the allegations contained in the third and sixth sentences of Paragraph 65, and, therefore, deny them. With respect to the fourth and fifth sentences of Paragraph 65, Defendants admit that non-legal letters sent to ICE detainees housed at any of the four facilities at issue in this litigation must be inspected to ensure that those letters do not contain contraband. With respect to the Yuba Facility, Defendants admit that any incoming mail from an attorney,

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judicial officer, elected representative, or government entity to an ICE detainee is opened in the presence of that detainee for inspection for contraband only. With respect to RCCC, Defendants admit that all mail is inspected for contraband except for legal mail; legal mail is given to the ICE detained to be opened in the presence of a deputy. With respect to the Contra Costa Facility, Defendants admit that, with the exception of legal mail, all mail is opened and inspected before being brought into the facility, and that legal mail is opened in front of the detainee for security purposes. With respect to the Mesa Verde Facility, Defendants admit that, with the exception of legal mail, mail is opened in the presence of the detainee; Defendants state that legal mail is delivered to the detainee, and the detainee signs a form acknowledging receipt of the mail item. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegation in Paragraph 65 that "legal correspondence to and from ICE custody can take a week in each direction," and therefore deny that allegation. With respect to the Yuba facility, Defendants note that incoming mail is distributed to detainees the same day it is picked up from the Post Office. With respect to the RCCC facility, Defendants note that all mail is delivered the day it arrives with the exception of Sunday, holidays, and any mail that is forwarded to investigations following inspection. With respect to the Contra Costa Facility, Defendants note that received mail will be inspected and given to the detainee within a day or less. With respect to the Mesa Verde Facility, mail is distributed to detainees within 24 hours of its receipt.

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allegations contained in this heading. DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL. No. 3:13-cv-05878-EMC

DENIED. Defendants deny that any "alternative means of 66. communication" are "inherent[ly] limited," and any implication in Paragraph 66 that ICE detainees in removal proceedings who are housed at any of the facilities at issue in this litigation are unreasonably and unnecessarily restricted or denied access to a telephone in any way that violates their statutory or constitutional rights. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 66, and, therefore, deny them.

#### Denial of Right to Gather and Present Evidence<sup>6</sup>

- 67. DENIED. Defendants deny any and all allegations in Paragraph 67 that ICE detainees in removal proceedings who are housed at any of the facilities at issue in this litigation are unreasonably and unnecessarily denied access to a telephone in any way that violates their statutory or constitutional rights. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 67, and, therefore, deny them.
- 68. DENIED. Defendants deny any and all allegations in Paragraph 68 that ICE detainees in removal proceedings who are housed at any of the facilities at issue in this litigation are unreasonably and unnecessarily restricted or denied access to a telephone in any way that violates their statutory or constitutional rights. Defendants specifically deny that it is "rare" for an ICE detainee housed at any of the facilities at issue in this litigation to have access to a telephone during

Although this is a heading to which no response is required, Defendants deny the

"business hours" or to place a call that is not "blocked." Defendants further deny the allegation that costs of making a telephone call from any of the facilities at issue in this litigation are "prohibitive," and deny any implication in Paragraph 68 that the costs of placing a telephone call at each facility are unreasonable. Additionally, Plaintiffs' allegation that "the prohibitive telephone rates render most Plaintiffs unable to actually complete the call," appears to be pure speculation, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny this allegation, and note that there are means for indigent aliens in each facility to make free legal calls. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 68.

#### **Prolonged Incarceration.**<sup>7</sup>

69. DENIED. Defendants deny any and all allegations in Paragraph 69 that ICE detainees in removal proceedings who are housed at any of the facilities at issue in this litigation are unreasonably and unnecessarily restricted or denied access to a telephone in any way that violates their statutory or constitutional rights, including the right to not be subject to unreasonably or unconstitutionally prolonged detention. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 69, and, therefore, deny them.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Although this is a heading to which no response is required, Defendants deny the allegations contained in this heading, and further note that Plaintiffs are not challenging the legality of their ICE detention, but rather the conditions of their lawful detention.

70. DENIED. Defendants deny any and all allegations in Paragraph 70 that ICE detainees in removal proceedings who are housed at any of the facilities at issue in this litigation are unreasonably and unnecessarily restricted or denied access to a telephone in any way that violates their statutory or constitutional rights, including the right to not be subject to unreasonably or unconstitutionally prolonged detention. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 70, and, therefore, deny them.

## ADDITIONAL ALLEGATIONS RE: INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS Audley Barrington Lyon, Jr.

- 71. ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit that Mr. Lyon is a 35-year-old man who was previously detained at the Contra Costa Facility and was released from ICE detention on bond; Defendants also admit that Mr. Lyon entered the United States as a legal permanent resident when he was approximately ten years old.
- 72. DENIED in part. Defendants cannot admit or deny whether Lyon is seeking a U-Visa as disclosure of such information is barred by 8 U.S.C. §1367(a)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(e). Defendants also cannot admit or deny whether Lyon is seeking protection relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) as disclosure of such information is barred by 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6, 1208.6.
- 73. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit that

  Lyon is currently represented in his removal proceedings by Eleni Wolfe-Roubatis of

Centro Legal de la Raza. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 73, and, therefore, deny them.

- 74. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit that the Contra Costa facility does not permit detainees to purchase calling cards or phone credit. Defendants cannot admit or deny whether Lyon is seeking a U-Visa as disclosure of such information is barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(e). Defendants deny the allegation that Lyon's "only option was to place a collect call to the police department." Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 74, and, therefore, deny them.
- 75. DENIED in part. Defendants cannot admit or deny whether Lyon is seeking a U-Visa as disclosure of such information is barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(e). Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 75, and, therefore, deny them.
- 76. DENIED. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegation in Paragraph 76, and, therefore, deny this allegation.
- 77. DENIED. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegation in Paragraph 77, and, therefore, deny this allegation.
- 78. DENIED. Defendants cannot admit or deny whether Lyon is seeking a U-Visa as disclosure of such information is barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(e). Defendants otherwise deny the allegation in Paragraph 78.

#### Jose Elizandro Astorga-Cervantes

79. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. With respect to the allegations in the first sentence of Paragraph 79, Defendants admit that Astorga-Cervantes is a 53-year-old man who was released from ICE detention on bond. Defendants admit the allegations in the second sentence of Paragraph 79. With respect to the third sentence of Paragraph 79, Defendants admit that Astorga-Cervantes was admitted to the United States in January 1977, when Astorga-Cervantes was approximately fifteen-years old, as an IR-2 Immigrant. Defendants admit Astorga-Cervantes has been a Lawful Permanent Resident ("LPR") since 1977, when he was admitted as an Immigrant IR-2. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegation that Astorga-Cervantes "has lived in the United States since he was a child," and, therefore, deny that allegation. Defendants note that DHS records do not support any allegation that Astorga-Cervantes lived in the United States prior to his admission in January 1977 when he was approximately fifteen-years old.

80. ADMITTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendants admit Astorga-Cervantes sought review of his custody conditions from the Immigration Court and was granted bond in the amount of \$6,000 by an Immigration Judge on January 23, 2014. DHS records reflect that Astorga-Cervantes posted bond and was released from ICE custody on February 20, 2014. Defendants deny any implication that Astorga-Cervantes demonstrated that he does not pose a risk of

flight. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 80, and, therefore, deny them.

- 81. DENIED. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge or information regarding Astorga-Cervantes's intentions or his application for section 212(c) relief to admit or deny the allegations in Paragraph 81 and, therefore, deny them.

  Defendants deny that release from custody and 212(c) relief "require" letters or testimony from family or community members, and further state that, with respect to Astorga-Cervantes's custody redetermination hearing, the record of proceedings speaks for itself with respect to any evidence presented.
- 82. DENIED. Defendants deny any and all allegations and/or implications in Paragraph 82 that Astorga-Cervantes, while previously in immigration detention at RCCC, was unreasonably or unnecessarily restricted or denied access to a telephone in any way that violated his statutory or constitutional rights.

  Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 82, and, therefore, deny them. Defendants note that Astorga-Cervantes was granted bond in the amount of \$6,000 by an Immigration Judge on January 23, 2014; he posted bond and was released from ICE custody on February 20, 2014.
- 83. DENIED. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations in Paragraph 83, and, therefore, deny them.
- 84. DENIED. Defendants deny any and all allegations and/or implications in Paragraph 84 that Astorga-Cervantes, while previously in immigration detention DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL.
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at RCCC, was unreasonably or unnecessarily restricted or denied access to a telephone in any way that violated his statutory or constitutional rights.

Defendants cannot admit or deny whether Astorga-Cervantes has applied for a U Visa, as disclosure of such information is barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(e). Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 84, and, therefore, deny them. Defendants note that Astorga-Cervantes has been represented in his immigration proceedings since at least January 13, 2014, and that he was granted bond in the amount of \$6,000 by an Immigration Judge on January 23, 2014; he posted bond and was released from ICE custody on February 20, 2014.

#### Nancy Neria-Garcia

- 85. DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants admit that Neria-Garcia is a 26-year old woman and that she is currently in ICE custody at the Contra Costa Facility. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit to deny the remaining allegation in Paragraph 85, and, therefore, deny this allegation. Defendants admit only that DHS records demonstrate Neria-Garica was ordered removed on November 16, 2010, after illegally entering the United States, and that her removal order was reinstated on November 20, 2010, upon her subsequent illegal re-entry to the United States.
- 86. DENIED in part. Defendants cannot admit or deny whether Neria-Garcia is seeking withholding of removal or protection under the Convention

Against Torture, as disclosure of such information is barred by 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6, 1208.6.

- 87. ADMITTED.
- 88. DENIED in part. Defendants deny the first and fifth sentences of Paragraph 88, and deny any and all allegations and/or implications in Paragraph 88 that Neria-Garcia, while in immigration detention, was unreasonably or unnecessarily restricted or denied access to a telephone in any way that violated her statutory or constitutional rights. Defendants deny the allegation in the third sentence of Paragraph 88 that Neria-Garcia had "no access" to any telephone for 23 hours a day while in immigration detention at the Yuba Facility. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 88, and, therefore, deny them.
- 89. DENIED in part. Defendants deny the first sentence of Paragraph 89 and any and all allegations and/or implications in Paragraph 89 that Neria-Garcia, while in immigration detention at the Mesa Verde Facility, was unreasonably or unnecessarily restricted or denied access to a telephone in any way that violated her statutory or constitutional rights. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations in Paragraph 89, and, therefore, deny them.

#### CLASS ALLEGATIONS

90. Paragraph 83 contains Plaintiffs' proposed class definition, to which no response is required. Defendants admit that the Court certified a class of "all DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL.

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current and future immigration detainees who are or will be held by ICE in Contra Costa, Sacramento, and Yuba Counties," see ECF No. 31, and has modified that class to include detainees who are or will be held by ICE in Kern County (where the Mesa Verde Facility is located), see ECF No. 98.

- 91. DENIED.
- 92. Paragraph 92 contains Plaintiffs' statement as to the relief they seek in this litigation, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek.
- 93. Paragraph 93 contains Plaintiffs' legal conclusion that joinder is impracticable, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit that the Court certified a class of "all current and future immigration detainees who are or will be held by ICE in Contra Costa, Sacramento, and Yuba Counties," see ECF No. 31, and has modified that class to include ICE detainees who are or will be held by ICE in Kern County (where the Mesa Verde Facility is located), see ECF No. 98. Defendants admit that RCCC, the Contra Costa Facility, the Mesa Verde Facility, and the Yuba Facility can "hold a combined total of between 600 and 700 immigration detainees on an average day"; Defendants deny any implication in Paragraph 93 that this is the average ICE-detained population among the facilities.
- 94. Paragraph 94 contains Plaintiffs' legal conclusion that joinder is impracticable, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit that the Court certified a class of "all current and DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL.

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future immigration detainees who are or will be held by ICE in Contra Costa, Sacramento, and Yuba Counties," *see* ECF No. 31, and has modified that class to include detainees who are or will be held by ICE in Kern County (where the Mesa Verde Facility is located), *see* ECF No. 98.

- 95. Paragraph 95 contains Plaintiffs' legal conclusion that there are questions of law and fact common to their purported class, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit that the Court certified a class of "all current and future immigration detainees who are or will be held by ICE in Contra Costa, Sacramento, and Yuba Counties," see ECF No. 31, and has modified that class to include detainees who are or will be held by ICE in Kern County (where the Mesa Verde Facility is located), see ECF No. 98; Defendants deny that there are questions of law and fact common to the Class.
  - (a) DENIED
  - (b) DENIED
  - (c) DENIED
  - (d) DENIED
  - (e) DENIED
  - 96. DENIED.
- 97. Paragraph 97 contains Plaintiffs' legal conclusion that the named Plaintiffs "will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the [purported] class," to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit that the Court certified a class of "all current and future DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL. No. 3:13-cv-05878-EMC Page 36

immigration detainees who are or will be held by ICE in Contra Costa, Sacramento, and Yuba Counties," see ECF No. 31, and has modified that class to include detainees who are or will be held by ICE in Kern County (where the Mesa Verde Facility is located), see ECF No. 98. Defendants deny that the named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. Defendants further deny that Plaintiffs' counsel are acting as "pro bono" counsel.

- Paragraph 98 contains Plaintiffs' legal conclusion that "a class action is 98. superior to all other available methods for adjudicating this controversy and is manageable," to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit that the Court certified a class of "all current and future immigration detainees who are or will be held by ICE in Contra Costa, Sacramento, and Yuba Counties," see ECF No. 31, and has modified that class to include detainees who are or will be held by ICE in Kern County (where the Mesa Verde Facility is located), see ECF No. 98; Defendants deny that the class as certified is manageable.
  - DENIED: (a)
- DENIED. Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or (b) deny the allegations in Paragraph 98(b), and, therefore, deny them. Defendants deny any implication in Paragraph 98(b) that any conduct by DHS or ICE has violated any legal rights of ICE detainees;
- (c) DENIED. Paragraph 98(c) includes Plaintiffs' legal conclusion that "prosecution of individual actions would be impossible," to which no response is DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL. No. 3:13-cv-05878-EMC

required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations in Paragraph 98(c), and, therefore, deny them;

- (d) DENIED. Paragraph 98(d) includes Plaintiffs' legal conclusion that "prosecution of separate actions . . . would be inefficient," to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants lack sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations in Paragraph 98(d), and, therefore, deny them;
- (e) DENIED in part and ADMITTED in part. Defendants deny that ICE contracts with Contra Costa County; the U.S. Marshals Service contracts with Contra Costa County but recognizes ICE as an authorized user, allowing for the detention of ICE detainees in the Contra Costa Facility. Defendants admit that ICE has entered into Intergovernmental Service Agreements with Yuba County, Sacramento County, and the City of McFarland, California to house ICE detainees. Defendants deny that any other defendants in this action contract with these entities to house ICE detainees. Defendants deny any implication in Paragraph 98(e) that the ICE detention standards governing telephone access are the same at all four facilities at issue in this litigation, or that any of the detention standards are inadequate or otherwise disregard ICE detainees' constitutional and statutory rights as alleged by Plaintiffs.
- (f) Paragraph 98(f) contains Plaintiffs' request for injunctive and declaratory relief, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL. No. 3:13-cv-05878-EMC

required, Defendants deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek in this litigation and deny the existence of any constitutional and statutory violations resulting from telephone access at the four facilities at issue.

#### DECLARATORY RELIEF ALLEGATIONS

99. Paragraph 99 contains Plaintiffs' statement and theory of their case, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants admit that they "deny that their policies, practices and omissions [if any] violate Plaintiffs' constitutional and statutory rights." Defendants deny the remainder of the allegations, and specifically deny any implication in Paragraph 99 that Defendants' policies and practices regarding telephone access at the four facilities at issue in this litigation are inadequate or otherwise disregard ICE detainees' constitutional and statutory rights as alleged by Plaintiffs.

# FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF Right to Representation of Counsel (Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1362; 1229a(b)(4)(A))

- 100. Defendants incorporate by reference all foregoing responses in response to the allegation in Paragraph 100 that "Plaintiffs reallege the foregoing paragraphs and incorporate them herein by this reference."
- 101. Paragraph 101 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.
- 102. Paragraph 102 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants state that the statutory provisions cited speak for themselves.

103. DENIED.

104. DENIED.

#### SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

## Right to a Full and Fair Hearing (Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause; 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B))

- 105. Defendants incorporate by reference all foregoing responses in response to the allegation in Paragraph 105 that "Plaintiffs reallege the foregoing paragraphs and incorporate them herein by this reference."
- 106. Paragraph 106 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required.
- 107. Paragraph 107 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants state that the statutory provisions cited speak for themselves.
  - 108. DENIED.
  - 109. DENIED.

#### THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

### Right to Petition the Government for Redress of Grievances (First Amendment Petition Clause)

- 110. Defendants incorporate by reference all foregoing responses in response to the allegation in Paragraph 110 that "Plaintiffs reallege the foregoing paragraphs and incorporate them herein by this reference."
- 111. Paragraph 111 contains legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny Plaintiffs' characterization of the law.

112. DENIED.

113. DENIED.

#### PRAYER FOR RELIEF

The remainder of the Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief consists of Plaintiffs' Prayer for Relief, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendants deny that ICE's policies and practices governing telephone access at the facilities at issue in this litigation are inadequate or otherwise disregard Plaintiffs' constitutional and statutory rights and deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to any relief.

#### FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The Complaint fails in whole or in part to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

#### SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendants have not violated any rights, privileges or immunities under the Constitution, laws of the United States, or any political subdivision thereof.

#### THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs fail to allege or demonstrate standing for those proposed class members who cannot show an actual injury caused by Defendants' policies and practices related to their conditions of confinement, including their access to telephones while in immigration custody. *See Lewis v. Casey*, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).

#### FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

To the extent any of the named Plaintiffs assert challenges to their individual immigration proceedings – including review of, or relief from, their respective immigration proceedings – this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear any such claims.

See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(g).

#### FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs fail to state a cognizable claim under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") insofar as the allegations in the complaint do not challenge final agency action within the meaning of the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 704; see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997).

#### SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendants reserve the right to assert additional affirmative defenses.

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1	DATED:	August 28, 2015
2		BENJAMIN C. MIZER
3		Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Division
4		WILLIAM C. PEACHEY
5		Director
6		ELIZABETH J. STEVENS
7		Assistant Director
8		/s/ Katherine J. Shinners
9		KATHERINE J. SHINNERS BRIAN C. WARD
10		JENNIFER A. BOWEN
11		Trial Attorney District Court Section
12		Office of Immigration Litigation
13		Civil Division United States Department of Justice
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15		Attorneys for Defendants
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	DEFS 'ANSWER TO SUPPL COMPL	

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE No. 3:13-cv-05878-EMC

electronic notice and electronic link of the same to all attorneys of record through

I hereby certify that on this 28th day of August, 2015, a true and correct copy

of **DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT** was served with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system, which provided an

the Court's CM/ECF system.

DEFS.' ANSWER TO SUPPL. COMPL. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE No. 3:13-cv-05878-EMC

/s/ Katherine J. Shinners

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