



WHAT IS THE WHEELER/ BATSON RULE?

Since 1978, attorneys in California have been unable to exercise peremptory challenges based on their belief that certain individuals are biased because they are a member of a specific racial, ethnic or religious group. (*People v. Wheeler* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276).

In 1986, the U. S. Supreme Court held that jury challenges based on group bias violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (*Batson v. Kentucky* (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 89 [106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed 2d 69].)

For Wr apply th

apply th excused "cogniza

r (1978)

t held that ias violate e v. Kentucky i. 1712, 90

COGNIZABLE GROUP

For Wheeler/Batson to apply the juror being excused must be from a "cognizable group".


CCP section 231.5 (amended effective 1/1/16) lists the groups.




Yes, it is improper to dismost prospective white male proris based solely on their gender and race. (People & Wallams (2000) 78 Cell App. 4th 1131, 1125, People V Wallis (2002) 27 Cal 40+E11, 913-814.)

Transgender people are not a protected group for purposes of Wheeler/Batson, under California law. True/ False True, under the new CCP 231.5

True, under the new CCP 231.5, "genetic information" is a Cognizable group.






B c ·v d

٠٧

0 • C

"'[I]t is necessary that a Wheeler objection be made at the earliest opportunity during the voir dire process,' and an objection first raised after the jury and alternates have been sworn is untimely." (People v. Perez (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1314.) If the parties have accepted the jury panel, but while selecting alternates a Wheeler/ Batson objection is made, the issue is reopened not only as to alternates but as to how the party exercised their peremptories for the seated panel members. (People v. Gore (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 692, 703.)

> 1. Party objecting must make a prima facie case (show that the totality of facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose)





des members ssed. person was a ignizable

Provide a construction of the construction of			
Your credibility is the key. Credibility can			
be measured by prosecutor's demeanor,			
how reasonable the evolutions are			

how reasonable the explanations are, common practices of the DDA or trial strategy. *People v. Lomax* (2010) 49 Cal. 4th 530 Even a trivial reason will suffice if it's penuine.

Reason must be plausible and supported by the record; make sure you ask questions to justify your basis for the challenge.


You must state reasons for each challenge. It's important to take good notes.

Must have race neutral reasons for the challenge.



Intell • A

> in a



Negative experience with law enforcement:

- Relative in jail/prison
- Prior arrest/conviction
- Divorce with police
 officer
- Family/friend prosecuted by the DA's office

Intelligence:

- Ability to comprehend the instructions/ questions
- Inattentive

Appearance/Demeanor:

- Unconventional appearance, long hair, unusual facial hair
- · too eager
- soft spoken
- frowning
- weird looking
- rolling eyes
- overweight
- reluctant/timid
- frowning
- defensive body language/ posture



- community
- Prior jury experience/hung jury

3. Court then makes a decision.

Step 3: Court's Analysis

Comparative analysis: If the reason for kicking a member of a cognizable group could apply just as well to any other juror, and that other juror is permitted to stay, that could be evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination.

No two people are exactly alike. Ask questions to develop dissimilarities

Statistical Analysis: What percentage of those challenges are of that group, how many sitting jurors are of that group, what percentage of the panel is of that group?


Disparate questioning: Were questions posed differently to the different groups?





Remedies

 Dismiss the entire panel and begin anew;
 If the moving party agrees, the court may reseat the dismissed juror;
 If the court warned the attorneys about Wheeler/ Batson before jury selection, the court may impose monetary sanctions;
 The court may grant the moving party additional peremptory challenges.



121 GG

postal worker M- therapist 4 - 4, 6, 9, 12 brother in prison Doesn't trust the police no eye contact

If you get challenged, don't panic. Allow the moving party to make a prima facie case.

Don't set out your justification until the court has made a record on the prima facie showing.

If the court rules there was no prima facie showing, ask to state your justification at a later time in order to preserve your justification for appeal.





Wheeler / Batson Guide

SrDDA Robert Mestman Orange County District Attorney's Office © 8/12/2015

Seminal Cases

P v. Wheeler (1978) 22 C3 258; Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 US 79

3 Prong Test

- Party objecting to challenge (defense) must make a prima facie case
 Showing that the totality of facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose
- 2. If prima facie case shown, burden shifts and party (DA) must explain adequately the challenge
 - Offer permissible race-neutral justification
- 3. Court then makes decision

• Whether party objecting (defense) has proved purposeful discrimination (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 US 162, 168)

Burden of Proof

- Defense has ultimate burden of proof. (Gonzalez v. Brown (9th Cir. 2009) 585 F3 1202, 1207; Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 US 765, 768)
- Defense must show purposeful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. (P v. Hutchins (2007) 147 CA4 992; Paulino v. Harrison (9th Cir. 2008) 542 F3 692, 703)
- · Consider totality of circumstances. (P v. Lenix (2008) 44 C4 602, 626)
- Presumption that challenge is proper. (Pv. Neuman (2009) 176 CA4 571)

Rebut Prima Facie Case (1st Prong)

- Whether members of group discriminated against were challenged/excused by defense. (*People v. Wheeler* (1978) 22 C3 258, 283)
- DA passed with excused juror on panel. (Pv. Williams (2013) 56 C4 630)
- Whether jury includes members of group discriminated against (P v. Ward (2005) 36 C4 186, 203)
- Did not know juror was member of group. (Pv. Barber (1988) 200 CA3 378)
- Admit mistake (if error). (P v. Williams (1997) 16 C4 153, 188-190)
- Justify prospective challenges before you even make them. (US v. Contreras (9th Cir. 1988) 83 F3 1103)
- Challenge of 1 or 2 jurors rarely suggests a pattern of impermissible group bias. (P v. Allen (2015) 237 CA4 971, 978)

Justifications (2rd Prong)

- Justification need not support a challenge for cause. (Pv. Thomas (2011) 51 C4 449, 474)
- "Trivial" reason (if genuine) will suffice. (Pv. Arias (1996) 13 C4 92, 136)
- Reasons must be inherently plausible & supported by record. (P v. Silva (2001) 25 C4 345, 386)
- Must state reasons for <u>each</u> challenge. (P v. Cervantes (1991) 223 CA3 323 ["I don't recall" fatal]; but see Gonzalez v. Brown (9th Cir. 2009) 585 F3 1202 [based on totality of circumstances, "I don't recall" not fatal])
- Could be combination of factors (change in dynamic of jury, change in mix of jurors, number of preemptory challenges left, etc.). (*P v. Johnson* (1989) 47 C3 1194, 1220-1221)
- For each excused juror, must identify characteristics in support of decision to excuse them. (*P v. Cisneros* (2015) 234 CA4 111, 121)

Factors in Court's Analysis (3rd Prong)

- Statistical evidence (percentage of jurors excused, remaining, etc.). (P v. Garcia (2011) 52 C4 706, 744)
- · Comparative analysis (see box below).
- Disparate questioning (court looks at differences in the way questions were phrased to different jurors). (*Miller-El v. Dretke* (2005) 545 US 231, 254)
- Historical evidence of discrimination (by individual prosecutor and/or office). (Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 US 231)
- · Credibility of prosecutor. (P v. Williams (2013) 56 C4 630)

Comparative Analysis

- Side-by-side comparison of jurors who were struck vs. jurors serving.
- If DA's proffered reason for striking juror applies just as well to an otherwise-similar juror, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination. (*Miller-El v. Dretke* (2005) 545 US 231, 241)
- Comparative juror analysis is but one form of circumstantial evidence that is relevant, but not necessarily dispositive. (Pv. Lomax (2010) 49 C4 530, 572)

Remedy

- Traditional: mistrial → draw an entirely different jury panel and start selection anew.
- Other alternatives (need consent of aggrieved party): disallow discriminatory challenge and reseat wrongfully excluded juror; monetary fines; allow aggrieved party additional peremptory challenges. (*P v. Willis* (2002) 27 C4 811; *P v. Mata* (2012) 203 CA4 898 [Def's personal waiver])

Cognizable Groups		Non-Cognizable Gro							
 There must be an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, 		• Poor people / low income (P v. Johnson	• Poor people / low income (P v. Johnson (1989) 47 C3 1194, 1214)						
 ethnic or similar grounds. (P v. Wheeler (1978) 22 C3 258, 276) Protected groups: "race, national origin, ethnic group identification, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, color, genetic information, or 		 Less educated (P v. Estrada (1979) 93 CA3 76, 90-91) Blue collar workers (P v. Estrada (1979) 93 CA3 76, 92) Battered women (P. Macioce (1987) 197 CA3 262, 280) 							
				disability." (CCP § 231.5; Govt Code § 11135(a))		• Death penalty skeptics (P v. Johnson (1989) 47 C3 1194, 1222)			
				 Defendant need <u>not</u> be member of excluded group. (Wheeler @ 281) <u>Race</u> African-Americans (P v. Wheeler (1978) 22 C3 258) 		• Ex-felons (P v. Karis (1988) 46 C3 612, 6			
 Resident aliens (<i>P v. Karis</i> (1988) 46 C3 612, 631-633) Naturalized citizens (<i>P v. Gonzalez</i> (1989) 211 CA3 1186, 1202 [but can't be 									
			• Hispanics (P v. Perez (1996) 48 CA4 1310; but see I				 pretext for challenge based on race/national origin]) Insufficient English spoken (P v. Lesara (1988) 206 CA3 1304, 1307) 		
1083, 1123 [Hispanic-surnamed jurors not necessa									
• Asian-Americans (P v. Lopez (1991) 3 CA4 Supp. 11									
Ethnicity		• New community resident (<i>Adams v. Sup. Court</i> (1974) 12 C3 55, 60)							
 Native Americans (US v. Bauer (9th Cir. 1996) 84 F3 1549) Irish/Italian-Americans (See 20 ALR 5th 398 at § 6) National origin Spanish surnamed jurors (P v. Trevino (1985) 39 C3 667) Religion Jews (P v. Johnson (1989) 47 C3 1194, 1217) But see P v. Martin (1998) 64 CA4 378 [permissible if valid reason related to religion (e.g., Jehovah's Witness); US v. DeJesus (3rd Cir. 2003) 347 F3d 500 [permissible for heighted religious involvement or beliefs vs. affiliation] Gender Women (P v. Garcia (2011) 52 C4 706; P v. Crittenden (1994) 9 C4 83, 115) Sexual Orientation Gay & Lesbian (P v. Garcia (2000) 77 CA4 1269, 1272) Disability US v. Harris (7th Cir. 1999) 197 F3 870 [but permissible if disability would affect 		 Men who wear toupees (P v. Motton (1985) 39 C3 596, 606) Retired correctional officers (P v. England (2000) 83 CA4 772) Support jury nullification (Merced v. McGrath (9th Cir. 2005) 426 F3 1076) 							
					People of color (as a group) (Pv. Neuman (2009) 176 CA4 571) [but see				
				 inclusion of "color" in Govt Code § 11135(a) eff. 1/1/16] Obese people (US v. Santiago-Martinez (9th Cir. 1995) 58 F3d 422) 					
		Non-Hispanic with Spanish surname (P v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 C4 1083, 1122) Requirements / Rules							
				 Wheeler/Batson objection may be raised by the defense or prosecution. (<i>P</i> v. Wheeler (1978) 22 C3 258, 280-283, fn.29; see, e.g., <i>P</i> v. Singh (2015) 234 CA4 1319 [against defense attorney]) Objection must be timely (i.e., before jury selection completed). (<i>P</i> v. Perez (1996) 48 CA4 1310; <i>P</i> v. Scott (2015) 61 C4 363, 383) 					
		• Single discriminatory exclusion is a violation. (Pv. Fuentes (1991) 54 C3 707)							
		• Give your justifications even if prima facie showing is not made. (P v. Scott							
		jury service (e.g., medication that causes drowsiness would interfere)]					(2015) 61 C4 363, 388 [encouraged for appellate review])		
		Distrust of law enforcement	Race-Neutral Justificat	tions (Examples)	Appearance / Demeanor				
		Negative experience ^{1, 6}	Occupation	<u>Stupid</u>	Unconventional appearance ¹²				
		Relative in jail or prison ^{2, 6, 17}	 Social worker¹ 	 Ability to comprehend^{1, 4, 9} 	Wearing "Coors" jacket ⁹				
		Refused employment by police ³	• Teacher ⁹	Answered only 2 of 10 questions ⁵	Long hair, facial hair ¹⁴				
		• Ex-husband is cop ¹⁵	Juvenile Counselor ¹³	Inattentive ¹⁰	• Weird, unusual ^{15, 17}				
		Divorce with police officer ³	 Tractor Driver⁹ 	Inconsistent answers ¹¹	• Too eager ^{13, 17}				
• Juror or friend/family arrested/prosecuted ^{4, 6, 8}	Pastor ¹⁸	Other	• Soft spoken, reluctant, timid ^{4, 17}						
Relative involved with drugs ^{8, 9}	Limited Life Experiences	Views on death penalty ^{6, 7}	Frowning, hostile looks ^{6, 8}						
Prior Jury Experience	 Single, no children⁵ 	Rely too heavily on experts ⁶	Emmotional ⁶ Defensive body language ¹⁵						
Previously sat on hung jury ^{1, 2}	 Few ties to community¹ 		Defensive body language ¹⁵						
 No prior jury experience⁵ 	 Follower¹⁷ 	Close-mindedness ⁶	Overweight ¹⁵						
1) P v. Turner (1994) 8 C4 137; 2) P v. Farnam (2002) 28 C4 107; 3)	Hayes v. Woodford (9th Cir. 2002) 301 F	3d 1054; 4) P v. Arias (1996) 13 C4 92; 5) P v. Perez (1994) 2	9 CA4 1313; 6) P v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 C4 1083;						
7) P v. Williams (2013) 56 C4 630; 8) P v. Dunn (1995) 40 CA4 1039	; 9) P v. Barber (1988) 200 CA3 378; 10)	US v. Power (9th Cir. 1989) 881 F2d 733; 11) P v. Mayfield (1 16) Rice v. Collins (2006) 546 US 333; 17) P v. Duff (2014) 58	(1997) 14 C4 668; 12) PV. Ward (2005) 36 C4 186;						