ATTACHMENT A - PART 2
Memorandum

United States Department of Transportation
Transportation Security Administration

Subject: Development of Watch List Policy

From: [Redacted]

To: Lee Longmire

Date: January 7, 2003

Reply to

cc: [Redacted]

You requested a list of areas in which we will need support to finalize a watch list policy. The deadline established by Adm. Schor for completion of the policy is January 20, 2003.

Please note that during the briefing for Adm. Schor on January 6, Maritime and Land Security proposed that TSA aviation watch lists [Redacted] Adm. Schor expressed reservation whether it is appropriate, at this time, to take this step. However, he instructed [Redacted] to work with Intel and Regulation and Policy on the proposal.

The following are the areas in which we need support to finalize the watch list policy.

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On January 6, Adm Schor was briefed on "Watch List" issues. At the end of the briefing, Adm Schor directed us to formalize a "Watch List" policy no later than January 20.

[Redacted] has the lead on this effort for Policy. [Redacted] will be assisting. They are pulling together a working group to address the issues related to the Watch List and to coordinate a written policy.

The following are the areas in which we need support to finalize the watch list policy.

We would appreciate it if you would designate someone to represent your organization on this workgroup so the policy can be developed and coordinated in time to meet Adm
Schor's suspense date.

Thanks for your assistance.

Lee
WATCH LIST WORKING GROUP
COORDINATION MEETING

AGENDA

1. Sign In

2. Review Briefing for Vadm Skhor

3. Review Issues and Task Assignments
   Develop TSA Policy Document that:
   - Provides coordinated TSA public affairs response to watch list inquires
4. Straw man Draft Policy

5. Working Group Schedule

6. Next Coordination Meeting (date/time/place)
WATCH LIST WORKING GROUP SCHEDULE

January 10, 2003

Friday, January 10
First coordination meeting, task assignments

Monday, January 13
Second coordination meeting; identification of major issues requiring policy decision

Tuesday, January 14
Submission to Policy by COB of written input (via email) for draft policy

Wednesday, January 15
Compile input into policy and distribute draft to working group for review, final comments

Thursday, January 16
Final comments to Policy by noon (via email)

Friday, January 17
Final draft policy to working group members for sign off by principals

Monday, January 20
Final sign off complete by noon; submission of Final Draft Policy to Vadim Skhor

0056
AGENDA

1. Pass Sign-in Sheet

2. Review Progress of Work for Each Issue

3. Review Input from Office of Intelligence
   - Discuss Alternative View
   - Discuss Additions/Deletions, if any

4. Review MOU Input
   - Discuss Alternative View

5. Discuss Other Concerns/Issues

6. Revise Work Schedule

7. Next Meeting of Working Group
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Issue No. 4:

Action: (b)(5)

Status: 

Issue No. 5:

Action: (b)(5)

Status: 

Issue No. 6:

Action: (b)(5)

Status: 

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Issue No. 7: [Redacted]
Action: [Redacted]
Status: 

Issue No. 8: [Redacted]
Action: [Redacted]
Status: 

Issue No. 9: Provide coordinated TSA public affairs response to watch list inquiries
Action: Deirdre O'Sullivan
Status: 

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---Original Message---

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2003 5:54 PM
To: O'Sullivan, Deirdre; Wolf, Chad
Cc: Blank, Tom; Krasinski, Ken; [Redacted]
Subject: Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR)

Need some help.

Received a phone message today from [Redacted] CAIR, again asking the status of our efforts to resolve Mr. [Redacted] frequent selection as a false positive because his name is identical to someone on the No-Fly List. We advised her previously we were working the issue in hopes the watch list working group would come up with a silver bullet to solve completely the problem. It does not appear that will happen; and any benefits that we do derive from the policy will take time to implement once it is approved. (Deirdre, you should be aware [Redacted] and CAIR met with a rather large contingent of OST/TSA officials in May 2001, and Congresswoman Slaughter has written two letters to TSA on behalf of [Redacted]. No solutions were forthcoming from these efforts. [Redacted] has suggested that at some point [Redacted] will sue.) I suspect the only real solution may be the fielding of CAPPS II in mid-summer.

I should get back to her soon, if possible.

Many thanks,

---"WARNING: This document contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR 1520. No part of this document may be released to persons without a need to know, as defined in 49 CFR 1520, except with the written permission of the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, Washington, DC. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. Government agencies, public release is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552."---
From: O'Sullivan, Deirdre
Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2003 8:31 PM
To: RE: Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR)
Subject: 1520.5(b)(9)(ii)

---Original Message---
From: Wednesday, January 22, 2003 5:54 PM
To: O'Sullivan, Deirdre; Wof; Chad
Cc: Bank, Tom; Klairenik, Ken
Subject: Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) - Asif Iqbal

Need some help.

Received a phone message today from CAIR, again asking the status of our efforts to resolve frequent selection as a false positive because his name is identical to someone on the No-Fly List. We advised her previously we were working the issue in hopes the watch list working group would come up with a silver bullet to solve completely problem. It does not appear that will happen, and any benefits that we do derive from the policy will take time to implement once it is approved. (Deirdre, you should be aware and CAIR met with a rather large contingent of OST/TSA officials in May 2001, and Congresswoman Slaughter has written two letters to TSA on behalf of No solutions were forthcoming from these efforts. has suggested that at some point I suspect the only real solution may be the fielding of CAPPS II in mid-summer.

I should get back to her soon, if possible.
Many thanks,

(b)(6)

Senior Advisor
Office of Security Regulation and Policy
Room 3522, GSA Building
400 7th Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C 20590
202-385-1820
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)

GAO Survey of Federal Agencies’ Use of “Watch lists” of Domestic and International Terrorists and Criminals

Agency Contact Information:
   Name: [Redacted]
   Title: Intelligence Operations Officer
   Organization: Transportation Security Intelligence Service, TSA
   Telephone: 202-267-3099
   Fax: 202-488-7119
   E-Mail: [Redacted]

I. Definition of Domestic and International Terrorist and/or Criminal

TSA uses the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d). That statute contains the following definitions:

--The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

--The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.

TSA does not specifically define “criminal,” as TSA does not watch list criminals.

II. Watch List Development and/or Maintenance

**Please note that the current TSA watch lists only identify potential threats to aviation and are only implemented by air carriers. TSA does not currently administer watch lists for any other mode of transportation.

Name of Watch list: No-Fly List

Purpose of Watch list: The purpose of the No-Fly list is to prevent the transport of individuals who pose a threat to U.S. civil aviation assets, passengers, or crewmembers.

1. Terrorists Only
2. Both electronically and manually
3. As of August 1, 2002, there were 349 individuals listed on the No-Fly list.
4. External Only
5. All individuals placed on the No-Fly list are added or removed based on the request of
and/or information provided by a U.S. federal intelligence or law enforcement agency.
The requesting agency must provide justification for the watchlisting request, as well as a
which are releasable at the "For
Official Use Only" level for dissemination to commercial air carriers
Since TSA has two watch lists, No-Fly and Selectee,
the determination of the list on which the individual is placed is based upon both the
request of the originating agency and the nature, credibility, and specificity of the threat
information provided.

The placement of individuals on the No-Fly list is guided by two primary principles:
A. Does the individual present a potential threat to U.S. civil aviation?
B. Did the requesting agency provide enough unclassified biographical information to
ensure that the name individual, if he/she presents himself/herself for transport, can be
identified?

However, these principles are necessarily subjective, providing guidelines, not "hard and
fast" rules. TSA has, in several instances, placed an individual on the No-Fly list

6. The requests for the addition of names to the No-Fly list must be conveyed via record
message traffic or a paper request (faxed or emailed), which ensures a paper trail on how
the request came to TSA and what the justification was for the request. Any aberrations
in application of the watchlisting criteria are noted and maintained in a file. The Current
Intelligence Operations Division Manager reviews all additions before the list is amended
and disseminated.

7. TSA will only remove a name from the No-Fly list if the originator of the request to
watch list provides, in writing, a request for the individual to be removed from the list, as
well as a sufficient justification for the removal, i.e. a statement from the requester that
the agency no longer considers the individual a threat to civil aviation. Additionally,
TSA will consider any threat information that other agencies may have presented
concerning the individual before deciding whether to remove the person from the No-Fly
list.

8. The requests for the removal of names to the No-Fly list must be conveyed via record
message traffic or a paper request (faxed or emailed), which ensures a paper trail on the
justification for the removal request. Any aberrations in application of the removal
criteria are noted and maintained in a file. The Current Intelligence Operations Division
Manager reviews all removals before the list is amended and disseminated.
9. The list is updated as necessary, if requests are received for additions/removals. These updates are performed at the close of business each day if any requests have been received for processing. However, if the requesting agency indicates there is an urgency to the request, the list will be updated and disseminated immediately regardless of the time of day or day of the week.

10. The information is classified “For Official Use Only.” Additionally, it is labeled as Sensitive Security Information (SSI), which is a handling and dissemination caveat, which specifies that only personnel involved in aviation security are allowed to have access to the list and its contents. SSI ensures that only individuals who are involved in aviation security are allowed to review and handle the list and its contents.

11. [Redacted]

12. [Redacted]

13. A. [Redacted]
B. The following biographical data is included in the No-Fly list: [Redacted]
C. [Redacted]
D. [Redacted]
E. [Redacted]
F. [Redacted]

14. TSA shares all or some of this information with select Federal, state, and local agencies, as well as private sector firms.

15. A. Federal Agencies: law enforcement and intelligence. [Redacted] TSA shares information with other federal agencies based on the release given by the agency that provided the information on the particular individual on the No-Fly list. For example, if the FBI allows information about an individual on the No-Fly list to be shared with the CIA, then TSA will also share that information with the CIA. However, because most information for the No-Fly list is provided to TSA to be shared [Redacted] TSA cannot release the information to an agency [Redacted] or the originator of the information permits release to the third agency.

B. State agencies: law enforcement, if personnel are directly involved in aviation security.

C. Local agencies: law enforcement, if personnel are directly involved in aviation security.
D. Private Sector: Commercial Airlines. The No-Fly list is disseminated to all U.S.
commercial air carriers, as well as foreign air carriers who provide last point of departure
service into/out of the United States.

16. Of the watch list data items listed, [redacted]
   [redacted] This data is shared with Federal law and intelligence agencies, which are either
   involved in aviation security or are granted access to the information by the originator of
   that information. TSA also shares this information from the No-Fly list with state and
   local law enforcement personnel that are directly involved with aviation security. TSA
   disseminates the biographical information contained in the No-Fly list to U.S.
   commercial air carriers, as well as foreign air carriers who provide last point of departure
   service into/out of the United States.

   Although it is not contained in the No-Fly list, originating agencies do provide TSA with
   some classified threat information about the persons on the No-Fly list. This information
   is shared only with Federal agencies' personnel who have an appropriate clearance level
   and are also approved to receive the information by the originating agency.

17. Whether federal, state, local, or private sector, TSA provides watch list data only to
   persons who "need to know" the information to perform their duties in aviation security,
   or are permitted access to the information by the originating agency. Agencies that
   provide the information to TSA do so with the understanding that it will only be shared
   with those persons. Unauthorized disclosure would jeopardize other agencies' willingness
   to provide information to TSA in the future.

Name of Watch list: Selectee List

Purpose of Watch list: The purpose of the Selectee List is to ensure additional security
screening measures are applied to individuals [redacted] These individuals are [redacted]
[redacted] The additional security screening is deemed sufficient to ensure these persons
are not a threat to an aircraft, its passengers, or crewmembers.

1. Terrorists Only
2. Both electronically and manually
3. As of August 1, 2002, there were 265 individuals listed on the Selectee list.
4. External Only
5. All individuals placed on the Selectee list are added or removed based on the request
   of and/or information provided by a U.S. federal intelligence or law enforcement agency.
   The requesting agency must provide justification for the watchlisting request, as well as a
   [redacted] which are releasable at the "For
   Official Use Only" level for dissemination to commercial air carriers [redacted]
Since TSA has two watch lists, No-Fly and Selectee, the determination of the list on which the individual is placed is based upon both the request of the originating agency and the nature, credibility, and specificity of the threat information provided.

Individuals are placed on the Selectee list if they are deemed to be U.S. commercial aviation, passengers, or crewmembers.

6. The requests for the addition of names to the Selectee list must be conveyed via record message traffic or a paper request (faxed or emailed), which ensures a paper trail on how the request came to TSA and what the justification was for the request. Any aberrations in application of the watchlisting criteria are noted and maintained in a file. The Current Intelligence Operations Division Manager reviews all additions before the list is amended and disseminated.

7. TSA will only remove a name from the Selectee list if the originator of the request to watch list provides, in writing, a request for the individual to be removed from the list, as well as a sufficient justification for the removal, i.e. a statement from the requester that the agency no longer considers the individual a threat to U.S. interests. Additionally, TSA will consider any threat information that other agencies may have presented concerning the individual before deciding whether to remove the person from the Selectee list.

8. The requests for the removal of names to the Selectee list must be conveyed via record message traffic or a paper request (faxed or emailed), which ensures a paper trail on the justification for the removal request. Any aberrations in application of the removal criteria are noted and maintained in a file. The Current Intelligence Operations Division Manager reviews all removals before the list is amended and disseminated.

9. The list is updated as necessary, if requests are received for additions/removals. These updates are performed at the close of business each day if any requests have been received for processing. However, if the requesting agency indicates there is an urgency to the request, the list will be updated and disseminated immediately regardless of the time of day or day of the week.

10. The information is classified "For Official Use Only." Additionally, it is labeled as Sensitive Security Information (SSI), which is a handling and dissemination caveat, which specifies that only personnel involved in aviation security are allowed to have access to the list and its contents. SSI ensures that only individuals who are involved in aviation security are allowed to review and handle the list and its contents.

11. 

12. 

0154
13. A. The following biographical data is included in the Selectee list:

B. The following biographical data is included in the Selectee list:

C. The following biographical data is included in the Selectee list:

D. The following biographical data is included in the Selectee list:

E. The following biographical data is included in the Selectee list:

F. The following biographical data is included in the Selectee list:

14. TSA shares all or some of this information with select Federal, state, and local agencies, as well as private sector firms.

15. A. Federal Agencies: law enforcement and intelligence. TSA shares information with other federal agencies based on the release given by the agency that provided the information on the particular individual on the Selectee list. For example, if the FBI allows information about an individual on the Selectee list to be shared with the

Then TSA will also share that information with the

However, because most information for the Selectee list is provided to TSA to be shared

TSA cannot release the information to an agency or the originator of the information permits release to the third agency.

B. State agencies: law enforcement, if agency is directly involved in aviation security.

C. Local agencies: law enforcement, if agency is directly involved in aviation security.

D. Private Sector: Commercial Airlines. The Selectee list is disseminated to all U.S.
commercial air carriers, as well as foreign air carriers who provide last point of departure service into/out of the United States.

16. Of the watch list data items listed, This data is shared with Federal law and intelligence agencies, which are either involved in aviation security or are granted access to the information by the originator of that information. TSA also shares this information from the Selectee list with state and local law enforcement personnel that are directly involved with aviation security. TSA disseminates the biographical information contained in the Selectee list to U.S. commercial air carriers, as well as foreign air carriers who provide last point of departure service into/out of the United States.

Although it is not contained in the Selectee list, originating agencies do provide TSA with some classified threat information about the persons on the Selectee list. This information is shared only with Federal agencies’ personnel who have an appropriate clearance level and are also approved to receive the information by the originating agency.
17. Whether federal, state, local, or private sector, TSA provides watch list data only to persons who “need to know” the information to perform their duties in aviation security, or are permitted access to the information by the originating agency. Agencies that provide the information to TSA do so with the understanding that it will only be shared with those persons. Unauthorized disclosure would jeopardize other agencies’ willingness to provide information to TSA in the future.

III. Watch list Policies and Procedures

1. No

2. No, TSA does not have an official watch list data sharing agreement with any agency. However, TSA does have general memorandums of understanding and “statements of intelligence interest” to facilitate information sharing with CIA, FBI, [REDACTED] 1520.5(b)(2)(i) 1520.5(b)(4)(i) (b)(2)

3. Yes. TSA directly shares the No-Fly and Selectee lists with the FBI. [REDACTED] 1520.5(b)(2)(i) 1520.5(b)(4)(i) (b)(2) TSA shares this information with other agencies on an ad hoc basis, depending on involvement in aviation security and release by originating agency. CIA, FBI, [REDACTED] and state and local law enforcement agencies may be provided this information as required and approved.

4. Electronically.

5. TSA shares the lists electronically via telecommunications links and web access.

IV. Watch list Users—Those Who Access and Use Other Agencies’ Watch lists

Name of Watch list: [REDACTED]

Agency Providing Watch list: [REDACTED]

How Does Your Agency Use This Watch list: TSA only has direct access to one intelligence or law enforcement watch list, [REDACTED] 1520.5(b)(3)(i) 1520.5(b)(4)(i) 1520.5(b)(3)(i) (b)(2)

1. Terrorists only.

2. Electronically.

3. Intelink.

4. Yes.

5. Real-time.
V. Information/Data Architecture

The information requested concerns a classified network certified and accredited by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) according to Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/3 standards. Considering the sensitive nature of this network, the information requested may be classified and therefore cannot be released or disseminated in the form requested. If you desire a meeting to discuss details of this network please contact [redacted] at [redacted] to schedule an appointment and pass the necessary clearances.

VI. Consolidation of Watch lists

1. Yes.

2. No.

3. N/A

4. Each agency's watch list serves a purpose particular to the interests and missions of that agency. For example, the TSA No-Fly and Selectee lists contain names of individuals who may pose a threat to commercial aviation, passengers, and crewmembers. The overriding concern is the safety of the flying public on American air carriers or in U.S. airspace.

5. Overall, because there are so many different watch lists supported by various agencies, there is insufficient information sharing between federal agencies.
However, on an ad hoc basis, when TSA has requested information from other agencies on a specific watchlisted individual, those agencies have been very responsive in providing what information they have available, usually in hard copy.

TSA provides its watch list information to the FBI to review watch lists and look for ways to increase cooperation.

6. There are two primary obstacles to sharing watch list information with other federal agencies: the "third agency" rule and data architecture.

A. Third Agency Rule: Since the information contained in the TSA No-Fly and Selectee lists is provided by another agency, TSA cannot share that information with a third agency unless specifically granted permission by the originating agency, i.e. if the third agency is an addressee on the watch list request or if TSA is granted specific permission to share the information. The agencies that contribute information to the TSA No-Fly and Selectee Lists specify that the information is

Therefore, TSA cannot share the information with federal entities unless the originator has approved it. TSA is currently working this issue with CIA and FBI for dissemination of the No-Fly and Selectee lists to

B. Data architecture:

7. TSA shares the No-Fly and Selectee lists with U.S. commercial air carriers, as well as foreign air carriers who provide service into/out of the United States. This information can also be shared with state and local law enforcement entities when
responsible for aviation security, such as law enforcement officers at airports. However, this information is shared on a strict "need to know" basis when law enforcement involvement is necessary.

8. [Redacted]

9. No.

10. [Redacted]

11. TSA is currently seeking guidance on the sharing of watch list information from the CIA and FBI. [Redacted]
From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, December 11, 2002 6:11 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: Re: Selectee/No Fly Listing Procedures

Below are the answers to your questions.

How does Alaska Airlines' system works in terms of handling Selectee/No Fly list passengers?
When Alaska Airlines receives a new list from the TSA we enter the names into a Sabre database.

Please briefly explain how the system works?
When a person's name is compared against the list in Sabre. If Sabre finds the passenger's name one on the list it will restrict our CSAs from checking-in the passenger.

What does Alaska Airlines consider a match? What procedural steps do you take upon receiving a match?
Alaska Airlines definition of a match is the same as described in SD 1544-01-21B and SD 1544-01-20A. Consequently, when a match is found we follow the steps as described in the SD. Any passenger who is not a match is cleared to travel.

Let me know if you have any other questions.

Alaska Airlines

> Morning
> Could you please advise; per TSA Intelligence (TSI) request, how does Alaska Airlines' system works in terms of handling Selectee/No Fly list passengers? Please briefly explain how the system works? What does Alaska Airlines consider a match? What procedural steps do you take upon receiving a match?
> Apparently there have been a couple of instances whereupon an individual has been on a list, however they are not on the TSI listing, hence we and myself are trying to clear up this problem and need your assistance in describing your procedures.
> Thanks in Advance,
From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, December 16, 2002 4:47 PM
To: Longmire, Lee; Wolf, Chad
Cc: Re: RE: Selectee/No Fly Listing Procedures

I’ve asked Sabre since October to help us fix this problem, but they don’t feel it is urgent enough and are dragging their feet.

A few options that may work.
1. Ask Sabre to program our system to [redacted] They won’t change the program unless asked by the TSA. (In writing)
2. [redacted]. [redacted] [redacted]
3. [redacted].
4. Get CAPPs II up and running so the government handles the name lists. Alaska Airlines would be very interesting in testing CAPPs II.

Thanks for working with us. This has been such a headache for me. Any solutions or combinations would be greatly appreciated.

[tsa.dot.gov writes:
> Many thanks to both of you for the information. It is a big help to
> understanding the problem of people being pulled aside when they are not on a
> watchlist. Any suggestions how to assist the passenger who is continually
> flagged by Sabre but not on a TSA watchlist?
>
> Again, many thanks.