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E-Mail: Colin.Schoell@doj.ca.gov

July 26, 2022

RE: Stephanie Clendenin, et al. v. Stephanie Stiavetti, et al.

Judicial Council of California, JCCP No. 5248

To Whom It May Concern:

You are receiving this cover letter because you or your office are the counsel of record in a matter that Defendants in the above-captioned case included in their Petition for Coordination (Petition) to the Judicial Council of California. Attached to the Notice of Submission of Petition for Coordination, filed in each of the included actions, are the Petition, three declarations in support, a Request for Judicial Notice, and a Motion for Stay. If you intend to file a response in support or in opposition to the Petition, you must serve and file the response at least nine court days before the date set for hearing on the Petition. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rules 3.525-3.526.) This hearing must be set within 30 days of the order assigning the coordination motion judge. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.527.)

The Motion for Stay seeks to stay all unresolved included actions, except for *Stiavetti*, pending adjudication of the Petition in order to preserve the benefits of coordinating these matters and better serve all the interested parties. If you intend to oppose this motion, you must serve and submit any filings in opposition to the Judicial Council within 10 days after service of the motion and request a hearing on the motion. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.515, subd. (d)-(e).)

To avoid unnecessary waste of paper, we have included our Electronic Service Consent and respectfully request that you promptly complete and return one as well. If you would like electronic copies of these filings or have any questions, please contact Deputy Attorney General Colin Schoell at Colin.Schoell@doj.ca.gov or at the phone numbers listed above.

Sincerely,

COLIN D. SCHOELL

Deputy Attorney General

For

ROB BONTA Attorney General

Colin Schu

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	ROB BONTA Attorney General of California GREGORY D. BROWN Supervising Deputy Attorney General COLIN D. SCHOELL Deputy Attorney General State Bar No. 332896 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 Telephone: (415) 510-3547 Fax: (415) 703-5843 E-mail: Colin.Schoell@doj.ca.gov Attorneys for Petitioners Stephanie Clendenin, Director of Department of State Hospitals; Nancy Bargmann, Director of Department of Developmental Services	Exempt from filing fees Gov. Code, § 6103	
10	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
11	COUNTY OF ALAMEDA		
12			
13	STEPHANIE STIAVETTI, et al.,	Case No. RG15779731	
14	Plaintiffs,	NOTICE OF SUBMISSION OF PETITION FOR COORDINATION	
15	V.	PETITION FOR COORDINATION	
16 17 18	STEPHANIE CLENDENIN, AS DIRECTOR OF THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOSPITALS, et al.,	Dept: 21 Judge: The Hon. Evelio Martin Grillo Action Filed: July 29, 2015ON	
19	Defendants.		
20			
21	TO EACH PARTY AND TO THE COUNSEL (OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY:	
22	YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT on July 20, 2022, defendants Stephanie		
23	Clendenin, as Director of the California Department of State Hospitals, and Nancy Bargmann, as		
24	Director of the California Department of Developmental Services, in Stiavetti v. Clendenin, Case		
25	No. RG15779731, Superior Court of Alameda County, submitted to the Chairperson of the		
26	Judicial Council a Petition for Coordination to the Judicial Council Re: Competency Services for		
27	Defendants Found Incompetent to Stand Trial (P	Petition). The Petition pertains to the actions	
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- 1			
1	listed in Exhibit A of the Declaration of Se	an Mark Rashkis in Support of the Petition. The	
2	Petition requests assignment of a judge to determine whether coordination of these actions is		
3	appropriate.		
4	The name and address of counsel for	petitioners is: Deputy Attorney General Colin Schoell	
5	Colin.Schoell@doj.ca.gov, 455 Golden Ga	te Avenue, Suite 11000, San Francisco, CA 94102-	
6	7004.		
7	TO ANY PARTY INTENDING TO OPPOSE THE PETITION FOR COORDINATION:		
8	Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.522(a)(4), any party intending to oppose the		
9	Petition must serve and submit to the Chairperson of the Judicial Council a written opposition at		
10	least nine court days before the hearing set in this matter.		
11	A copy of the Petition and supporting documents is filed herewith as Exhibit A.		
12	Dated: July 22, 2022	Respectfully submitted,	
13	P 10	ROB BONTA Attorney General of California	
14		GREGORY D. BROWN Supervising Deputy Attorney General	
15		Supervising Deputy Interney Contra	
16	8	11-11	
17		COLIN D. SCHOELL	
18		Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for Petitioners	
19		Stephanie Clendenin, Director of Department of State Hospitals; Nancy	
20		Bargmann, Director of Department of Developmental Services	
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Exhibit A

RECEIVED Judicial Council of California 1 **ROB BONTA** JUL 2 0.2022 Attorney General of California 2 GREGORY D. BROWN Supervising Deputy Attorney General 3 COLIN D. SCHOELL Deputy Attorney General State Bar No. 332896 4 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 5 Telephone: (415) 510-3547 Fax: (415) 703-5843 6 E-mail: Colin.Schoell@doj.ca.gov Attorneys for Petitioners 7 Stephanie Clendenin, Director of Department of Exempt from Filing Fees — Gov. Code, § 6103 State Hospitals; Nancy Bargmann, Director of 8 Department of Developmental Services 9 10 11 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 14 15 STEPHANIE STIAVETTI, et al., 16 Plaintiffs. 17 PETITION FOR COORDINATION TO ٧. THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL RE: 18 COMPETENCY SERVICES FOR **DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT** STEPHANIE CLENDENIN, AS 19 TO STAND TRIAL; MEMORANDUM DIRECTOR OF THE CALIFORNIA **OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN** DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOSPITALS, 20 SUPPORT OF PETITION et al., 21 Defendants. Dept: 22 The Hon. Evelio Martin Grillo Judge: Action Filed: July 29, 2015 23

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PETITION

TO THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL:

Petitioners Stephanie Clendenin, as Director of the California Department of State Hospitals, and Nancy Bargmann, as Director of the California Department of Developmental Services, through their counsel Colin Schoell at 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000, San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 submit this Petition pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 404 to request assignment of a judge to determine whether it would be appropriate to coordinate this action with the actions listed in the attached Declaration of Sean M. Rashkis in Support of Defendants' Petition for Coordination to the Judicial Council Re: Competency Services for Defendants Found Incompetent to Stand Trial (Rashkis Decl.), ¶ 4.

- 1. This petition is based on Code of Civil Procedure sections 404 and 404.1, California Rules of Court, Rule 3.521, the attached memorandum in support, the Request for Judicial Notice in support, the declarations of Sean M. Rashkis, Colin D. Schoell, and Jaci Thomson in support, and the complete files and records of this action and the actions listed below.
- 2. This petition is made on the ground that these actions share common questions of fact and law, and that coordination of these actions will promote the ends of justice. The petition is supported by the declaration of Colin D. Schoell, setting forth facts showing that the actions are complex and that coordination would satisfy the criteria set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 404.1, in that significant common questions of law and fact predominate in the actions; judicial facilities and resources will be more efficiently utilized; the burden on the courts' calendars will be lessened; and duplicative or inconsistent rulings will be avoided.
- 3. The defendant's name, county, case number, and the names and addresses of counsel for each included action are set forth in the attached Rashkis Decl., Exhibit B.
- 4. Petitioners expect at least one party to the included actions to oppose this Petition and therefore request a hearing to determine whether coordination of these action is appropriate.

 Petitioners request that the hearing be set in the Superior Court of Alameda County.
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1	Wherefore, petitioners request the petition for coordination be granted.	
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3	Dated: July 20, 2022	Respectfully submitted,
4		ROB BONTA Attorney General of California
5		GREGORY D. BROWN Supervising Deputy Attorney General
6		
7		Colin Schull
8		COLIN D. SCHOELL
9		Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for Petitioners Stephanie Clendenin, Director of Department of State Hospitals; Nancy Bargmann, Director of Department of
11		Department of State Hospitals; Nancy Bargmann Director of Department of
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES

22.

INTRODUCTION

California's criminal justice system has long wrestled with the crisis of defendants with serious mental illness or developmental disability. In recent years, however, the number of defendants declared incompetent to stand trial (IST) due to that mental illness or developmental disability has dramatically increased, outstripping the State's treatment capacity and forcing the State to maintain a statewide waitlist for the treatment of IST patients. Civil litigation surrounding the IST waitlist has grown immensely, and numerous courts throughout the state have taken different, and often conflicting, approaches to addressing the State's ongoing efforts to reduce wait times for the treatment of IST patients.

The litigation surrounding the statewide waitlist should be managed by a single judge to avoid duplicative and unnecessary proceedings, conflicting and inconsistent rulings, and to holistically address the systemic barriers exacerbating the delays in the commencement of substantive competency services. On that basis, petitioners Stephanie Clendenin, in her official capacity as the Director of the Department of State Hospitals (DSH), and Nancy Bargmann, in her official capacity as Director of the Department of Developmental Services (DDS), jointly request that the Judicial Council assign a coordination motion judge and designate as complex the 79 related cases (referred to herein as the "competency services cases") and coordinate them for further proceedings under Code of Civil Procedure section 404. Litigation concerning the waitlist is burdensome on the courts, as the hearings have become more numerous, lengthier, and increasingly complex with time. Coordination will promote the ends of justice, conserve judicial resources, eliminate inconsistent trial court decisions, and better serve those whose rights are at stake. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 404.1.)

The benefits of having one judge vested with the power to oversee competency services litigation on a state-wide basis are underscored by the recent *Stiavetti* litigation: pursuant to the

¹ Judgment was entered against Pamela Ahlin and Santi Rogers, who were at the time Directors of the DSH and DDS, respectively, and were sued in their official capacity. As such, they were replaced by Stephanie Clendenin and Nancy Bargmann, the current directors of DSH and DDS, respectively, while the matter was on appeal.

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December 16, 2021, amended judgment in Stiavetti, et al., v. Clendenin, et al. (Stiavetti), Alameda County Superior Court Case No. RG15779731, DSH and DDS are ordered to commence substantive competency services for all criminal defendants in California committed to them as IST within what will ultimately be 28 days after service of that defendant's commitment packet. This 28-day timeframe will take effect following a 30-month phase-in period beginning August 27, 2021, with increasingly strict deadlines. The first of several benchmarks is that DSH and DDS must commence substantive competency services for all IST defendants committed to the Departments within 60 days by August 27, 2022. Under Stiavetti's amended judgment, the 28-day deadline is not in effect until February 27, 2024. Thus, the Stiavetti court set a single IST standard that all courts should follow.

Yet, in each of the 79 related cases, IST defendants awaiting substantive competency services—and thus covered by the Stiavetti statewide injunction—are simultaneously the subject of duplicative sanctions proceedings overseen by the local superior court in the county where each respective defendant was charged. Thus, while one court in Alameda County adjudicates enforcement of one judgment on behalf of all waitlisted defendants across the state, the courts in many of the other counties in California have continued with their own proceedings to adjudicate the ramifications of the State being unable to provide timely access to competency services within their jurisdiction. The multiplicity of cases results in a number of different and competing courtordered deadlines for DSH to commence treating different IST defendants. This case multiplicity also results in various courts ordering DSH, on threat of sanctions, to commence treating certain IST defendants ahead of their turn on the waitlist, thereby delaying the treatment of other IST defendants from other counties. The proliferation of cases is duplicative, unnecessary, inefficient, consumes judicial resources, and in many instances results in conflicting orders for the same named IST defendants.

The shared goal of all litigants is to hasten the commencement of substantive competency services to criminal defendants found IST. To this end, one judge should handle all proceedings that interpret, adjudicate, and enforce the state law—including the statewide court order in Stiavetti that was affirmed on appeal in a published precedential opinion—that lie at the core of

these proceedings. For all these reasons, and those discussed below, the ends of justice are served by an order coordinating the instant proceedings.

Factual and Procedural Background

I. EVENTS IN RECENT YEARS HAVE LED TO A STATEWIDE IST WAITLIST FOR COMPETENCY SERVICES

Criminal defendants who, as a result of mental health disorder or developmental disability, cannot understand the nature of their criminal proceedings or rationally assist counsel with their defense are deemed incompetent to stand trial (IST). (Pen. Code, § 1367, subd. (a).) Following an adversarial process whereby the nature and degree of incompetency is determined, and disputes about it are resolved, if the trial court enters an order of incompetency all further criminal proceedings are suspended. (*Id.*, §§ 1368-1370.) Defendants who are incompetent due to a mental health disorder (also referred to as patients herein) are then committed to DSH, and those incompetent due to a developmental disability (in whole or in part) are committed to DDS. (*Id.*, § 1367, subd. (b).)² The trial court serves DSH or DDS with a commitment packet, thereby initiating the relevant department's statutory obligations to provide competency restoration services.

In recent years, the number of felony defendants found IST has increased and continues to do so, outstripping DSH's competency services capacity and leading to a waitlist for those defendants to begin receiving substantive competency restoration services. DSH's statewide waitlist was further exacerbated by several factors arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. (Declaration of Jaci Thomson (Decl. Thomson), ¶ 5.) There are several unavoidable reasons: the need to suspend admissions to state hospitals due to the recent COVID-19 surge associated with the Omicron variant, county transportation scheduling issues, COVID-19 outbreaks and quarantines at county jails, and not receiving timely medical screenings and COVID-19 test results from committing counties for incoming patient admissions. (Decl. Thomson, ¶ 5.) These

² The vast majority of defendants found IST are committed to DSH, and all of the cases proposed to be coordinated by this petition concern DSH commitments. Accordingly, this petition primarily focuses on DSH patients, and will note differences about the populations of DSH and DDS patients only when material.

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combined factors resulted in delayed and/or rescheduled admissions, which further impacts the statewide waitlist. (Ibid.) As of July 4, 2022, there were 1,739 IST defendants on DSH's statewide waitlist. (Decl. Thomson, $\P 4.$)³

DSH utilizes a statewide waitlist for admission of IST defendants awaiting commencement of substantive competency services at a DSH facility. (Decl. Thomson, ¶ 4.) To ensure equity throughout the state, defendants are placed on the waitlist in order of their commitment date, even if they first receive treatment at a jail-based competency treatment (JBCT) program. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 4710; Decl. Thomson, ¶ 3.) DSH may send an IST referral to an inpatient facility at one of the four state hospitals that treats IST patients, to one of 21 jail-based competency treatment (JBCT) programs, eight of which may accept IST referrals from other counties, or the Admission Evaluation and Stabilization (AES) facility located in the Kern County Jail, amounting to 12,088 referrals over the last three years.⁴ (Decl. Thomson, ¶ 4.) Alternatively, DSH may refer an IST defendant for outpatient treatment though contracted services under its Mental Health Diversion and community-based restoration (CBR) programs. (Decl. Thomson, ¶ 4.) However, a waitlisted defendant whose mental state becomes "psychiatrically acute", as determined by DSH clinicians, may be admitted on an expedited basis unrelated to their commitment date via an acuity review process. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 4717.) Defendants committed with a developmental disability are governed by different procedures, and therefore are placed on a distinct statewide waitlist for DDS. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6509, subd. (b).)

II. STIAVETTI ESTABLISHED A 28-DAY CONSTITUTIONAL DEADLINE FOR THE COMMENCEMENT OF SUBSTANTIVE SERVICES AND ENTERED A WRIT REQUIRING DSH AND DDS TO MEET THAT DEADLINE FOR ALL IST PATIENTS IN CALIFORNIA

On July 29, 2015, family members of five criminal defendants found IST filed a petition for writ of mandamus and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the directors of DSH and DDS. (Stiavetti v. Clendenin (Stiavetti) (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 691, 703.) The civil

³ Due to the limited number of IST defendants treated by DDS compared to DSH, DDS is currently in compliance with the 28-day deadline for the commencement of substantive competency services set forth in Stiavetti v. Clendenin (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 691.

⁴ ISTs that initially receive competency treatment at a JBCT or AES program, but are later deemed to require additional treatment at a state hospital, remain at the relevant JBCT or AES program and are admitted to a state hospital based on the initial commitment date.

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action alleged that the delays in providing substantive competency services by DSH and DDS violated the due process rights of IST defendants statewide. (*Id.* at p. 694.)

The trial court concluded that the IST defendants' constitutional due process rights required DSH and DDS to "commence substantive services to restore an IST defendant to competency within 28 days of the transfer of responsibility." (Stiavetti, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 704.) However, the court also made clear that DSH and DDS "will not be in violation of the judgment if they show good cause for not admitting a few IST defendants within the required timeframes." (Id., at 715.) Due to the administrative difficulty of compliance with the judgment, the trial court set a 30-month phase-in period over which DSH and DDS must meet the 28-day deadline. (Id., at 704.) As part of this phase-in period, DSH and DDS must meet a 60-day deadline within 12 months, a 45-day deadline within 18 months, and a 33-day deadline within 24 months.⁵ (See Request for Judicial Notice (RJN), Exh. A, Stiavetti v. Ahlin (April 19, 2019) Alameda County Superior Court Case No. RG15779731, p. 4 [trial court judgment].) Additionally, DSH and DDS must file status reports to the court two months after each deadline containing a breakdown of the location of IST defendants DSH and DDS have responsibility for, as well as the minimum, maximum, average, and median wait time during that period. (Id. at p. 5.) DSH and DDS appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the portions of the judgment that DSH and DDS appealed, ⁶ remanding the case to the trial court for enforcement. (Stiavetti, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 738.) On remand, the trial court issued an amended judgment retaining the phased compliance deadlines and stating the 28-day deadline is not in effect until February 27, 2024, or "within 30 months of" August 27, 2021. (See RJN, Exh. B, Stiavetti v. Ahlin (December 16,

⁵ Defendants in *Stiavetti* filed a motion for modification on July 1, 2022, requesting that the court remove these intermediary deadlines due to the ongoing necessity of unit quarantines to combat the spread of COVID-19.

⁶ The *Stiavetti* plaintiffs cross-appealed on a narrow issue concerning the transfer-of-responsibility date for certain IST patients committed to DDS, and the Court of Appeal reversed on that issue, providing for an earlier transfer-of-responsibility date than the trial court had originally ordered. (*Stiavetti*, *supra*, 65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 731, 738.) In all other respects the judgment was affirmed, including the imposition of a 28-day deadline for commencement of substantive competency services, as well as the 30-month period for DSH and DDS to phase in the implementation of this deadline. (*Id.* at p. 738.)

2021) Alameda County Superior Court Case No. RG15779731, p. 4 [trial court amended judgment].)

III. FOLLOWING THE STIAVETTI APPELLATE DECISION, BOTH THE STIAVETTI TRIAL COURT AND SUPERIOR COURTS ACROSS THE STATE ARE SEEKING TO ENFORCE DSH'S COMPLIANCE WITH EITHER STIAVETTI'S DEADLINES OR THEIR OWN

Following the Court of Appeal's published opinion in *Stiavetti*, both the *Stiavetti* trial court and numerous other superior courts throughout the state have taken steps to enforce DSH's compliance with various (and often competing) court-imposed deadlines for the commencement of substantive competency services for IST defendants. Because of this inconsistent and unpredictable enforcement, DSH is facing duplicative and often competing litigation as different superior courts around the state seek to impose and enforce different deadlines for the commencement of competency services for IST defendants from their respective counties. These enforcement proceedings continue notwithstanding *Stiavetti*'s statewide permanent injunction and ongoing enforcement proceedings pursuant to its amended judgment, and the fact that all IST defendants committed to DSH are on the same statewide waitlist for admission to a treatment facility.

In *Stiavetti*, the superior court is currently overseeing and enforcing DSH's and DDS's compliance with the court's permanent injunction, which applies to all IST patients throughout the state. (*Stiavetti*, *supra*, 65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 714-715.) Recognizing that numerous practical realities make it essentially impossible for DSH to immediately meet the court's 28-day standard, the *Stiavetti* superior court created a 30-month phased timeline for DSH to come into compliance with the 28-day standard. (RJN, Exh. A, p. 4.) The court will oversee DSH's plan to come into compliance and enforce the injunction in the event of noncompliance. (RJN, Exh. A, pp. 4-5.) Because *Stiavetti*'s injunction applies statewide, any oversight and enforcement actions taken by the court will apply to all IST defendants in the state. (*Stiavetti*, *supra*, 65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 714-716; RJN, Exh. B, p. 4 [*Stiavetti* trial court amended judgment requiring compliance with phased requirements for commencement of substantive services for "all IST defendants"].)

Meanwhile, in the other 78 actions included in this petition, the superior courts have issued their own independent orders requiring DSH to commence substantive competency services

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within specific timelines set by those courts for particular IST defendants – all of whom are on the same statewide waitlist for all IST defendants committed to DSH and are already covered by the Stiavetti injunction. (Declaration of Sean M. Rashkis (Decl. Rashkis), ¶ 4.) Some of these superior courts order the immediate admission of the IST defendant at issue, or further complicate matters by holding DSH to a different standard than the one established in the Stiavetti judgment. (See RJN, Exhs. D, p. 2 ["directing DSH to immediately commence treatment"]; C, p. 6 [ordered to "admit and accept" defendant "no later than 21 days from the date of this order"]; E, p. 3 [DSH failed to admit defendant within "60 days" of the commitment order, and "within thirty days" of the prior OSC hearing]; M, p. 1 [On June 14, 2021, the Court ordered DSH to receive Defendant by June 18, 2021].) Each of these 78 actions involves either an order to show cause (OSC) why DSH should not be sanctioned for failing to comply with the court-ordered deadline for commencing substantive competency services, or a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking to require DSH to commence substantive competency services within a certain time or for the court to order that the Sheriff release the defendant from custody. (See RJN, Exhs. C, p. 6 [ordering DSH to "admit and accept petitioner" within 21 days and ordering the Orange County Sheriff's Department to deliver petitioner to DSH for care and treatment]; D, p. 2 [habeas proceedings].)

The deadlines imposed by the courts in these actions vary, with several following *Stiavetti*'s 28-day deadline but declining to follow *Stiavetti*'s 30-month phase-in for that deadline (See RJN, Exh. O, pp. 2-3 [recognizing the 28-day placement deadline in *Stiavetti* but ordering placement in a competency training program 11 days after an order granting writ of habeas corpus following an order to show cause]), and sometimes imposing deadline lengths that differ from *Stiavetti*'s statewide 28-day deadline (See RJN, Exhs. C, p. 6 [ordered to "admit and accept" defendant "no later than 21 days from the date of this order"]; D, p. 2 ["directing DSH to immediately commence treatment"]; E, p. 3 [DSH failed to admit defendant within "60 days" of the commitment order, and "within thirty days" of the prior OSC hearing]; M, p. 1 [On June 14, 2021, the Court ordered DSH to receive Defendant by June 18, 2021]). When these courts impose deadlines shorter than *Stiavetti*'s, they present DSH with a choice: follow the court's order and admit a particular IST defendant for treatment ahead of their position on the waitlist,

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disrupting DSH's ability to comply with the *Stiavetti* statewide injunction; or violate the court's order and face potential sanctions in order to treat all IST defendants fairly and maintain the integrity of the statewide waitlist. As previously noted, each of the IST defendants in these actions is also covered by the *Stiavetti* permanent injunction and ongoing enforcement proceedings.

The litany of actions to oversee or enforce DSH's compliance with deadlines to commence

thereby delaying the treatment of other IST defendants ahead of them on the waitlist and

substantive services tend to be lengthy and complex cases, and when DSH is unable to meet a deadline, the court generally must assess the reasons why and consider DSH's ongoing efforts to reduce IST wait times on a statewide basis as to whether they have good cause and substantial justification for non-compliance. The proceedings have often required DSH to call numerous evidentiary witnesses to testify regarding the multifaceted reasons for the length of the statewide waitlist—including but not limited to the lack of adequate behavioral and mental health treatment options in the community, as well as recent complications due to the COVID-19 pandemic—and DSH's various efforts to reduce the waitlist, such as increasing bed capacity, diverting people with serious mental illness charged with a felony into treatment instead of through the criminal justice system, JBCT programs, and community-based restoration (CBR) programs. (See RJN, Exh. F, pp. 3, 11 [four witnesses, bed capacity, JBCT]; D, pp. 2, 10-11 [admission procedures, bed capacity, JBCT, diversion].) These evidentiary hearings frequently extend over several court days and can often take several months to conclude, depending on the superior court's calendar. (See RJN, Exhs. G, p. 6 [six hearings over five months]; F, p. 3 [five hearings over three months]; H, p. 1 [24 days of hearings over one year].) Because all IST patients committed to DSH are placed on the same statewide waitlist for commencement of treatment, the testimony and documentary evidence in proceedings concerning the waitlist and DSH's compliance with courtordered treatment deadlines tends to be largely duplicative in each case regardless of the county or IST patient(s) involved.

Not only is this duplications litigation lengthy and complex, but it is also voluminous. The thousands of patients annually committed to DSH as IST, combined with the number of patients

on the waitlist, results in the same type of sanctions litigation expending countless judicial resources across the state. From July to December 2019, after the original *Stiavetti* trial court order was issued, DSH appeared 438 times in Order to Show Cause proceedings across the state, which all sought to impose sanctions on DSH for patients awaiting competency restoration. (Rashkis Decl., ¶ 3.) Although this litigation slowed during the early stages of COVID, DSH still was required to appear in 750 competency litigation proceedings in 2020. (*Ibid.*) But just as quickly, the pace of litigation regarding the waitlist resumed, and in the first half of 2021 (January to June) DSH made 668 appearances in superior courts on OSCs, followed by 972 appearances in superior courts on OSCs for the second half of 2021, all of which were regarding delayed admissions of patients for competency restoration. (*Ibid.*)

Moreover, the multitude of separate OSC proceedings result in inconsistent rulings impacting the statewide waitlist which frequently conflict with the amended judgment in *Stiavetti*. Rather than consuming unnecessary judicial resources by requiring DSH to appear in hundreds or thousands of mostly duplicative competency litigation proceedings per year, DSH could provide status reports to the superior court to update it on the status of the defendant's transportation to a competency restoration program.

ARGUMENT

I. STANDARD FOR COORDINATION

"When civil actions sharing a common question of fact or law are pending in different courts, a petition for coordination may be submitted to the Chairperson of the Judicial Council ... by all of the parties plaintiff or defendant in any such action." (Code Civ. Proc., § 404.) A petition for coordination must "be supported by a declaration stating facts showing that the actions are complex, as defined by the Judicial Council and that the actions meet the standards specified in Section 404.1." (Code Civ. Proc., § 404.)

Under section 404.1, pending complex cases are appropriate for coordination "if one judge hearing all of the cases for all purposes in a selected site or sites will promote the ends of justice," taking into account:

- 1. Whether a common question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the litigation;
- 2. The convenience of parties, witnesses, and counsel;
- 3. The relative development of the actions and the work product of counsel;
- 4. The efficient utilization of judicial facilities and manpower;
- 5. The calendar of the courts;
- 6. The disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and
- 7. The likelihood of settlement of the actions without further litigation should coordination be denied.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 404.1.)

II. THE 79 COMPETENCY SERVICES CASES ARE COMPLEX CIVIL PROCEEDINGS

As a threshold matter, the 79 competency services cases proposed for coordination are complex civil proceedings, and therefore, meet the initial criteria for coordination. They derive from, and are ancillary to, actions pending in criminal court, but proceed as civil proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure. (*People* v. *Lawley* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131 [although it arises in the context of a criminal trial, a competency hearing is a special proceeding, governed generally by the rules applicable to civil proceedings]; accord, *People v. Fields* (1965) 62 Cal.2d 538, 540.) Upon suspension of the criminal proceedings, interim proceedings concerning the patient's competency and treatment are special proceedings of a civil nature. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.130(c) & (f); *People v. Stanley* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 807 ["A proceeding to determine the mental competence of a criminal defendant to stand trial pursuant to . . . [Penal Code] section 1368 is a special proceeding civil in nature"].)⁷ Further, OSC hearings as to why the IST defendant has not begun receiving substantive competency services threaten DSH with sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 177.5, which is a civil proceeding.

Additionally, the 79 cases proposed to be coordinated are complex. A complex action is an action that "requires exceptional judicial management to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on

⁷ Here, the Director of DSH and the Director of DDS are the sole defendants in *Stiavetti* following the dismissal of the State of California on April 26, 2016, and DSH is the sole real party in interest to the other 78 coordination cases, which concern orders to show cause or petitions for writs of habeas corpus that seek to enforce orders requiring DSH to commence treatment of IST patients. DSH and DDS do not need the agreement of any additional parties or approval of the trial court to submit this petition. (Code Civ. Proc., § 404.) DSH and DDS have voluntarily solicited the views of the *Stiavetti* plaintiffs and they do not join in this petition. (Declaration of Colin Schoell (Schoell Decl.) ¶ 12.)

the court or the litigants." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.400(a).) Such a case may involve numerous time-consuming pretrial motions; a great number of witnesses or a substantial amount of evidence; many separately represented parties; related actions pending in other counties, states, or countries or in a federal court; or other issues. (*Id.*, rule 3.400(b).)

Here, Stiavetti was deemed complex and assigned to the complex-litigation department the same year it was filed. (Schoell Decl., \P 3.) The other 78 cases DSH and DDS seek to have coordinated with Stiavetti raise essentially the same issues and accordingly are complex as well, as described further below.

Each of the other 78 cases concern OSCs issued in connection with commitment orders or OSCs issued following the grant of a petition for habeas corpus that order DSH to admit an IST defendant on an expedited basis, or habeas writs ordering commencement of substantive competency services within a time frame that contradicts with the operative *Stiavetti* judgment. Regardless of the origin, these proceedings seek to enforce DSH's compliance with court-ordered deadlines to commence substantive competency restoration services under threat of sanctions. (Rashkis Decl., ¶ 3.) The proceedings assess whether DSH is unable to comply and, if so, why that is and what efforts DSH is undertaking to cure its compliance deficiencies. (See, e.g., RJN, Exh. E, p. 8 [endeavoring to establish whether DSH can "show cause, if any exists, as to why defendant has not been placed with Department of State Hospitals as ordered by this Court on July 28, 2021, and order, which is still in full force and effect."].)

In many recent instances, similar hearings have spanned months and required dozens of hours of testimony. (See *People v. Kareem A.* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 58, 64-69 [noting the consolidated appeal of four separate sanctions orders stemmed from extensive briefing and two evidentiary hearings relating to 247 IST defendants, which required testimony from five DSH employees being questioned at length]; RJN, Exh. F, pp. 1-2 [consolidated proceedings of 8 defendants, including 5 days of hearings spanning four months]; Exh. I, pp. 1-2 [consolidated proceedings of 15 defendants spanning three months]; Exh. G, pp. 1-2, 5-6 [consolidated proceedings of 29 defendants spanning 7 months]; Exh. H, pp. 1, 16 [consolidated proceedings of 10 defendants, including 24 days of hearings spanning one year].) As evidenced by the orders to

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show cause included in the instant petition, many of the recent and current competency services proceedings have already been consolidated in preparation for hearings of similar length and scope. (Rashkis Decl., ¶ 3; See RJN, Exhs. D [3 defendants]; F [8 defendants]; G [29 defendants]; H [10 defendants]; I [15 defendants]; J [140 defendants]; K [18 defendants]; L [3 defendants].) In advance of these evidentiary hearings, there is often significant civil discovery and motion work, including but not limited to discovery regarding DSH's efforts to increase the capacity of its competency treatment programs and the ongoing impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. (See RJN, Exh. F, pp. 11, 16, 19 [analyzing bed capacity changes, telehealth services, Jail-Based Competency Training, intergovernmental efforts, and COVID-19 impacts].) Much of this civil discovery and motion work is duplicative of the work done in other competency services proceedings because it centers on DSH's efforts to address the IST waitlist. Relevant evidence has generally included legislative reports, budgetary documents, expert reports, and materials concerning community mental health resources, JBCT programs, CBR programs, and diversion. (See, e.g., RJN, Exhs. I, pp. 5, 21-31 [analyzing at length documentary evidence including the Governor's Budget Estimates for DSH FY 2018-2019, the May Revise of the Governor's Budget Estimates for DSH FY 2018-19, Mental Health Services Oversight & Accountability Commission Report entitled, "Reducing Criminal Justice Involvement for People with Mental Illness," dated November 2017]; J, pp. 23-29 [analyzing evidence regarding impacts of jail-based competency treatment, new regulations, and bed capacity in omnibus sanctions proceeding related to placement of 140 IST defendants.)

The complexity of each hearing is exacerbated by the complexity of the statewide system for administering competency services. As discussed above, DSH places all criminal defendants committed to its custody for competency services on a single waitlist in order of commitment date. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 4710.) While a commitment order does not explicitly demand that a defendant jump the waitlist, a threat of sanction proceedings, by way of an Order to Show Cause or a habeas petition threatening to penalize DSH for anything other than immediate admission, does. Such an immediate admission for a particular IST defendant would have the effect of pushing back the admission of every other IST defendant ahead of them on the waitlist,

impacting competency services proceedings in other courts and counties. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.400(b) [listing among the factors that make a matter complex the existence of related actions pending in other counties].)

DSH, in particular, functions as a central point of contact for managing thousands of patient commitments every year to provide people with the care they need. DSH sends patients from 58 counties to one of four hospitals that treat IST patients, or serving them through JBCT programs, county-run and DSH-funded diversion programs, or through CBR or other alternative treatment programs, amounting to 12,088 referrals over the last three years. (Thomson Decl., ¶ 4.) All IST commitments are processed by a division of DSH called the Patient Management Unit (PMU). PMU is responsible for receiving and reviewing the commitment documents that are required by Penal Code section 1370, subdivision (a)(3). (*Id.*, ¶ 3.) PMU also maintains DSH's statewide waitlist to ensure that IST referrals are prioritized by their respective commitment dates in the event a commitment packet is not timely delivered to DSH by committing courts, or when an IST patient is treated in a DSH Mental Health Diversion program or Community Based Restoration Program and thereafter requires a higher level of care in a DSH facility. (*Ibid.*)

A patient's placement among the four state hospitals might be further limited by the nature of the charges alleged, special medical needs, the degree of psychiatric acuity, the individual's propensity for violence, or a history of elopement. (*Id.*, ¶ 4.) Unless a compelling reason is indicated for an alternative DSH facility placement, PMU makes an effort to place IST referrals in a facility that is closest to the IST's county of residence. (*Id.*, ¶ 4.) The safety measures taken in response to COVID-19, detailed in the Factual Background, *supra*, have greatly impacted the hospitals' ability to admit and integrate new patients from county jails into the hospitals. (*Id.*, ¶ 7; see also RJN, Exh. F, p. 19 [analyzing impact of COVID-19, Executive Order N-35-20, and DSH Directive dated March 23, 2020, suspending admission of patients to DSH facilities in the context of need to protect patient safety].)

In short, hearings held to enforce commitment orders are inherently complex for a variety of reasons, including: the sophisticated psychiatric testimony that is typically delivered; the months

⁸ See Welfare and Institutions Code, section 7234, subdivision (b)(2).

of preparation, discovery, and law and motion work that these proceedings frequently require; the interrelatedness of all IST enforcement proceedings throughout the state given that all IST defendants committed to DSH are placed on the same statewide waitlist for commencement of substantive competency services; and because so much of the evidence and testimony revolve around DSH's ongoing efforts to address the IST waitlist on multiple fronts, as well as DSH's role in centrally managing the placement of all patient commitments statewide.

III. COORDINATION WILL PROMOTE JUDICIAL ECONOMY AND SERVE THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE

Statewide coordination of the 79 competency services cases will promote judicial economy, serve the interest of justice, and will likely advance at least five of Code of Civil Procedure section 404.1's explicit considerations.

A. Common Questions of Fact and Law Are Predominating and Significant.

Above all else, the 79 cases DSH and DDS seek to have coordinated concern common questions of fact and law that are predominating and significant to the litigation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 404.1.)

Each of the enforcement proceedings share essentially identical questions of law and fact with *Stiavetti*. Each individual case concerns the oversight and enforcement of DSH's duty to commence substantive competency services for a particular IST defendant, and in virtually every case, the primary reason for the delay in commencing treatment is the fact that DSH's treatment facilities are full and thus, the defendant is awaiting their turn on the statewide waitlist for treatment along with every IST patient committed after them. (See, e.g., RJN, Exh. F, pp. 11, 16, 19 [analyzing the impacts of DSH programs, intergovernmental efforts, and COVID-19 on DSH's waitlist].) *Stiavetti* concerns the exact same issues—oversight and enforcement of DSH's compliance with the court-ordered timeline to commence substantive competency services—but does so for all IST defendants on a statewide basis. Thus, each individual enforcement proceeding is almost entirely, if not wholly, duplicative of the ongoing oversight and enforcement action in *Stiavetti*.

Beyond the fact that each of the other 78 cases concerns IST defendants who are already covered by *Stiavetti*'s permanent injunction, all of these cases involve the same agency, DSH, and the overwhelming majority of factual disputes concern the placement policies, budgeting, and operations of DSH, as well as the admission, discharge, and wait-listing of those committed to DSH's care. In each of these cases, the courts are endeavoring to understand the complex reasons why DSH is currently unable to meet the timeline imposed by the court, and what efforts DSH is undertaking to be able to meet that standard. (See, e.g., RJN, Exh. I, pp. 5-6, 21-31 [analyzing the Governor's Budget Estimates and a 2017 Mental Health Services Oversight & Accountability Commission Report].) Ultimately, the trial courts must determine whether DSH's efforts are reasonable and sufficient in light of the barriers it faces.

For all these reasons, the enforcement proceedings overwhelmingly share common, and in many instances, identical, questions of fact and law.

B. Coordination Will Advance the Efficient Utilization of Judicial Resources.

Coordination is also appropriate because it will promote the "efficient utilization of judicial facilities and manpower" and lessen the burden on the "calendar of the courts." (Code Civ. Proc., § 404.1.) As an initial matter, the sheer number of these proceedings imposes an immense impact on judicial economy. From July to December 2019, after the original *Stiavetti* trial court order was issued, DSH appeared 438 times in Order to Show Cause proceedings across the state, all of which involved efforts to impose sanctions on DSH for patients awaiting competency restoration. (Rashkis Decl., ¶ 3.) Since then, the number of appearances has grown significantly. Courts required DSH to appear in 750 competency litigation proceedings in 2020 and 1,640 appearances in OSCs in 2021 regarding delayed admissions for patients. (*Ibid.*) These thousands of appearances are not an efficient utilization of judicial facilities and personnel, and it cannot be disputed that these OSCs are a severe burden on the courts' calendars.

The enforcement hearings at issue also frequently require civil discovery and law and motion practice; they have historically involved all manner of pre-hearing disputes; and the hearings themselves have often required multiple court days and, including continuances, have taken as long as 14 months to complete. (Schoell Decl., ¶ 10.) Meanwhile, DSH's ongoing

efforts to comply with the phased milestones toward the statewide 28-day standard established in *Stiavetti* are being directly adjudicated—and, to the extent necessary and appropriate, will be enforced—by the *Staivetti* court. Thus, if these actions are not coordinated, superior courts across California will continue to preside over lengthy hearings in multiple different proceedings, duplicative of *Stiavetti*, that will strain the courts' resources. Furthermore, COVID-19 has strained the court system, and the result of DSH's pandemic admission protocols has been to lengthen the IST waitlist at the very time that courts are least available to handle these proceedings. (See RJN, Exh. 1 (*Afre*), p. 19 [analyzing impact of COVID-19 and finding good cause and a substantial justification for DSH's non-compliance].)

In short, piecemeal adjudication of the issues relating to DSH's statewide IST waitlist in multiple duplicative and potentially inconsistent proceedings is an inefficient use of judicial resources, placing an unnecessary strain on courts' calendars and burdening judges, court clerks, and judicial staff. Coordination of the 79 cases—as well as any future such cases—in a single proceeding would ease the burden on courts' calendars and better utilize judicial resources.

C. Coordination Will Avoid Duplicative and Inconsistent Rulings and Orders.

Coordination of competency services cases is also supported by section 404.1's criteria concerning "the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments." (Code Civ. Proc., § 404.1.) As discussed in greater detail above, DSH operates a single waitlist serving all criminal defendants committed to its custody for competency services, and defendants are placed by order of commitment date. While a commitment order does not explicitly suggest that any single IST defendant jump the waitlist, a threat of sanctions, by way of an order to show cause flowing from a commitment order or a habeas writ ordering immediate admission, asks DSH to violate California Code of Regulations, title 9, section 4710, which prohibits DSH from admitting any IST defendant before others with earlier dates of commitment, subject only to limited exceptions for cases of psychiatric acuity. Given the statewide IST waitlist, enforcement of individual commitment orders has the effect of creating inconsistency about who should be

⁹ Due to their recurring nature, Petitioners expect to submit add-on petitions to coordinate future iterations of these same type of cases, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.531.

admitted next.

Duplicative and inconsistent rulings will also result from the current county-by-county adjudication of the individual enforcement proceedings that are duplicative of the statewide *Stiavetti* proceedings. For example, because each IST patient is admitted for treatment based on a statewide waitlist, any order in any case that affects the waitlist—such as ordering DSH to immediately begin treating a patient who is not first on the waitlist—will directly affect DSH's timeline for admitting other patients, whose admission for treatment may be delayed if they are displaced from their position on the list. (Thomson Decl., ¶ 6.) This creates a significant risk that different superior courts might issue directly conflicting orders, such as two or more courts each ordering DSH to immediately admit different patients to a single open treatment bed, or different courts setting different admission deadlines for the same patient. Indeed, some superior courts are issuing admission deadlines that are different from the statewide 28-day deadline, with a 30-month phase-in period, established in *Stiavetti*. (See RJN, Ex. E, p. 8 [finding that DSH "failed to admit the Defendant to the State Hospital no more than 60 days after the date the Defendant was committed on August 3, 2021" over a year in advance of the August 27, 2022, phased deadline in the *Stiavetti* trial court]).

Piecemeal proceedings create a further risk that if the courts seek to enforce DSH's compliance with commencement-of-services deadlines through sanctions, DSH could be sanctioned twice by two separate courts for the same IST patient—once in *Stiavetti* and a second time in the court handling the individual patient's case. Finally, different courts could issue duplicative or conflicting orders concerning the reasonableness and sufficiency of DSH's efforts to come into compliance with court-ordered deadlines, as DSH's compliance efforts are a statewide undertaking. Coordination would avoid such duplicative and cross-purpose rulings.

D. All Cases Proposed to Be Coordinated Are at the Same Relative Stage of Adjudication.

Additionally, the cases DSH and DDS seek to coordinate are at the same relative stage of adjudication. (Code Civ. Proc., § 404.1.) Unlike most coordinated actions, the proceedings DSH and DDS propose to coordinate are at their "end" stages. In *Stiavetti*, judgment has issued, and in

each competency services proceeding, a commitment order has issued. The only remaining task of the courts is to monitor compliance, and to tackle questions of non-compliance, with the orders they have issued. The dominant concern underlying the compliance inquiry is whether DSH has taken adequate steps toward reducing its waitlist and providing timely substantive competency services. Ultimately, the courts wrestling with waitlist litigation are all asking the same fundamental question—that is, how the court can go about enforcing DSH's compliance with court-ordered deadlines for the commencement of substantive competency services. To this end, if these cases are coordinated in a centralized department, DSH still intends to provide criminal courts with status reports on commencement of substantive competency services for IST defendants so those courts are aware of the ongoing progress toward competency in each coordinated matter. In fact, in 2020 and 2021, DSH filed 768 reports of this nature with the courts, and if required, DSH does not object to continuing to file these reports in the future. (Rashkis Decl., ¶ 3.) DSH does not seek to prevent the courts from remaining informed of the status of the IST defendants on the waitlist. Rather, this petition is intended to maximize the efficiency of the judicial process.

E. The Remaining "Ends of Justice" Considerations Are Less Applicable.

The two remaining considerations of the "ends of justice" inquiry are less applicable to the instant proposal. Due to the widespread and unique nature of competency services proceedings, forum convenience and likelihood of settlement do not counsel in favor or against coordination. First, as to the convenience of the parties, witnesses, and counsel, there is no single county that is more convenient than the others. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 404.1.) Alameda County Superior Court is convenient for DSH witnesses and counsel and is the venue for *Stiavetti*, to which all the included actions are related. (Rashkis Decl., ¶ 4.) The eleven counties from which the remaining cases would be transferred 11 vary in distance from Alameda County. Because the proceedings to

11 The eleven counties are Alameda, Butte, Orange, Santa Barbara, Shasta, Solano, Sonoma, Stanislaus, Tuolumne, Ventura, and Yolo.

In 2020, DSH's legal division filed 272 of these reports. For January to June 2021, DSH's Legal Division filed 333 of these reports. And for July 2021 to December 2021, DSH's Legal Division filed 163 of these reports.

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enforce commitment orders often continue long after the defendants have in fact received substantive competency services, the defendants themselves may no longer even be in the county's custody or have IST status. (See, e.g., RJN, Exh. F, pp. 3-8 [conducting evidentiary hearings on five days over a three-month period between March and June 2021 and issuing an order on September 10, 2021, long after DSH had issued Certifications of Mental Competency or the IST defendants were otherwise restored to competence].)

Second, the likelihood of settlement should coordination be denied is less pertinent to the analysis, as these cases are not of a type that can typically be settled. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 404.1.) Foremost, the fact that a statewide waitlist exists means that if the instant petition is denied, any advancement of one defendant negatively affects the remainder of them—each commitment is connected and, if subject to negotiation, each placement would create a competition among and between wait-listed defendants. Second, the cases are difficult, if not impossible, to settle because of the status of the proceedings. In Stiavetti, because the matter is post-judgment, there does not appear to be any remaining dispute between the parties that could be settled in the ordinary sense. DSH is working on multiple fronts to bring the system into compliance with the court-ordered 28-day deadline over the 30-month phase-in period. If DSH is able to bring the system into compliance and meet the court's timelines, the case should end, and if DSH is unable to meet these timelines, the court will determine the appropriate remedy at that time. Similarly, in the 78 other enforcement proceedings to be coordinated with Stiavetti, the order committing an IST defendant to DSH's custody is final—substantive competency services are due, and only commencing the services can resolve the dispute. Individual superior courts issuing sanctions against DSH will not speed up the process, because, generally, DSH is bound by regulation to schedule admission of IST defendants according to their date of commitment. The nature of the proceedings makes the matters generally unsuitable for settlement—in delivering substantive competency services to waitlisted defendants, services have either commenced or they have not, and it does not appear that any in-between currently exists that would enable an agreement in compromise to accelerate the waitlist. Finally, to the extent any settlement is possible, it would have to be a global settlement, and thus, coordination would only enhance, not

hinder, what little potential for settlement might exist.

In sum, the competency services cases qualify for coordination under section 404.1, and the ends of justice will be served by bringing these interrelated and largely duplicative proceedings before a single court, where judicial resources can effectively and efficiently focus on one common goal: shortening the statewide IST waitlist.

IV. ALAMEDA COUNTY IS BEST SITUATED TO HANDLE THE COORDINATED COMPETENCY PROCEEDINGS

DSH and DDS propose Alameda County Superior Court as the venue for the coordinated action because it is already managing implementation of the statewide judgment in *Stiavetti*, which affects every IST patient in the state who is awaiting the commencement of substantive competency services. Put another way, receipt of the transferred cases does not significantly expand or add to the scope of the *Stiavetti* court's work—but it does greatly diminish the burden on other superior courts.

As a threshold matter, DSH and DDS seek to coordinate only proceedings that oversee or enforce DSH's compliance with the 28-day deadline to commence treatment, as set forth by *Stiavetti*. DSH does not wish to coordinate other logistical concerns related to the commencement of substantive services, specifically transportation of IST defendants on the waitlist, which may be more appropriately left to the courts in the counties where IST defendants are detained. The *Stiavetti* judgment requires DSH to provide all waitlisted defendants, regardless of their county of origin, with substantive competency services within (ultimately) 28 days of service of the commitment packet on DSH. (Schoell Decl. ¶ 8.)¹² The judgment also requires DSH and DDS to file four status reports identifying: (1) the number of defendants found incompetent to stand trial that DSH and DDS have responsibility for at the *beginning* of specified milestone dates; (2) the number of criminal defendants that DSH and DDS have responsibility for

The Honorable Winifred Smith, of Department 21, retired in 2021. *Stiavetti* is now pending before the Honorable Evelio Grillo, who was transferred to Department 21 (Complex Litigation) following Judge Smith's retirement. If, for any reason, Judge Grillo cannot preside over the coordinated matter, Alameda County Superior Court has other complex judges well-qualified to handle the coordinated actions.

at the end of those milestones; (3) the number of new defendants found incompetent to stand trial and committed to DSH or DDS custody that have been added to the waitlist between the milestones; (4) the average and median wait times between the milestones; and (5) the range of wait times between the milestones. (See RJN, Exh. B, at p. 5.)¹³ As evidenced by these terms from the Stiavetti amended judgment, the Stiavetti court intends to analyze aggregate data tracking implementation of its statewide order, and to account for any competency services that are not timely delivered to an in-custody criminal defendant declared incompetent to stand trial. In short, Alameda County is already doing the work of ensuring no defendant's competency services are delayed without penalty, and would be the jurisdiction best suited to, and least burdened by, receipt of the coordinated actions.

CONCLUSION

For all the above reasons, the Judicial Council should issue an order under Code of Civil Procedure section 404 coordinating the instant 79 proceedings and transferring them to Alameda County Superior Court, where they can be adjudicated before a single judge.

Respectfully submitted,

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ROB BONTA

Dated: July 20, 2022

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Reporting requirements (1) and (2) must also include a breakdown of how many criminal defendants were in a hospital, treatment facility, outpatient program, jail-based competency treatment program, other facilities or programs under DSH's or DDS's supervision, and how many criminal defendants are not yet receiving substantive services. (See RJN, Exh. B. p. 5.)

- 4		Judicial Council of California
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12		6000
13	STEPHANIE STIAVETTI, et al.	JCCP Case No.
14	Plaintiffs,	DECLARATION OF JACI THOMSON IN
15	V.	SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' PETITION FOR COORDINATION TO
16	**	THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL RE: COMPETENCY SERVICES FOR
17	STEPHANIE CLENDENIN, et al	DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL
18	Defendants.	
19	Alameda Cnty. Super. Ct. Case No. RG157779731	
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I, Jaci Thomson, do hereby declare as follows:

- 1. I am the Deputy Director of Hospital Strategic Planning and Implementation for the Department of State Hospitals (DSH). The facts set forth herein are of my own personal knowledge and if sworn I could and would testify competently hereto.
- 2. In the course of my duties, I oversee key functions supporting DSH's hospital operations, including, but not limited to, patient referral processing, system-wide admission coordination, data analytics, and policy and regulation development. Specifically, I facilitate bed activation and planning, including beds utilized for provision of restorative care to criminal defendants declared incompetent to stand trial (IST), and oversee census and patient movement tracking and reporting. I also manage the development of patient population projections for capacity and other planning. I have held this position since September 20, 2021.
- 3. DSH receives service of several thousand court-ordered, incompetent to stand trial (IST) commitments from each of California's 58 counties every year. DSH prioritizes and sequences these commitments based on the date of commitment, pursuant to title 9 California Code of Regulations, section 4710. All IST commitments are processed by a division of DSH called the Patient Management Unit (PMU). PMU is responsible for receiving and reviewing the commitment documents that are required by Penal Code section 1370, subdivision (a)(3). PMU also maintains DSH's statewide waitlist to ensure that IST referrals are prioritized by their respective commitment dates in the event a commitment packet is not timely delivered to DSH by committing courts, and/or when an IST is treated in a DSH Mental Health Diversion program or Community Based Restoration Program and thereafter requires a higher level of care in a DSH facility.
- 4. DSH places IST defendants at one of a variety of DSH facilities¹ located throughout the State. An IST patient's placement is impacted by the nature of the charges alleged, special medical needs, the degree of psychiatric acuity, the IST's propensity for violence, or a history of elopement. DSH may place an IST referral in an inpatient facility at one of the

¹ Facilities under the jurisdiction of DSH are defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 4100.

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four state hospitals that treats IST patients, to one of 22 jail-based competency treatment (JBCT) programs, six of which may accept IST referrals from other counties, or the Admission Evaluation and Stabilization (AES) facility located in the Kern County Jail, or the recently opened the Sacramento Behavioral Health Hospital, an Institute for Mental Disease located in Sacramento. Alternatively, courts may refer an IST for outpatient treatment though contracted services with DSH under its Mental Health Diversion and community-based restoration (CBR) programs. Over the last three years, DSH received 12,088 referrals for IST treatment.² As of July 4, 2022, there were 1,739 IST defendants on DSH's statewide waitlist.

DSH undertook, and continues to make, significant efforts to address its waitlist. 5. However, COVID-19 impacted these gains due to the census reductions DSH made to implement isolation and quarantine spaces and the admission protocols recommended by public health experts. Since March of 2020, DSH suspended admission and/or discharges several times in response to COVID-19 and subsequent variants. The initial decision to suspend admissions occurred on March 23, 2020, was for 30-days, and was continued on April 23, 2020, for an additional 30-days. The Omicron variant impacted both staff and patients at DSH Hospitals and, as a result, the number of positive cases, units on quarantine, including admission units, increased significantly. As a result, DSH's Director temporarily suspended IST admissions on January 12, 2021, for 30-days due to the impact of the Delta variant of the COVID-19 virus. The most recent suspension occurred on January 3, 2022, for 30-days, with an extension of up to 30-days on February 2, 2022, , due to the growing impact of the Omicron variant of the COVID-19 virus. A copy of these Directives can be found at: https://www.dsh.ca.gov/COVID-19/notices.html> (last visited Jul. 5, 2022). DSH's statewide waitlist was further exacerbated by several factors arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, including: the need to suspend admissions to state hospitals, county transportation scheduling issues, COVID-19 outbreaks and quarantines at the county jails, and not receiving timely medical screenings and COVID-19 test results from committing counties for incoming patient admissions. These combined factors resulted in delayed and/or rescheduled

² ISTs that initially receive competency treatment at a JBCT or AES program, but are later deemed to require additional treatment at a state hospital, remain at the relevant JBCT or AES program and are admitted to a state hospital based on the initial commitment date.

admissions, which further impacts the statewide waitlist. The admission suspensions protected the health, safety, and welfare of patients by controlling admissions for the benefit of those that are at increased risk of developing severe COVID-19, given that the introduction of new persons is one of the most significant risk vectors to the spread of COVID-19. As of July 5, 2022, COVID-19 quarantines impacted those DSH Hospitals serving ISTs as follows: (i) DSH-Atascadero – 18 units on quarantine; (ii) DSH-Metropolitan – 8 units on quarantine; (iii) DSH-Napa – 14 units on quarantine; and (iv) DSH-Patton – 25 units on quarantine. When units at a State Hospital are placed on quarantine, the impacted Hospital cannot admit any new IST defendants to that unit until that unit comes off quarantine, which may prevent new admissions and can prevent movement to a permanent unit for treatment.

6. Because each IST patient is admitted for treatment based on a statewide waitlist, any order in any case that affects the waitlist—such as ordering DSH to immediately begin treating a patient who is not first on the waitlist—will directly affect DSH's timeline for admitting other patients, whose admission for treatment may be delayed if they are displaced from their position on the list.

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date: July 8, 2022

Jaci Thomson Deputy Director

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RECEIVED Judicial Council of California **ROB BONTA** 1 Attorney General of California JUL 2 0 2022 2 GREGORY D. BROWN Supervising Deputy Attorney General 3 COLIN D. SCHOELL Deputy Attorney General State Bar No. 332896 4 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 5 Telephone: (415) 510-3547 Fax: (415) 703-5843 6 E-mail: Colin.Schoell@doj.ca.gov Attorneys for the California Department of State 7 Hospitals and the California Department of Exempt from Filing Fees — Gov. Code, § 6103 Development Services 8 9 10 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 13 JCCP Case No. STEPHANIE STIAVETTI, et al. 14 DECLARATION OF SEAN M Plaintiffs, RASHKIS IN SUPPORT OF 15 **DEFENDANTS' PETITION FOR** COORDINATION TO THE JUDICIAL 16 **COUNCIL RE:** COMPETENCY SERVICES FOR STEPHANIE CLENDENIN, et al 17 **DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT** TO STAND TRIAL 18 Defendants. Alameda Cnty. Super. Ct. Case No. 19 RG157779731 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1

I, Sean Mark Rashkis, do hereby declare as follows:

- I am an Assistant Chief Counsel in the Legal Division of the Department of State Hospitals (DSH). The facts set forth herein are of my own personal knowledge and if sworn I could and would testify competently hereto.
- 2. In the course of my duties, I supervise staff attorneys that represent DSH and serve as the liaison to the California Attorney General's Office for many cases referred to that office, including hearings relating to substantive competency services for criminal defendants committed to DSH under Penal Code section 1370. I have served in this role for over six years.
- 3. From July to December 2019, after the original *Stiavetti* trial court judgment was issued, DSH appeared 438 times in Order to Show Cause proceedings across the state, all of which sought to hold DSH in contempt for patients awaiting competency restoration. Although this litigation slowed during the early stages of COVID, DSH still was required to appear in 750 competency litigation proceedings in 2020. But just as quickly, the pace of litigation regarding the waitlist resumed, and in the first half of 2021 (January to June) DSH made 668 appearances in Superior Courts on OSCs, followed by 972 appearances in Superior Courts on OSCs for the last six months of 2021, all of which were regarding delayed admissions of patients for competency restoration and many of which were consolidated for evidentiary hearings. DSH routinely files status reports with courts throughout the state on status of admission for IST defendants to a DSH facility. For 2020, DSH's Legal Division filed 272 of these status reports. For January to June 2021, the Division filed 333 of these reports. For July 2021 to December 2021, the Division filed 163 of these reports. In addition to formal filings, DSH's Patient Management Unit consistently communicates with courts and defense counsel by phone or email to provide status of admission.
- 4. Alameda County Superior Court is convenient for DSH witnesses and counsel, and, as a supervisor of attorneys that appear in such matters, there is simply no single county that is ideal for all witnesses and counsel, as they routinely come from all over the State. The contact information for counsel of the included actions is attached hereto as Exhibit B. The most relevant information to criminal defendants from these hearings, however, are the status reports regarding their current place on the waitlist, which DSH currently provides and can continue to provide to

	1.0.1.	1'1 4										
1		s while the matters are coordinated for sanctions purposes. DSH included cases from										
2	the 11 Co	unties that are part of this Petition because of an inconsistent application of the Stiavetti										
3	decision and/or its compliance framework, such inconsistency resulted in the setting of multiple											
4	OSCs in each County, sometimes with minimal advance notice, and with these OSCs set in the											
5	same courthouse multiple days each week. A true and correct copy of the 79 cases included for											
6	coordination are attached hereto as Exhibit A and listed below, with 78 of those being OSC											
7	proceedings challenging DSH's waitlist for IST criminal defendants and seeking to enforce											
8	DSH's compliance with court-ordered deadlines to commence substantive competency restoration											
9	services:											
10	a.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. KUMONEE BUTLER;										
11		Filing County: Alameda; Case Number: 21-MH010020-1; 21-MH-005438-1; 21-MH-010046; 21-MH-005472;										
12		Filing Date: 2/2/2022										
13	b.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. SHAQUIN FERGUSON; Filing County: Alameda;										
14	,	Case Number: 20-MH-005617; 19-MH009119-1; 21-MH-005839-1; Filing Date: 2/4/2022										
15	c.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. DARIO FRANCO;										
16		Filing County: Alameda; Case Number: 22-MH-003675-1; 22-MH-001935-1; 22-MH-000832-1;21-MH-										
17		014648-1; 21-MH-0069601; Filing Date: 4/15/2022										
18	d.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. JESUS HEREDIA ESTRADA;										
19		Filing County: Alameda; Case Number: 21-MH-005194-1;										
20		Filing Date: 2/4/2022										
21	е.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. MARIA OREBEL MENDEZ; Filing County: Alameda;										
22		Case Number: 21-MH-009758-1; Filing Date: 12/17/2021										
23	f.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. LEONEL MIRANDA;										
24		Filing County: Alameda; Case Number: 21-MH-014828-1;										
25		Filing Date: 5/27/2022										
26	g.	Case Name: STIAVETTI v. CLENDENIN, et al. Filing County: Alameda										
27		Case Number: RG15779731 Filing Date: 07/29/2015										
28	///	3										

1	h.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. MICHAEL TECKLE; Filing County: Alameda;
2		Case Number: 21MH005420; Filing Date: 2/4/2022
3	i.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. CHARLES ANDERS;
4		Filing County: Butte; Case Number: 21CF04542-1;
5		Filing Date: 2/9/2022
6	j.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. JOEL BIGGINTON;
7		Filing County: Butte; Case Number: 19CF02615-4;
8	_	Filing Date: 1/12/2022
9	k.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. HALEY BOWEN; Filing County: Butte;
10		Case Number: 21CF05246-1; Filing Date: 2/9/2022
11	1.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. VICTORIA FLOYD;
12		Filing County: Butte; Case Number: 21CF05620-1;
13		Filing Date: 2/23/2022
14	m.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. JEFFERY HAGAR; Filing County: Butte;
15		Case Number: 20CF03938-1; Filing Date: 12/29/2021
16	n.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. KAO LAO;
17		Filing County: Butte; Case Number: 21CF06521-1;
18		Filing Date: 4/20/2022
19	0.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. RHONDA LAURIE MAGNUSSON; Filing County: Butte;
20		Case Number: 21CF03671-1; Filing Date: 1/20/2022
21		Case Name: PEOPLE v. KEITH RYAN MILNER
	p.	Filing County: Butte
22		Case Number: 21CF06346-1 Filing Date: 05/09/2022
23	q.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. CAMERON ALEXANDER NAVARRO;
24		Filing County: Butte; Case Number: 18CF05593-1;
25		Filing Date: 12/30/2021
26	r.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. JOHN A. ROOD; Filing County: Butte;
27		Case Number: 21CF04975-1; Filing Date: 4/7/2022
28		4 4 11/2022

		- Time to the state of the stat
1 2	S.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. PAUL STEVE SEGURA; Filing County: Butte; Case Number: 21CF04579-1; Filing Date: 12/30/2021
3	t.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. JAVIER AGUILAR; Filing County: Orange; Case Number: 21CF2712; 21CF2878; 21CM12060;
5		Filing Date: 2/15/2022
6 7	u.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. DONALD EARL BENJAMIN; Filing County: Orange; Case Number: 21CF2511; Filing Date: 3/10/2022
8 9 10	v.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. JOSEPH BRAHAM; Filing County: Orange; Case Number: 21CF3526; Filing Date: 3/23/2022
11	w.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. JASEN CORDIERO; Filing County: Orange;
12		Case Number: M-19685 X A; Filing Date: 3/16/2022
13 14	x.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. JOSHUA EASTMAN; Filing County: Orange; Case Number: 21CF3420;
15		Filing Date: 3/30/2022
16 17	y.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. AMINADAB GAXIOLOA GONZALEZ; Filing County: Orange; Case Number: M-19498 X A; Filing Date: 12/1/2021
18	Z.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. DERRION GIBSON;
19 20		Filing County: Orange; Case Number: 21WF2638; Filing Date: 2/4/2022
21	aa.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. WILLIAM GUNDISALVUS;
22		Filing County: Orange; Case Number: 22WF0353; 22WF0304; Filing Date: 4/11/2022
23	bb.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. NORMA GORDIAN JIMENEZ;
2425		Filing County: Orange; Case Number: 21CF2525; Filing Date: 1/28/2022
26	cc.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. STEPHEN ALEXANDER McGAVOCK; Filing County: Orange;
27		Case Number: 21HF1730; Filing Date: 12/20/2021
28		5

1	dd.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. GEORGE THOMAS NASSIF;
2		Filing County: Orange; Case Number: M-19585 X A; Filing Date: 12/15/2021
3	ee.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. ALFRED CHRIS NUNEZ;
4		Filing County: Orange; Case Number: 21WF2129;
5		Filing Date: 11/30/2021
6	ff.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. JOSE SALAS; Filing County: Orange;
7		Case Number: M19773; Filing Date: 2/9/2022
8	gg.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. REYNALDO SOTO;
9		Filing County: Orange; Case Number: 18CR03245; 19CR04509; 21CR06895; 21CR06903; 21CR06926;
10		21CR07546; Filing Date: 1/28/2022
11	hh.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. ANDREW JINHYUN YOON;
12		Filing County: Orange; Case Number: M-19495; 21CF1652;
13		Filing Date: 12/1/2021
14	ii.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. JESUS AGUILAR; Filing County: Santa Barbara;
15		Case Number: 21CR02344; 22CR00014; 22CR00508; 22CR01064; Filing Date: 3/11/2022
16	jj.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. ELIAS BANALES;
17		Filing County: Santa Barbara; Case Number: 21CR06204; 21CR07723;
18		Filing Date: 3/11/2022
19	kk.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. ALONZO BROWN; Filing County: Santa Barbara;
20		Case Number: 20CR06969; 20CR04014; 20CR07507; Filing Date: 2/18/2022
21	11.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. TORREY DUNSON;
22		Filing County: Santa Barbara; Case Number: 20CRR01062; 20CR05645; 20CR04301;
23		Filing Date: 3/11/2022
24	mm.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. PATRICIA MICHELLE MCCOY; Filing County: Santa Barbara; Case Name 21 CR 207111, 20 CR 21680.
25		Case Number: 21CR00711; 20CR01680; Filing Date: 3/18/2021
26	nn.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. KEITH DAVID MILTON;
27	÷-	Filing County: Santa Barbara; Case Number: 21CR06670; 21CR05007; 20CR06290; 19CR09821;
28		Filing Date: 3/11/2022 6

1	00.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. JUAN PACHECO; Filing County: Santa Barbara;
2		Case Number: 20CR06230; 20CR08068; 21CR05344; 22CR00578; 22CR01424; Filing Date: 3/11/2022
4	pp.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. GERRARDO RAMIREZ; Filing County: Santa Barbara;
5		Case Number: 20CR02270; Filing Date: 7/10/2022
6	qq.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. STEPHEN WADSWORTH; Filing County: Santa Barbara;
7 8		Case Number: 21CR08284; Filing Date: 3/11/2022
9	rr.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. GABRIEL WISEMAN; Filing County: Santa Barbara; Case Number: 21CR07489; 21CR08533;
10		Filing Date: 3/18/2022
11	SS.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. BRANDON BEAGLE; Filing County: Shasta;
12		Case Number: 22MH0433; Filing Date: 2/15/2022
13	tt.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. TIFFANY ROCHELLE BEEDY; Filing County: Shasta;
1415		Case Number: 21F6952; 19F4124; 21M2171; 20M5149; 20M2844; Filing Date: 1/26/2022
16	uu.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. MARK RAIBLEY; Filing County: Shasta;
17		Case Number: 22HM493; Filing Date: 3/21/2022
18 19	VV.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. JOSEPH AMIR RODGERS; Filing County: Shasta;
20		Case Number: 19F4574 et seq.; Filing Date: 1/12/2022
21	ww.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. AUSTIN EVAN SCHUMACHER; Filing County: Shasta;
22		Case Number: 22HM495; 21F7252; Filing Date: 1/12/2022
23	XX.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. MELEIKE STEVENSON;
2425		Filing County: Shasta; Case Number: 22HM494; Filing Date: 2/25/2022
26	уу.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. JANET WILSON;
27		Filing County: Shasta; Case Number: 22HB293;
28		Filing Date: 2/9/2022

1	zz.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. ROBERT KIMURA CUELLAR; Filing County: Solano;
2		Case Number: FCR357677; Filing Date: 12:00:00 AM
3	aaa.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. LONZELL TYRELL McINTOSH;
4	l daa.	Filing County: Solano; Case Number: FCR362024;
5		Filing Date: 4/25/2022
6	bbb.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. BRANDIE LOUISE McNARY; Filing County: Solano;
7		Case Number: FCR352963; FCR352498; Filing Date: 3/28/2022
8	ccc.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. DENNIS MERRIDA;
9		Filing County: Solano; Case Number: VCR235704;
10		Filing Date: 3/10/2022
11	ddd.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. WILLIAM WENZEL NEUBURGER; Filing County: Solano;
12		Case Number: FCR361605; Filing Date: 2/10/2022
13	eee.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. JAMAAL D. STORMS;
14		Filing County: Solano; Case Number: FCR358348; FCR347009;
15		Filing Date: 1/13/2022
16	fff.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. CHARLES CORNELIUS TYES; Filing County: Solano;
17		Case Number: FCR359852; VCR238166; Filing Date: 10/18/2021
18	ggg.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. JOSEPH JULIUS WHITMAN;
19	888.	Filing County: Solano; Case Number: FCR360767;
20		Filing Date: 1/13/2022
21	hhh.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. NORRIS WILLIAMS; Filing County: Solano;
22		Case Number: FCR361083; Filing Date: 1/24/2022
23	iii.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. TANJEET SINGH CLAIRE;
24	''''	Filing County: Sonoma; Case Number: SCR-744643-1;
25		Filing Date: 5/10/2021
26	jjj.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. JONATAN MACIAS LOPEZ; Filing County: Stanislaus;
27		Case Number: CR-21-011535; Filing Date: 4/5/2022
28	7.4	8 8

1 2	kkk.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. STEVE LEE MORRIS; Filing County: Stanislaus; Case Number: CR-21-010999; Filing Date: 3/9/2022
3	111.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. ANTHONY PINTO;
4		Filing County: Stanislaus; Case Number: CR-22-001780;
5		Filing Date: 6/27/2022
6	mmm	n.Case Name: PEOPLE v. RAYMOND RICO; Filing County: Stanislaus;
7		Case Number: CR-21-012577; Filing Date: 3/9/2022
8	,,,,,	Case Name: PEOPLE v. JONATHAN JAMES ROMERO;
9	111111.	Filing County: Stanislaus;
10		Case Number: CR-20-003842; CR-20-005074; CR-20-005100; Filing Date: 1/6/2022
11	000.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. JEANNIE MARIE SORIANO;
12		Filing County: Stanislaus; Case Number: CR-22-001639; Filing Date: 4/20/2022
13		
14	ppp.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. TERRY WILLIAMS HUGHES; Filing County: Tuolumne;
15		Case Number: CRF67674; CRM61806; CRM62080; CRM62463; CRM62902; CRM63978; CRM67371; Filing Date: 3/9/2022
16	aaa	Case Name: PEOPLE v. EDWARD ISHAM;
17	qqq.	Filing County: Tuolumne; Case Number: CRF67854; CRF68180; CRM65782; CRM67481; CRM67785;
18		CRM67908; CRM67911; CRM68000; CRM68185; CRM68205; CRM68542; Filing Date: 3/4/2022
19		
20	rrr.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. HALEIGH PELLO; Filing County: Tuolumne; Control Name of Control C
21		Case Number: CRF64077; CRF65163; CRM63560; CRM63946, CRM63992; CRM64039; CRM67336; CRM67348; CRM67634; CRM67740; CRM67852; CRM67852; CRM67854; CRM
22		CRM67894; Filing Date: 12/23/2021
23	SSS.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. AMELIO EREDIO RENTERIA;
24		Filing County: Tuolumne; Case Number: CRF66192; Filing County: 12(10)(2021)
25		Filing Date: 12/10/2021
26	ttt.	Case Name: PEOPLE v. MICHELLE VERMON-VONDRA; Filing County: Tuolumne; Case Name: CREC7722:
27		Case Number: CRF67722; Filing Date: 12/6/2021
28	///	9

1 2 3		Filing County:	2021003132 M A; 2021002076 M A; 2020027695 M A; 2020027608 439 F A;
4		Case Name: Filing County:	PEOPLE v. JOSE SANCHEZ;
5		Case Number: Filing Date:	2018020003 F A;
6		_	PEOPLE v. DALLAS SMITH;
7 8		Filing County: Case Number: Filing Date:	Ventura; 2021018509;
9			PEOPLE v. BRYAN WILSON;
10			2021022381 FA;
11		Filing Date:	
12		Filing County:	PEOPLE v. AARON RENE HILLS; Yolo;
13		Case Number: Filing Date:	CR21-1735; CR21-1733; CR20-3574; CR20-0485; 1/6/2022
14		Case Name: Filing County:	PEOPLE v. ROBIN STARR;
15			CR21-1812; 21-2722; 19-3231;
16		8	
17	I de	clare under the	e penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
18	foregoing is	s true and corre	ect.
19	Date: July	20, 2022	
20			Sean Mark Rashkis
21			Sean Mark Rashkis Assistant Chief Counsel
22	SA201510456	58	
23	42946268.doc		#
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	ROB BONTA Attorney General of California GREGORY D. BROWN Supervising Deputy Attorney General COLIN D. SCHOELL Deputy Attorney General State Bar No. 332896 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 Telephone: (415) 510-3547 Fax: (415) 703-5843 E-mail: Colin.Schoell@doj.ca.gov Attorneys for Petitioners Stephanie Clendenin, Director of Department of State Hospitals; Nancy Bargmann, Director of Department of Developmental Services	Judicial Council of California JUL 2 0 2022 And Judicial Council of California JUL 2 0 2022 Coordination Lawyer Exempt from Filing Fees— Gov. Code, § 6103
10	HIDIOIAL COLDICIL OF TH	TO CT A TO OF CALL HODDINA
11	JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF TH	HE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
12	25 II	^
13	STEDIIANIE STIAVETTI ot ol	JCCP Case No. 5244
14	STEPHANIE STIAVETTI, et al.	
15	Plaintiffs,	DECLARATION OF COLIN D. SCHOELL IN SUPPORT OF
16	v.	DEFENDANTS' PETITION FOR COORDINATION TO THE JUDICIAL
17	STEPHANIE CLENDENIN, et al	COUNCIL RE: COMPETENCY SERVICES FOR
18		DEFENDANTS INCOMPETENT TO
19	Defendants.	STAND TRIAL
20	Alameda Cnty. Super. Ct. Case No. RG157779731	
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I, Colin D. Schoell, declare

- 1. I am an attorney licensed to practice before all courts of the State of California and a Deputy Attorney General for the State of California. I represent defendants in the above-captioned action. The matters set forth herein are known to me to be true, and if called upon, I could competently testify thereto.
- 2. Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 404 et seq. and California Rules of Court, rule 3.501 et seq., petitioners the Department of State Hospitals (DSH), the Department of Developmental Services (DDS), and their respective directors petition to have the cases identified in the Declaration of Sean M Rashkis (Rashkis Decl.), Exhibit A, coordinated. All of the proceedings in the Rashkis Decl., Exhibit A are related to the complex case *Stiavetti*, *et al. v. Clendenin et al.*, Alameda County Superior Case no. RG157779731 (*Stiavetti*).
- 3. Plaintiffs in *Stiavetti*—the family members of criminal defendants who were found incompetent to stand trial (IST), committed to DSH or DDS for treatment, and experienced delays in placement in a DSH or DDS facility—filed a petition for writ of traditional mandamus and civil complaint for injunctive relief on July 29, 2015. Defendants moved for complex designation on December 14, 2015. The motion was granted and the matter transferred to Alameda County Superior Court's complex department on December 21, 2015.
- 4. Judgment was entered against DSH, DDS, and their respective directors on April 19, 2019. The relevant portion of that judgment was affirmed on appeal, and the remittitur issued on August 27, 2021. The judgment and a subsequently issued writ of mandate, effective August 27, 2021, give DSH and DDS a deadline (starting at 60 days after a one-year phase-in period, and ultimately reaching 28 days after a 30-month phase-in period) to commence substantive competency services for IST defendants, measured the "transfer of responsibility" date to DSH or DDS following a commitment order. The judgment and writ of mandate govern all defendants found incompetent to stand trial in California.
 - 5. The universe of legal proceedings related to *Stiavetti* is large, as *Stiavetti*'s

deadline for the commencement of substantive competency services applies to all proceedings in California in which a criminal defendant is declared incompetent to stand trial and committed to either DSH or DDS for competency services. These proceedings are civil, and begin with a court declaring a doubt as to a defendants' competency. If a defendant is found incompetent to stand trial, the court may issue a Commitment Order to DSH or DDS to provide competency treatment to the criminal defendant.

- 6. In this petition, DSH and DDS seek only to coordinate a small subset of the competency proceedings now pending—those proceedings that are at a similar stage of litigation, enforcement. In the proceedings proposed for coordination, DSH and/or DDS are presently subject to enforcement proceedings relating to whether they have commenced substantive competency services for a particular IST defendant or group of defendants within a deadline imposed by the court.
- 7. DSH has four hospitals that provide IST competency services and DSH maintains a single waitlist for criminal defendants waitlisted for such services. DDS has one facility for the provision of competency services, and also maintains a single waitlist. Both the DSH and DDS waitlists place defendants according to the date of their commitment order, with limited exceptions.
- DSH and DDS to commence substantive competency services for all IST defendants committed to DSH or DDS in California within a specific time period—eventually reaching 28 days, but to be phased in over a period of 30 months—following the date of service of the defendant's commitment packet for DSH commitments and the date of service of the commitment order for DDS commitments. The *Stiavetti* superior court is currently overseeing and enforcing DSH's and DDS's compliance with that judgment and writ of mandate. Meanwhile, in the other 78 proceedings in this petition for coordination, superior courts are overseeing sanctions or other enforcement proceedings against DSH for DSH's failure to commence competency treatment for specific IST defendants within the deadlines imposed by those courts. Thus, for each of the IST defendants in the other 78 proceedings, there are currently two separate orders from two different

courts imposing commencement-of-treatment deadlines on DSH (and in many instances, two separate deadlines), and two separate proceedings to enforce those deadlines—one in the county of that defendant's criminal action, and the second in *Stiavetti* in Alameda County. In short, the cases turn on identical provisions of the Penal Code, involve a single service (competency treatment), offered by a single department (DSH), based on each IST defendant's placement on a single waitlist, and each individual case involves an IST defendant who is also covered by the statewide proceedings in *Stiavetti*.

- 9. The proceedings to enforce commencement-of-treatment deadlines for IST defendants are complex in that they require analysis of the entire system that delivers competency services to California's criminal defendants. Each of the criminal defendants is on a single statewide waitlist for DSH or DDS commitments, and DSH orchestrates placement statewide of over 3,000² defendants per year from 58 counties to a system of four hospitals, 22 jail-based competency treatment programs (including the Admission Evaluation and Stabilization Center in the Kern County Jail), and community-based restoration out of Los Angeles County
- 10. Hearings in these enforcement proceedings in the various superior courts generally require voluminous evidence to determine whether DSH³ had good cause or substantial justification for its inability to meet the court-imposed deadlines. Specifically, DSH generally must submit documentary evidence and the testimony of witnesses detailing the circumstances that have resulted in significant increases in the number of IST defendants referred to DSH in recent years, efforts DSH has made to increase its bed capacity for IST treatment, efforts DSH has made to develop and implement diversion programs and community-based mental health services programs to help prevent individuals from becoming IST defendants in the first place, and DSH's ongoing efforts to coordinate with other stakeholders to develop comprehensive solutions to the ongoing IST waitlist issues and the widespread mental health issues that underlie them. In some jurisdictions, such proceedings have consumed months of trial court time, with some taking as long as 14 months to complete.

² Fiscal Year 2020-2021 data.

³ Enforcement proceedings against DDS have been relatively uncommon and there are none currently pending, but would likely raise similar issues if they were to arise in the future.

1	ROB BONTA	Exempt from filing fees
2	Attorney General of California GREGORY D. BROWN	Gov. Code, § 6103
3	Supervising Deputy Attorney General COLIN D. SCHOELL	RECEIVED
4	Deputy Attorney General State Bar No. 332896	Judicial Council of California
5	455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA 94102-7004	Andrea hranello (b.a.)
6	Telephone: (415) 510-3547 Fax: (415) 703-5843	Coordination Lawyer
7	E-mail: Colin.Schoell@doj.ca.gov Attorneys for Petitioners	*
8	Stephanie Clendenin, Director of Department of State Hospitals; Nancy Bargmann, Director of	
9	Department of Developmental Services	· ·
10		
11		
12	JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF TH	IE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
13		
14	*	-2110
15	0	JCCP Case No.
16	STEPHANIE CLENDENIN, AS DIRECTOR OF THE CALIFORNIA	PETITIONERS' REQUEST FOR
17	DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOSPITALS, et al.,	JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR COORDINATION
18	Petitioners,	
19	V.	
20	STEPHANIE STIAVETTI, et al.,	
21	Respondents.	
22		
23		
24	Petitioners respectfully requests that, purs	uant to Rule of Evidence section 452, the Court
25	take judicial notice of the following documents:	
26	//	
27		
28		

INTRODUCTION

Petitioners respectfully request this Court take judicial notice of records of courts of this state, pursuant to Evidence code section 452, in considering the Petition for Coordination.

MATTERS TO BE NOTICED

Petitioners respectfully request this Court take judicial notice of the following:

- 1. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Judgment issued in *Stiavetti, et al. v. Ahlin, et al.* (Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. RG15779731).
- 2. Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Amended Judgment issued in *Stiavetti, et al. v. Ahlin, et al.* (Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. RG15779731).
- 3. Attached as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the Order Granting Habeas Corpus issued in *In re Lopez-Diaz* (Orange County Superior Court, Case No. M-19406).
- 4. Attached as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the Decision and Order on Petition for Writ of Mandate and Request for Sanctions issued in *In re Chunn*; *People v. Stallings*; *People v. Wakefield Jr.* (Solano County Superior Court, Case Nos. FCR319528, FCR309169, VCR221562; VCR227518, VCR227072; VCR227318, FCR309597).
- 5. Attached as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of the Order Imposing Monetary Sanctions issued in *People v. Cuellar* (Solano County Superior Court, Case No. FCR357677).
- 6. Attached as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of the trial court order issued in *People v. Afre, et al.* (San Francisco County Superior Court, Case Nos. 19018798, 20006575 [and associated cases]).
- 7. Attached as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of the Amended Decision on Sanctions issued in *People v. Czirban, et al.* (Contra Costa County Superior Court, Case Nos. 5-151662-4 [and associated cases]).
- 8. Attached as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of the Order Denying Request for Sanctions Under CCP §177.5 issued in *People v. Jones, et al.* (Contra Costa County Superior Court, Case Nos. 02-327376-0 [and associated cases]).
- 9. Attached as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of the Amended Decision on Sanctions issued in *People v. Aguillar, et al.* (Contra Costa County Superior Court, Case Nos. 4-

1	29	9	17	-8	4	18	290	91	5-2	4-	19	11	13-	0	4-	188524	-3	[and	associated	casesT	١
1	02	7	1 /	-0		10	"	<i>_</i>	J-Z.		ェノ	1 1		v.		100227	-5	Tanta	associated	Cases	,

- 10. Attached as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy of the Omnibus Order Imposing Sanctions for Failure to Admit Defendants for Treatment as Ordered issued in *In re Kareem A., et al.* (Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. ZM031353 [and associated cases]).
- 11. Attached as Exhibit K is a true and correct copy of the Omnibus Order: (1) Granting in Part and Denying in Part the Request for Imposition of Sanctions Against the Department of State Hospitals and (2) Denying the Request to Modify the *Loveton* Order issued in *People v. Ballard-Grajada*, *et al.* (Contra Costa County Superior Court, Case No. 02-326721-8 [and associated cases]).
- 12. Attached as Exhibit L is a true and correct copy of the Order Imposing Monetary Sanctions issued in *People v. Calderon, et al.* (Solano County Superior Court, Case No. FCR358606 [and associated cases]).
- 13. Attached as Exhibit M is a true and correct copy of the Order Imposing Sanctions for Failure to Timely Receive Petitioner issued in *In re Edwards* (Shasta County Superior Court, Case Nos. 21HB3119, 20F8437, 20M2700).
- 14. Attached as Exhibit N is a true and correct copy of the Order and Judgment of Indirect Contempt and Order Modifying Contempt Fine from \$1500 to \$1000 issued in *People v. Portades, Jr.* (Solano County Superior Court, Case Nos. VCR230763, VCR229829, VCR228558).
- 15. Attached as Exhibit O is a true and correct copy of the Order re: Writ of Habeas Corpus issued in *In re Osborne* (Sonoma County Superior Court, Case No. SCR-748629-1-MH).

The Court may take judicial notice of the above-listed documents under Section 452, subdivision (d), of the California Evidence Code because the documents are court records.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), provides that judicial notice may be taken of records of "any court of this state." The court must take judicial notice of any matter specified in Evidence Code section 452 "if a party requests it and: (a) [g]ives each adverse party sufficient notice of the request, through the pleadings or otherwise, to enable such adverse party to prepare

RECEIVED Judicial Council of California **ROB BONTA** 1 Attorney General of California 2 GREGORY D. BROWN Supervising Deputy Attorney General 3 COLIN D. SCHOELL Deputy Attorney General State Bar No. 332896 4 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 5 Telephone: (415) 510-3547 6 Fax: (415) 703-5843 E-mail: Colin.Schoell@doj.ca.gov 7 Attorneys for Petitioners Stephanie Clendenin, Director of Department of State Hospitals; Nancy Bargmann, Director of 8 Department of Developmental Services 9 10 11 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 JCCP Case No. STEPHANIE STIAVETTI, et al., 14 [1] PETITIONERS' NOTICE OF Plaintiffs. 15 MOTION AND MOTION FOR STAY PENDING COORDINATION; AND 16 [2] MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF 17 STEPHANIE CLENDENIN, AS DIRECTOR OF THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOSPITALS. [Code Civ. Proc., § 404.5; California Rules of 18 Court, rule 3.515] et al., 19 Defendants. 20 Alameda Cnty. Super. Ct. Case No. 21 RG15779731 22 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 23 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that as part of its petition for coordination to the Judicial Council 24 of California, Defendants in the above-captioned case will move for an order to stay all actions 25 listed in Exhibit A pending resolution of the petition for coordination. This motion is made on 26

pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 404.5 and the standards set forth in California Rules

the ground that a stay is necessary and appropriate to effectuate the purposes of coordination,

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1	of Court, rule 3.515, subdivision (f) and Code of Civil Procedure, section 404.1. All known	
2	pending related cases to be stayed are listed in Exhibit A, and the stay order should extend to	an
3	related case brought to this court in an add-on petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.515, subo	1.
4	(b).)	
5	This motion is further based upon this notice and motion; the Memorandum of Points a	ınd
6	Authorities in support thereof; the Declaration of Colin D. Schoell and attached exhibits; the	
7	Declarations of Jaci Thomson and Sean M. Rashkis and attached exhibits; and all other recor	ds
8	and files in this action, and any further evidence or argument as may be presented prior to or	at
9	the time of the hearing on the motion, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.527.	
10	Dated: July 20, 2022 Respectfully submitted,	
11 12	ROB BONTA Attorney General of California GREGORY D. BROWN	
13	Supervising Deputy Attorney General	
14		
15	Colin Schull	
16	COLIN D. SCHOELL Deputy Attorney General	
17	Attorneys for Petitioners Stephanie Clendenin, Director of	
18	Department of State Hospitals; Nancy Bargmann, Director of Department of	
19	Developmental Services	
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

In a separate Petition for Coordination (Petition), filed in this court on July 20, 2022, Defendants Stephanie Clendenin, in her official capacity as the Director of the California Department of State Hospitals (DSH), and Nancy Bargmann, in her official capacity as Director of the Department of Developmental Services (DDS) (collectively, Petitioners), seek to coordinate the unresolved cases attached as Exhibit A. Petitioners request the coordination motion judge stay all of these included commitment order enforcement actions pending resolution of the petition for coordination because they are numerous, widespread, and involve complex, nearly identical factual and legal issues that would be better adjudicated on a statewide basis by a single judge. Therefore, a stay of these enforcement actions would promote judicial efficiency and consistency by preserving those issues for a single judge, thereby better serving those whose rights are at stake.

A stay of these included actions will promote the ends of justice under both parts of the two-part standard set by California Rules of Court, rule 3.515, subdivision (f):

- First, the imminence of enforcement proceedings in the superior courts will materially affect the status of the actions to be stayed because the "trial" in the included actions—evidentiary hearings—could begin prior to the assignment of a coordination motion judge, reducing the considerable judicial efficiency benefits gained from coordination of the included actions if the actions are not stayed.
- Second, a final judgment in the actions to be stayed would have a res judicata effect
 on the only legal issue in the included actions: whether Petitioners timely commenced
 substantive competency services following a commitment order from the superior
 court. Once the superior court decides whether or not to issue sanctions, adversarial

¹ As explained in more detail in the Petition, although DDS receives some IST commitments, the vast majority are committed to DSH. DDS is not currently facing enforcement proceedings relating to its commitments, so all of the cases proposed to be coordinated and stayed here concern DSH commitments.

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27 28 litigation in the action effectively ends and cannot be re-opened should the coordination motion judge grant the petition for coordination.

Further, issuance of a stay in this case would guarantee that the benefits of coordination are realized if the petition is granted by preserving the aspects of coordination that promote the ends of justice in this case. (Code Civ. Proc., § 404.1.) Granting this motion for stay would benefit all parties by preventing inconsistent or duplicative rulings on common issues of fact and law while conserving limited judicial resources. Petitioners do not seek to stay Stiavetti v. Clendenin, Alameda Superior Court, Case No. RG15779731 (Stiavetti), because the petition for coordination is intended to prevent the included actions, listed in Exhibit A, from interfering with the statewide enforcement proceedings occurring in Stiavetti, which can and should continue pending resolution of the petition. Additionally, Petitioners recognize that some of the included actions in Exhbit A will have resolved prior to a decision on this motion for stay, and seek only to stay the unresolved actions and any added by an add-on petition. For each of these reasons, and as further set forth herein, the coordination motion judge should stay the included actions listed in Exhibit A pending adjudication of the petition for coordination.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As described in depth in the petition for coordination, the events in recent years have led to a statewide waitlist for criminal defendants who, as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, are deemed incompetent to stand trial (IST). (Pen. Code, § 1367, subd. (a).) Defendants who are IST due to a mental health disorder are committed to DSH while those who are IST due to a developmental disability (in whole or in part) are committed to DDS. (Id., § 1367, subd. (b).) The trial court serves DSH or DDS with a commitment packet, which initiates the commitment proceedings and the relevant department's obligation to provide competency restoration services.

Recently, however, the number of felony defendants found IST has increased significantly and continues to do so, outstripping DSH's capacity to provide competency services and resulting in a waitlist for those defendants to begin receiving competency services. The length of this statewide waitlist, and by extension the time each individual waits to receive competency

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services, was further exacerbated by necessary public health and safety measures taken in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result of the statewide waitlist, proceedings to enforce the commitment orders began occurring in superior courts across the state with the same issue: whether sanctions against DSH are appropriate for the delay in the commencement of substantive competency services.

Because the enforcement proceedings all have the same issue, much of the evidence produced in these hearings is duplicative of evidence produced in other superior courts. Where a judge has not previously heard the evidence, DSH would often opt to call witnesses in addition to its pleadings to more fully explain why the defendant at issue had not yet begun receiving competency services. These evidentiary hearings could take several months or even years, depending on the court's scheduling. Where a judge had previously heard DSH's testimonial evidence of its efforts to address the waitlist, DSH would often opt to submit the issue on the pleadings to conserve its limited resources, as well as the court's, and those proceedings could conclude just a handful of hearings after they began. However, with some counties pursuing enforcement proceedings more aggressively than others, this led to a patchwork of proceedings across the state, opening the door to inconsistent or even conflicting standards of enforcement. For that reason, Petitioners are now pursuing coordination of these enforcement proceedings before a single coordination judge, so that judge may be presented with all the evidence and make consistent rulings regarding sanctions for delays in the commencement of competency services. In order to preserve these sanctions decisions for the coordination judge to consider on a statewide basis if the petition is granted, Petitioners also seek a stay of these included actions while the petition for coordination is pending.

ARGUMENT

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pending a determination of whether coordination is appropriate, the coordination motion judge may "stay any action being considered for, or affecting an action being considered for, coordination." (Code Civ. Proc, § 404.5.) A motion for stay should be granted pending resolution of the coordination petition where "the stay will promote the ends of justice." (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 3.515, subd. (f).) A stay promotes the ends of justice when the imminence of a proceeding "might materially affect the status of the action," and when "a final judgment in the action would have a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect with regard to any common issue of the included actions." (*Ibid.*) The ends of justice are also promoted where the elements of Code of Civil Procedure, section 404.1, outlining the considerations for appropriateness of coordination, are preserved for the coordination judge to consider. The elements most applicable here are common questions of fact and law between the included actions, efficient utilization of judicial resources, avoidance of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, and the actions being at the same relative stage of adjudication. (Code Civ. Proc., § 404.1.)

II. THE COORDINATION MOTION JUDGE SHOULD STAY THE INCLUDED ACTIONS PENDING ADJUDICATION OF THE PETITION FOR COORDINATION TO PROMOTE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE

Although the standard set out in California Rules of Court, rule 3.515, subdivision (f) does not cleanly apply to the included actions, a stay nevertheless promotes the ends of justice as defined by that rule's standards and those outlined in Code of Civil Procedure, section 404.1. The included actions in this case differ from typical cases included in petitions for coordination in that they are solely enforcement proceedings and do not follow the standard civil case's procedure of discovery, trial, and judgment. Instead, Petitioners may put on witnesses in evidentiary hearings over the course of months or even years (depending on the court's calendar and scheduling), or simply submit on the pleadings and receive a judgment on sanctions in a matter of just a few weeks. Petitioners make this decision in each case based on the presiding judge's preferences, resulting in inconsistencies throughout the state.

Here, the included actions' imminent sanctions proceedings would materially affect the actions' status and a sanctions judgment would have a res judicata effect on the main issue common to the included actions: whether Petitioners timely commenced substantive competency services. If a stay is not issued, the included actions will be materially affected because the superior courts are likely permitted to issue a decision on sanctions if enforcement hearings—analogous to the "trial" of these proceedings—begin prior to the order assigning a coordination motion judge. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.515, subd. (i).) That sanctions decision is a final

judgment on the sole issue in the action and has a res judicata effect on the main issue common to the included actions, whether Petitioners willfully defied the court's order to provide competency services, or did so without good cause or substantial justification. (*Newland v. Super. Ct.* (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 615 [sanction orders "have the force and effect of a money judgment"].) Therefore, one of the main benefits of coordination in this case, eliminating inconsistent or duplicative rulings by adjudicating the actions before a single judge on a statewide basis, will be lost and all parties will be harmed if a stay order is not issued.

Additionally, a stay of the included actions is necessary to preserve the aspects of coordination that promote the ends of justice in this case, which are explained in more detail in the petition for coordination. Namely, a stay would maximize the efficient utilization of judicial resources, preserve the included actions at the same relative stage of adjudication, and avoid duplicative or inconsistent rulings by ensuring that common questions of fact and law are preserved for adjudication on a statewide basis and not on a county-by-county basis by various superior courts.² (Code Civ. Proc., § 404.1.) For those reasons, a stay of all included actions listed in Exhibit A will promote the ends of justice for all parties in this case by ensuring the benefits of coordination are realized.

A. Without a Stay, the Imminence of Enforcement Proceedings in the Included Actions Materially Affects their Status by Enabling the Superior Courts to Rule on Sanctions if Enforcement Proceedings Begin Prior to the Assignment of a Coordination Motion Judge.

An order staying the included actions is necessary to preserve the benefits of coordination pending adjudication of the petition in this case because without a stay order, the imminent "trials" in the included actions—evidentiary hearings—may begin prior to assignment of the coordination motion judge and thereby materially affect the actions' status. Without a stay order, the superior courts may continue to exercise jurisdiction over the included actions for pretrial and discovery proceedings, as well as enter judgment in any action where the trial commenced prior to the assignment of the coordination motion judge. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.515, subd. (i).)

² Due to the widespread nature of the included actions and the unique nature of the proceedings, forum convenience and likelihood of settlement are less applicable to these cases, as Petitioners cannot settle these cases due to their statutory obligations to provide competency services in the order of commitment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 404.1.)

In this case, the evidentiary sanctions proceedings in the included actions could be considered a "trial" that commenced prior to the order assigning a coordination motion judge because they involve the presentation of evidence and argument on the dispositive issue. If these proceedings commence prior to issuance of the order assigning a coordination motion judge, a process that can take up to sixty days, then the superior court is permitted to issue a sanctions judgment despite that order, unless a stay is issued. This sanctions decision is a final judgment that cannot be reversed by the coordination judge. (*Newland v. Super. Ct.* (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 610.) Without a stay order, many of the included actions will begin sanctions proceedings during the thirty to sixty-day period between the filing of the petition and the assignment of a coordination motion judge. Consequently, imposing a stay will preserve the benefits of coordinating those actions by postponing a decision on sanctions and allowing a single judge to make consistent decisions on the propriety of sanctions in each case if the petition is granted.

The imminence of these proceedings threatens to disrupt the statewide enforcement of the judgment issued in *Stiavetti* and oversight of Petitioners' steps implemented to come into compliance with that judgment. Each action that reaches a decision on the issue of sanctions must be removed from the necessarily statewide enforcement of *Stiavetti*'s judgment, in favor of the county-specific decision. Additionally, permitting the included actions to proceed pending the adjudication of the petition would short-circuit the potential benefits of coordinating the included actions by preventing the coordination judge from ruling on sanctions after assessing the merits of the issue on a statewide basis. Instead, the current state of affairs would continue: the cases would move out of the same stage of adjudication through an inefficient utilization of judicial resources in each county, with duplicative or inconsistent rulings on the issues common to all of the included actions. The coordination judge would then no longer have the opportunity to apply a consistent statewide standard to the included actions where the superior courts issued a decision on sanctions because of res judicata, and the benefits of coordination would be lost for all parties.

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B. The Issuance of a Decision on Sanctions in the Included Actions Would Have a Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel Effect on the Primary Issue **Common to those Actions**

The coordination motion judge should grant this motion for stay in this case because the superior courts in some of the included actions may issue decisions on sanctions that have a res judicata effect on that action prior to the adjudication of the petition for coordination. An order granting coordination acts as a stay of the included action when filed in the action's superior court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.529, subd. (b)-(c).) However, if the included actions are permitted to proceed while the coordination motion judge is considering the petition for coordination, then the parties would lose the ability to preserve the benefits of coordination with this statutory stay for any included actions where a decision on sanctions is issued prior to the order granting coordination. Adjudication of the petition for coordination can take several months after filing, especially if a hearing must be held as is likely here, during which time the included actions will proceed unless the coordination motion judge issues a stay order. While some of these actions can take months or years to conclude, that timeframe is entirely dependent on the superior court's calendar and the number of witnesses called to provide evidentiary testimony. Therefore, these actions have the potential to move quickly because they involve just a single issue: whether Petitioners willfully defied the court's order to timely commence substantive competency services for the defendant following their commitment, or did so without good cause or substantial justification.

If the superior court schedules hearings rapidly, Petitioners would have no recourse to postpone the decision on sanctions until after the Petition is decided, undercutting the benefits of coordination if the Petition is subsequently granted. In short, if the included actions are not stayed during the months between filing and adjudication of the petition, the benefits of coordinating many of those actions will be lost because those superior courts will issue a decision on sanctions.

The parties will also suffer irreparable harm in any actions where a decision on sanctions is issued while the petition is pending because, if the petition is granted, the superior courts will have already decided the actions on an inconsistent, county-by-county basis, preventing the

Pri	EFS-005-CV
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY: STATE BAR NO: 332,896 NAME: Colin D. Schoell FIRM NAME: California Attorney's General Office STREET ADDRESS: 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 CITY: San Francisco STATE: CA ZIP CODE: 94102-7004 TELEPHONE NO.: (415) 510-3547 FAX NO.: (415) 703-5843	FOR COURT USE ONLY
E-MAIL ADDRESS: Colin.Schoell@doj.ca.gov ATTORNEY FOR (name): Stephanie Clendenin, Director DSH; Nancy Bargmann, Director CDDS SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA STREET ADDRESS: 455 Golden Gate Avenue MAILING ADDRESS: 455 Golden Gate Avenue CITY AND ZIP CODE: San Francisco, CA 94102-3688 BRANCH NAME: Plaintiff/Petitioner: Stephanie Clendenin, Dir. DSH; Nancy Bargmann, Dir. CDDS	CASE NUMBER: 5248
Defendant/Respondent: Stephanie Stiavetti, et al. CONSENT TO ELECTRONIC SERVICE AND NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE ADDRESS	JUDICIAL OFFICER: DEPARTMENT:
 The following party or	
Date: Jul 25, 2022 Colin Schoel1 TYPE OR PRINT NAME	Schull Signature of Pariy or Attorney)

Page 1 of 2

	CASE NUMBER:
	5248
CASE NAME: Stephanie Clendenin, et al. v. Stephanie Stiavetti, et al.	

(Note: If you serve Consent to Electronic Service and Notice of Electronic Service Address by mail, you should use form POS-030, Proof of Service by First-Class Mail–Civil, instead of using this page.)

PROOF OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE

CONSENT TO ELECTRONIC SERVICE AND NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE ADDRESS

1.	lа	m at least 18 years old.
	a.	My residence or business address is (specify):
	h	My electronic service address is (specify):
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2.		ectronically served a copy of the Consent to Electronic Service and Notice of Electronic Service Address as follows: Name of person served:
		Electronic service address of person served:
		On behalf of (name or names of parties represented, if person served is an attorney):
	c.	On (date):
	d.	At (time):
		Electronic service of the Consent to Electronic Service and Notice of Electronic Service Address on additional persons is described in an attachment.
Ld	ecla	re under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
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DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL

Case Name: STEPHANIE STIAVETTI, et al. v STEPHANIE CLENDENIN, et al.

Case No.: RG15779731

I declare:

I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter; my business address is 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000, San Francisco, CA 94102-7004.

On July 26, 2022, I served the following documents:

- NOTICE OF SUBMISSION OF PETITION FOR COORDINATION
- PETITION FOR COORDINATION TO THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL RE: COMPETENCY SERVICES FOR DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
- DECLARATION OF JACI THOMSON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
 PETITION FOR COORDINATION TO THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL RE:
 COMPETENCY SERVICES FOR DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO
 STAND TRIAL
- DECLARATION OF SEAN MARK RASHKIS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
 PETITION FOR COORDINATION TO THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL RE:
 COMPETENCY SERVICES FOR DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO
 STAND TRIAL EXHIBITS TO THE DECLARATION OF SEAN MARK
 RASHKIS ON CD
- DECLARATION OF COLIN D. SCHOELL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
 PETITION FOR COORDINATION TO THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL RE:
 COMPETENCY SERVICES FOR DEFENDANTS INCOMPETENT TO STAND
 TRIAL
- PETITIONERS' REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR COORDINATION EXHIBITS TO THE REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE ON CD
- [1] PETITIONERS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR STAY PENDING COORDINATION; AND [2] MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF EXHIBITS TO THE MOTION FOR STAY ON CD
- CONSENT TO ELECTRONIC SERVICE AND NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE ADDRESS

by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States Mail at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:

Clerk of the Court Alameda County Superior Court Oakland - René C. Davidson Courthouse 1225 Fallon Street Oakland, CA 94612 Michael Temple Risher, Esq. American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Nor Cal 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111

Duncan C. Simpson, Esq. Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 1870 Embarcadero Road Palo Alto, California 94303

Peter J. Eliasberg, Esq. American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of So Cal 1313 West 8th Street Los Angeles, CA 90017

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States of America the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on July 26, 2022, at San Francisco, California.

Moe San

Declarant

Signature

SA2015104568