Claudia Center (SBN 158255) CCenter@dredf.org 2 | Malhar Shah (SBN 318588) MShah@dredf.org Dylan Crary (SBN 340644) DCrary@dredf.org Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund 3075 Adeline Street, Suite 210 Berkeley, CA 94703 Telephone: (510) 644-2555 6 7 Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Petitioners 8 Additional counsel on next page 9 10



SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA

Mark S., by and through his guardian ad litem, Anna S., Rosa T., by and through her guardian ad litem Sofia L., and Jessica Black, Michell Redfoot, and Dr. Nefertari Royston, as taxpayers,

Plaintiffs and Petitioners.

V.

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA; TONY
THURMOND, in his official capacity as STATE
SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC
INSTRUCTION; STATE BOARD OF
EDUCATION; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION; and Pittsburg Unified
SCHOOL DISTRICT, DOES 1-100,
INCLUSIVE

Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. N21-1755

UNLIMITED JURISDICTION

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER FILED BY DEFENDANTS CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (CDE), STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION (SBE), AND TONY THURMOND, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION (SSPI)

1	Linnea Nelson (SBN 278960)
2	LNelson@aclunc.org Grayce Zelphin (SBN 279112)
3	GZelphin@aclunc.org Brandon Greene (SBN 293783)
	BGreene@aclunc.org
4	American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California
5	39 Drumm Street, San Francisco, CA 94111
6	Telephone: (415) 621-2493
7	Ana G. Nájera Mendoza (SBN 301598)
8	AMendoza@aclusocal.org Victor Leung (SBN 268590)
9	VLeung@aclusocal.org American Civil Liberties Union
10	Foundation of Southern California 1313 West 8th Street
11	Los Angeles, CA 90017 Telephone: (213) 977-9500
12	Robyn Crowther (SBN 193840)
13	RCrowther@Steptoe.com Amanda C. Schwartz (SBN 307522)
14	ASchwartz@Steptoe.com Steptoe & Johnson LLP
15	One Market Plaza Spear Tower, Suite 3900
16	Telephone: (818) 219-0961
	Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Petitioners
17	
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INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs have brought a California Constitutional challenge and several California statutory challenges against the California Department of Education ("CDE"); State Superintendent of Public Instruction ("SSPI") Tony Thurmond, the State Board of Education ("SBE"); and the State of California (collectively "State Defendants"), based on State Defendants' persistent and systematic failure to fulfill their non-delegable duty of ensuring equal educational opportunity to students at Pittsburg Unified School District ("Pittsburg Unified" or "the District"). In their First Amended Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ("First Amended Complaint" or "FAC"), Plaintiffs provided comprehensive and detailed allegations about the severe inequities and discrimination Pittsburg Unified has inflicted on its students of color and students with disabilities and State Defendants' failure to fulfill their duty to ensure equal educational opportunity to Pittsburg Unified's students. However, rather than address these allegations, State Defendants² simply recycle previous arguments from their January 11, 2022 demurrer and refuse to acknowledge the First Amended Complaint's detailed and comprehensive allegations supporting Plaintiffs' taxpayer and writ of mandate claims. This Court should deny State Defendants' demurrer because Plaintiffs have properly pleaded their claims in the First Amended Complaint. Prevailing caselaw makes clear that State Defendants have mandatory constitutional and statutory obligations to ensure that students in California have equal educational opportunity, and these obligations are enforceable through taxpayer claims and a writ cause of action. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully ask the Court to deny State Defendants' demurrer.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs allege that State Defendants have: (1) permitted Pittsburg Unified to disproportionately identify Black and English learner students as eligible for special education,

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¹ Plaintiffs also bring these claims against Pittsburg Unified School District.

² On April 25, 2022, Defendant State of California filed a request to join in the demurrer filed on the same date by the Superintendent of Public Instruction, State Board of Education, and California Department of Education. For purposes of this opposition, Plaintiffs include the State of California when referring to "State Defendants."

1	including identifying them with more significant or restrictive disabilities, FAC ¶¶ 6, 10-12, 44,	
2	47-49, 97, 100-103, 113, 114, 133, 140, 141, 143; (2) failed to act when their own data confirms	
3	that Pittsburg Unified is disproportionately placing students found eligible for special education	
4	and particularly Black and English learner students, in segregated special education classrooms,	
5	FAC ¶¶ 10-12, 44, 47-49, 54-56, 58, 97, 100-103, 113, 114, 133, 140, 141, 143; (3) persistently	
6	fail to intervene to remedy Pittsburg Unified's known disproportionate discipline of students	
7	with disabilities, students of color, and particularly disabled students of color, FAC ¶¶ 15, 44, 75	
8	81, 97, 101, 103, 113, 114, 133, 140, 141, 143; and (4) ignored that Pittsburg Unified	
9	consistently fails to provide students with evidence-based instruction and services tied to	
10	statewide academic content standards. FAC ¶¶ 14, 72, 97, 100-103, 113, 114, 133, 140, 141, 143	
11	The FAC makes clear that State Defendants were aware of each of Pittsburg Unified's	
12	discriminatory policies and practices; in fact, much of the underlying data supporting Plaintiffs'	
13	allegations comes from State Defendants' records. FAC ¶¶ 10-12, 14, 47-49, 54-56, 58, 75, 81,	
14	97, 100-103. Still, State Defendants, who have the ultimate responsibility to ensure that all	
15	students receive equal educational opportunity in the State, have refused to prevent or remedy	
16	these systematic violations by Pittsburg Unified, which have harmed Plaintiffs. See, e.g., FAC	
17	¶¶ 44, 58, 97, 100-103, 113, 114, 133, 140, 141, 143.	

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Plaintiffs are two English learner students with disabilities at Pittsburg Unified (collectively "Student Plaintiffs"), through their guardians ad litem, as well as three taxpayer Plaintiffs, who are parents of current and former Pittsburg Unified students and/or current and former staff at Pittsburg Unified (collectively "Taxpayer Plaintiffs"). FAC ¶¶ 22-28. As detailed in the FAC, each Plaintiff has been harmed by discriminatory policies and practices in Pittsburg Unified schools; State Defendants' systematic and longstanding refusal to accept their obligations to address the discriminatory policies and practices taking place at Pittsburg Unified has caused further harm. FAC ¶¶ 22-28, 58-59, 68-69, 71, 76-78, 83-94, 96, 97.

LEGAL STANDARD

In ruling on a demurrer, a court must "assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of

which judicial notice has been taken." *Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court*, 220 Cal. App. 4th 549, 558 (2013), *as modified on denial of reh'g* (Nov. 13, 2013); *Schifando v. City of Los Angeles*, 31 Cal. 4th 1074, 1081 (2003). Courts "liberally construe[] [the pleading], with a view to substantial justice between the parties." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 452; *Schifando*, 31 Cal. 4th at 1081. "[A]verments with respect to racial segregation should be treated on general demurrer as allegations of ultimate facts and not mere conclusions of law." *Tinsley v. Palo Alto Unified Sch. Dist.*, 91 Cal. App. 3d 871, 892 (1979). "[I]t is error for a . . . court to sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory." *Aubry v. Tri–City Hosp. Dist.*, 2 Cal. 4th 962, 966-67 (1992). "[I]t is [also] an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility [that the] defect . . . can be cured by amendment." *Id.* at 967.

ARGUMENT

I. Taxpayer Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action Properly States a Claim Against State Defendants for Illegal Expenditure of Taxpayer Funds

Any resident of a "local agency" who, "within one year before the commencement of the action, has paid a tax that funds the defendant local agency" may bring "[a]n action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of [the] local agency." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 526(a). "[Section 526a] has been judicially extended to all state and local agencies and officials." *Vasquez v. State*, 105 Cal. App. 4th 849, 854 (2003). While "waste" as used in section 526a "means something more than an alleged mistake by public officials in matters involving the exercise of judgment or wide discretion[,] . . . a court must not close its eyes to wasteful, improvident and completely unnecessary public spending." *City of Ceres v. City of Modesto*, 274 Cal. App. 2d 545, 555 (1969). Code of Civil Procedure ("CCP") section 526a is liberally construed, particularly at the demurrer stage where disputes of fact do not defeat the statement of a claim. *See id.* (reversing dismissal of taxpayer claim under CCP section 526a where complaint alleged a useless expenditure and waste of public funds even though performed in the exercise of a lawful power); *Collins v. Thurmond*, 41 Cal. App. 5th 879, 911 (2019) (upholding taxpayer claim of waste

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27 28 through inaction where plaintiff-appellants alleged "that the state-level defendants approved budgets with knowledge that local-level defendants would use approved funds to engage in discriminatory and illegal practices").

State Defendants challenge Taxpayer Plaintiffs' standing under CCP section 526a by relying on a single argument, that "the taxpayer claim remains grounded in a challenge to the discretion granted to and employed by State Defendants." Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Demurrer of California Department of Education, State Board of Education, and Tony Thurmond to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4, Mark S v. State, No. MSN21-1755 (Cal. Super. Apr 25, 2022) ("CDE MPA"). But Taxpayer Plaintiffs have alleged a taxpayer claim arising from illegal action which cannot be a legal exercise of discretion by State Defendants. Collins, 41 Cal. App. 5th at 910-11. State Defendants repeatedly identify *Collins* as the controlling precedent, but that case plainly held that taxpayer claims may proceed under such circumstances. Indeed, Taxpayer Plaintiffs have followed the framework set forth in Collins in alleging the taxpayer claim in their First Amended Complaint, because the facts involving illegal expenditures are substantially similar in both cases. Specifically, there, the appellate court held that plaintiffs stated a viable taxpayer claim where they alleged that the CDE and SSPI "approved budgets and authorized payments' to local school districts," thereby "authorizing funds that they know are being illegally used by their recipients, that illegality arising, at a minimum, from a violation of the equal protection clause." *Id.* at 909-11. Taxpayer Plaintiffs here allege the same:

> "State Defendants continue to permit or authorize the allocation or reimbursement of public funds to Pittsburg Unified despite knowing that the funds are being illegally used. Because State Defendants have permitted the use of these funds or authorized these funds without fulfilling their statutory and constitutional obligation to ensure these funds are not used to deprive students of equal educational access in a discrimination-free environment, they have also committed waste."

FAC ¶ 132. That illegal use arises, at a minimum, from violations of the Equal Protection Clause that are alleged in the FAC, ¶ 108-115, which this Court has held Plaintiffs properly pled in their original Complaint. Order after hearing on February 24,

2022 at 20-21, Mark S v. State, No. MSN21-1755 (Cal. Super. Mar. 9, 2022). Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint also references several state statutes that require State Defendants to ensure public funds are spent by school districts for lawful purposes, including for the provision of a public education system free of unlawful discrimination. See FAC ¶¶ 128-29.

Accordingly, Taxpayer Plaintiffs have properly pleaded their Fourth Cause of Action, and this Court should deny the State Defendants' demurrer and allow the case to proceed to discovery so Plaintiffs can have the opportunity to review Pittsburg Unified's budgets and prove that State Defendants have consistently wasted taxpayer funds by approving illegal expenditures.

II. Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action Properly States a Claim Against State Defendants for a Writ of Mandate

To state a cause of action for a writ of mandate, a plaintiff must plead: (1) a clear duty to act by the defendant; (2) a beneficial interest in the defendant's performance of that duty; (3) the defendant's ability to perform the duty; (4) the defendant's failure to perform that duty or abuse of discretion if acting; and (5) "no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy exists." *Agric. Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Exeter Packers, Inc.*, 184 Cal. App. 3d 483, 489 (1986). While "[m]andamus will not lie to control an exercise of discretion, i.e., to compel an official to exercise discretion in a particular manner[,] . . . [it] may issue . . . to compel an official both to exercise [their] discretion . . . and to exercise it under a proper interpretation of the applicable law." *Cal. Hosp. Ass'n v. Maxwell-Jolly*, 188 Cal. App. 4th 559, 570 (2010) (quoting *Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors*, 49 Cal.3d 432, 442 (1989)).

State Defendants assert that Plaintiffs challenge only discretionary acts rather than ministerial duties that State Defendants are required to perform. This is incorrect. In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs have identified multiple clear, ministerial duties of State Defendants to intervene on behalf of students with and without disabilities and students of color when unlawful discrimination occurs. FAC. ¶¶ 109, 129, 131; *Butt v.State*, 4 Cal. 4th 668, 688, 692 (1992) (discussing the State's obligation and "duty to intervene" when a denial of equal educational opportunity is at issue); *Molar v. Gates*, 98 Cal. App. 3d 1, 25 (1979) (holding that a

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traditional mandamus is an appropriate remedy to enforce plaintiff's constitutional right to equal protection). Plaintiffs' FAC alleges violations of these duties, both because State Defendants failed to perform its required duties and because State Defendants abused their discretion in purportedly acting on those duties. FAC ¶¶ 44, 56, 58, 81, 95-99,113, 114, 129, 132, 140, 143, 144.

A. Plaintiffs assert State Defendants fail to perform mandatory duties.

State Defendants have failed to intervene to remedy and prevent constitutional deprivations brought to their knowledge, thus failing to act on their mandatory duties to ensure equal educational opportunity to students in Pittsburg Unified. FAC ¶¶ 95-99, 113, 114, 140, 146. For example, the State, through the CDE, has been aware of racial discrimination in the District's discipline practices for years, as shown by its own statistics over several years and multiple written complaints over the last two years. FAC ¶¶ 75, 81, 97, 101, 103. Despite this knowledge, the State and the CDE have not taken action to correct the policies and practices leading to substantial disparate impact on the minority children of Pittsburg Unified. FAC ¶¶ 95, 96 ("[T]he State has abdicated its legal responsibilities to Mark S. and Rosa T. . . . and their disabled peers and other students of color to provide equal educational opportunities."), 97 (noting that "the State . . . has only flagged the District on a small subset of issues described in this Writ and Complaint"), 140 (stating "the State's system for monitoring school districts and selecting them for more intensive review and intervention fails to identify the scope of systemic issues at school districts").

The SSPI has a mandatory, non-discretionary duty to "monitor and review all special education programs approved" under the State's special education programs "to ensure that all funds appropriated to special education local plan areas . . . are expended for the purposes intended," including "to assist local educational agencies to provide special education and related services to individuals with exceptional needs." Cal. Educ. Code § 56836.04. This mandate includes not only an obligation to monitor, but also to take *some* action besides monitoring to intervene to ensure that the funds appropriated are expended for the intended purposes. Plaintiffs allege that the State, including the SSPI, has failed both to monitor Pittsburg Unified's special

education program *and* failed to ensure funds are expended to provide legally-required special education and related services to disabled students beyond merely monitoring. FAC ¶¶ 97 ("[the State] failed to proactively or adequately monitor, review, inspect, and remedy the District's unlawful policies and practices"), 132 ("State Defendants continue to permit or authorize the allocation or reimbursement of public funds to Pittsburg Unified despite knowing that the funds are being illegally used."). Plaintiffs further allege that the State has failed to ensure that educational programs and activities under the jurisdiction of the SBE, including curriculum aligned to statewide academic content standards, are available to students without regard to race, ancestry, national origin, or disability, as required by 5 C.C.R. § 4900. FAC ¶ 129 (alleging that State Defendants "fail[ed] to prevent and remedy unlawful discrimination in special education programs and disciplinary policies and practices, and otherwise fail[ed] to take steps to ensure equal educational access for Black, Native American, multiracial, English learner, and disabled students").

B. Plaintiffs assert State Defendants abused their discretion in performing mandatory duties.

Plaintiffs have alleged that State Defendants have failed to perform a mandatory duty; additionally, as an alternative theory, Plaintiffs have properly alleged that State Defendants abused their discretion in performing their duties. Mandate is available to aggrieved parties, as a matter of law, to correct an abuse discretion by a public official or agency. *Maxwell-Jolly*, 188 Cal. App. 4th at 570 (noting that "[a]lthough administrative actions enjoy a presumption of regularity, this presumption does not immunize agency action from effective judicial review"); *Citizens for Amending Proposition L v. City of Pomona*, 28 Cal. App. 5th 1159, 1173 (2018) (a writ of mandate "will lie to correct abuses of discretion."). Courts will find abuse of discretion where agency action has effectively "'alter[ed] or amend[ed] the statute or enlarge[d] or impair[ed] its scope," where the agency fails to exercise discretion, or where the agency has "engage[d] in unjustified, unreasonable delay in the implementation of statutory commands." *Grimes v. State Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1065, 1073 (1999) (citations omitted).

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Here, as outlined in the First Amended Complaint, State Defendants have abused their discretion by altering, amending, or impairing the scope of statutory and state constitutional provisions that require State Defendants to eliminate bias or discrimination from the state's public education system. State Defendants are governed by the California Constitution and state laws to provide "equal education to students of color and disabled students of color." FAC ¶ 140. The FAC outlines several duties imposed on State Defendants by the State Constitution, the California Education Code, and California Code of Regulations to govern and oversee a public education system that is free of unlawful discrimination. For example, the FAC specifically alleges that it is the "intent of Defendant State Board of Education that Defendant State Superintendent of Public Instruction assist school districts to 'recognize and eliminate unlawful discrimination that may exist within their programs or activities' and that the 'Superintendent shall meet this responsibility through technical assistance and ensuring compliance' pursuant to standard complaint procedures." FAC ¶ 140, citing 5 C.C.R. § 4900(c). Yet, Plaintiffs allege that State Defendants have not taken any action to intervene and, if they have provided any technical assistance and oversight to school districts, such assistance or oversight allowed "unlawful discrimination that continues unabated in public schools." *Id.* This impairment of the scope of the statute is an abuse of discretion.

State Defendants' conduct is impairing, or amending, the scope of their statutory duties by allowing discrimination to continue, even after State Defendants allegedly intervened on a small subset of issues Plaintiffs raise in their FAC. Here, Plaintiffs allege that the State Defendants' "paper-compliance mindset [] overly focusses on quantitative measures and wholly fails to capture suspected or known violations" of the State's proscriptions on discrimination in schools and that "the State Defendants' defective system for monitoring, providing leadership to, and selecting school districts for intensive review and intervention has had and continues to have the effect of denying Plaintiffs full and equal access to the benefits of the programs and activities administered by Defendants, or of subjecting Plaintiffs to discrimination under such programs or activities, on the basis of their race, national origin, or disability." *Id.* These and other allegations in the FAC suffice to establish Plaintiffs' writ of mandate claim under a theory that the State

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Defendants abused their discretion. *Collins*, 41 Cal. App. 5th at 911 (stating that "disputes of fact do not defeat the statement of a claim At the pleading phase, the question is only whether the allegations constitute a cognizable cause of action, not whether the allegations will be proved or defeated by a defense to the claim.").

State Defendants' citations to Collins do not undermine Plaintiffs' writ claim. In fact, in Collins, with respect to the "duty to monitor," the court found that "appellants have stated a broad challenge to the state-level defendants' conduct sufficient to support their writ claim." The facts of that case supported a finding that the state defendants abused their discretion by failing to collect data required by law. Collins, 41 Cal. App. 5th at 918. While the facts in Collins and the present case are not identical, parallels can be drawn, as the State wholly failed to acknowledge and ameliorate known or suspected violations of the law in both instances. Here, Plaintiffs allege that State Defendants abused their discretion by "implement[ing] an unconstitutional system of public education that deprives students of equal educational access in a discrimination-free environment." FAC ¶ 144. Specifically, State Defendants were obligated to assist school districts in eliminating unlawful discrimination in educational programs or activities, but then utterly failed to cure or further prevent "suspected or known violations." FAC ¶ 140. In short, Plaintiffs' allegations demonstrate that State Defendants abused their discretion by altering, amending, or impairing the scope of statutory and state constitutional provisions that required State Defendants to ensure a public school system free from discrimination based on race, national origin, and disability.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff respectfully request that the Court deny State Defendants' demurrer. In the alternative, should the Court find any such amendment necessary, Plaintiffs request leave to amend their First Amended Complaint and Writ.

Dated: May 24, 2022

Malhar Shah Claudia Center

DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUCATION AND

DEFENSE FUND



Linnea Nelson
Grayce Zelphin
Brandon Greene
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION OF NORTHERN
CALIFORNIA

ana Nájero Mendozu

Ana G. Nájera Mendoza Victor Leung AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Roleyn O. Crown

Robyn Crowther Amanda C. Schwartz STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP

PROOF OF SERVICE

I am a resident of, or employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to this action. My business address is: Steptoe & Johnson LLP, 633 West Fifth Street, Suite 1900, Los Angeles, California 90071.

On May 24, 2022, I served the following listed document(s) PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER FILED BY DEFENDANTS CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (CDE), STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION (SBE), AND TONY THURMOND, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION (SSPI) by method indicated below, on the parties in this action:

	State of California Deputy Attorney General California Department of Justice 455 Golden Gate Avenue # 11000	Andrew.Edelstein@doj.ca.gov Jacquelyn.Young@doj.ca.gov	
1	San Francisco, CA 94102 Tony Thurmond, in his official capacity as State		
	Superintendent of Public School Instruction 1430 N Street, Suite 5111 Sacramento, CA 95814		
	State Board of Education 1430 N Street, Suite 5111 Sacramento, CA 95814	LGarfinkel@cde.ca.gov	
	California Department of Education 1430 N Street, Suite 5111 Sacramento, CA 95814		
	Pittsburg Unified School District c/o Katherine Alberts 1390 Willow Pass Rd #700, Concord, CA 94520	kalberts@leonealberts.com	

BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused the document(s) to be sent by email to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on May 24, 2022, at Los Angeles, California.

/s/ Melissa Hernandez
MELISSA HERNANDEZ