1	MARK PARNES, State Bar No. 104775
2	TROY A. VALDEZ, State Bar No. 191478
2	WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI Professional Corporation
3	650 Page Mill Road
	Palo Alto, CA 94304-1050
4	Telephone: (650) 493-9300
	Facsimile: (650) 565-5100
5	
	MARGARET C. CROSBY, State Bar No. 056812
6	American Civil Liberties Union
_	Foundation of Northern California, Inc.
7	1663 Mission Street, Suite 460
8	San Francisco, CA 94103 Telephone: (415) 621-2493
0	Facsimile: (415) 255-8437
9	1 desimile. (113) 233 0 137
	ROBIN L. GOLDFADEN, State Bar No. 208055
10	American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
	Immigrants' Rights Project
11	405 14th Street, Suite 300
	Oakland, CA 94612
12	Telephone: (510) 625-2010 ext. 214
12	Facsimile: (510) 622-0050
13	RICHARD WILSON, DC Bar No. 425026 (To Be Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
14	ENSAAF, Inc.
•	c/o Washington College of Law, International Human Rights Law Clinic
15	4801 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Room 448
	Washington, DC 20016-8184
16	Telephone: (202) 274-4147
	Facsimile: (270) 916-7074
17	
18	Attorneys for Plaintiff
10	HARPAL SINGH CHEEMA
19	
20	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
.	
21	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
22	SACRAMENTO DIVISION
	SHERINIZITI O DI VISIOIT
23	
24	
_	
25	
ا ء	
26	
27	
_ ′	
28	

_ 1			
1	HARPAL SINGH CHEEMA,		
2	Plaintiff,	Case No	
3	v.)	COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND	
4	MARK CHANDLESS, Warden, Yuba County	DECLARATORY RELIEF AND DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF	
5	Jail; VIRGINIA BLACK, Yuba County Sheriff;) NANCY ALCANTAR, Field Office Director,)	RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND	
6	Detention and Removal, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; MICHAEL J. GARCIA,	INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT OF 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, ET	
7	Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; VICTOR CERDA,	SEQ., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT OF 1993, 42	
8	Acting Director, Office of Detention and Removal, U.S. Immigration and Customs	U.S.C. § 2000bb, ET SEQ., FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE U.S.	
9	Enforcement,	CONSTITUTION, AND ART. I, § 4 OF	
10	Defendants.	THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION	
11		DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL	
12			
13	INTRODUCTION		
14	1. By this complaint, Plaintiff Harpal Singh Cheema seeks relief from the substantial		
15	burdens that Defendants have imposed on his religious exercise. Under the authority of U.S.		
16	Customs and Immigration Enforcement, Mr. Cheema is confined to the Yuba County Jail,		
17	pending the outcome of immigration proceedings in which he seeks relief based on the brutal		
18	torture and persecution he suffered before fleeing India and arriving in the United States. As a		
19	devout Sikh, Mr. Cheema is obligated to keep his head covered at all times. Nonetheless,		
20	Defendants have been unjustifiably and unlawfully s	subjecting Mr. Cheema to extraordinary	
21	restrictions on his use of a religious headcovering, prohibiting him from leaving his bed with his		
22	head covered.		
23			
24	JURISDICTION A	AND VENUE	
25	2. This action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1	1983, the laws and the Constitution of the	
26	United States, and the Constitution of the State of California. This Court has subject matter		
27	jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), 1343(a)(4) and 42 U.S.C §§ 2000bb-1(c),		
28	2000cc-2(a) and directly under the Constitution. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction under		

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202. Injunctive relief is authorized under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

3. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in the Eastern District of California.

PARTIES

Plaintiff

4. Plaintiff Harpal Singh Cheema, an *Amritdhari* Sikh, was born in India in 1958. He is presently confined to the Yuba County Jail while his immigration proceedings are pending. Federal authorities – first the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and now its successor agency (as of March 1, 2003), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a bureau of the Department of Homeland Security – have subjected Mr. Cheema to detention since 1997. Since 1993, when he arrived in the United States after fleeing persecution in India, Mr. Cheema has been pursuing immigration relief in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal. Mr. Cheema has been granted deferral of removal. His application for asylum and withholding of removal is pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Defendants

- 5. Defendant Mark Chandless is the Warden of Yuba County Jail. He is sued in his official capacity and individually for damages. Mr. Chandless is directly responsible for the restrictions that Yuba County Jail has imposed on Mr. Cheema's use of a religious headcovering.
- 6. Defendant Virginia Black is the Sheriff of Yuba County. She is sued in her official capacity. Ms. Black is responsible for oversight of the County's jails. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that information and belief alleges, that Ms. Black was, at all relevant times herein alleged, responsible for the policy pursuant to which Plaintiff is restricted in his use of a religious headcovering.
- 7. Defendant Nancy Alcantar is the San Francisco Field Office Director for Detention and Removal, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. She is sued in her individual and official capacity. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that information and

belief alleges, that Ms. Alcantar is responsible for determining whether and where Plaintiff is detained, ensuring that immigration detainees under her legal authority are housed in detention facilities that comply with national Detention Standards, and ensuring that such immigration detainees are not subject to unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful conditions of confinement.

- 8. Defendant Michael J. Garcia is the Assistant Secretary for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement within the Department of Homeland Security. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that information and belief alleges, that Mr. Garcia oversees ICE's functions including, but not limited to, fulfilling ICE's responsibility for the detention of, and conditions of confinement for, non-citizens who are held in custody pending the outcome of their immigration proceedings. Mr. Garcia is sued in his official capacity.
- 9. Defendant Victor Cerda is the acting Director of ICE's Office of Detention and Removal (DRO). DRO secures bed space in detention facilities such as Yuba County Jail. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that information and belief alleges, that Mr. Cerda oversees DRO's functions including, but not limited to, monitoring facilities housing immigration detainees to ensure compliance with national Detention Standards, which specify the minimum living conditions appropriate for detainees, and laws governing conditions of confinement for immigration detainees. Mr. Cerda is sued in his official capacity.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

10. Plaintiff Harpal Singh Cheema is an *Amritdhari* (initiated) Sikh, born in India in 1958. He is presently detained at the Yuba County Jail, under the authority of U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement, while his application for relief under the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Convention Against Torture is pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals.

The Sikh Religion and Its Requirements for Plaintiff

11. The monotheistic Sikh religion was founded in India in or around the year 1500 by Guru Nanak. Today, there are over 20 million Sikhs worldwide.

- 12. Guru Nanak passed on the leadership of the Sikh religion to nine successive Gurus. The teachings of Sikhism's 10 Gurus are enshrined in the Sikh Holy Book, the *Sri Guru Granth Sahib*.
- 13. The final living Guru, Guru Gobind Singh, died in 1708. Before his death, Guru Gobind Singh crystallized the practices and beliefs of the faith and determined that no future living Guru was needed.
- 14. In keeping with Guru Gobind Singh's direction, the Sikh religion has, since Guru Gobind Singh's death, been jointly guided by the Sikh Holy Book and the collectivity of *Amritdhari* Sikhs. *Amritdhari* Sikhs are men and women who have undergone the Sikh initiation ceremony, akin to a baptism, binding them to a life of discipline and piety. An *Amritdhari* Sikh is regarded as having reached the highest level of religious commitment.
- 15. Amritdhari Sikhs are charged with upholding the highest Sikh values of devotion, remembrance of God at all times, truthful living, equality between all human beings, and social justice. They are required, *inter alia*, to engage in lengthy meditation and prayer each morning and every night before retiring. They are also obliged to perform good works and to aid the weak and oppressed.
- 16. *Amritrdhari* Sikhs must strictly follow the Sikh Code of Conduct and Conventions, known as the *Rehat Maryada*, and wear the prescribed physical articles of the faith, which are known as the "five Ks" *kes*, *kanga*, *kara*, *kirpan*, and *kachhera*.
- 17. One of the five Ks kes means uncut hair. In keeping with the *Rehat Maryada*'s requirements, *Amritdhari* Sikhs do not cut their hair. Relatedly, the *Rehat Maryada* further requires that male Sikhs wear a turban, known as a *dastaar*, to cover their heads. Wearing a turban is viewed by observant Sikhs as being one of the religion's central requirements.
- 18. As an *Amritdhari* Sikh, Mr. Cheema must follow the *Rehat Maryada*. Thus, for Mr. Cheema, as an *Amritdhari* Sikh, it is a religious imperative that he cover his head. Having his head uncovered is a deeply humiliating and defiling experience.

Plaintiff's Immigration Proceedings

- 19. Harpal Singh Cheema and his wife fled India and applied for immigration relief in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal when they arrived in the United States in 1993.
- 20. Mr. Cheema, a human rights lawyer in India, has long advocated for an independent Sikh state known as Khalistan. In response to his political and legal activities, Indian officials subjected Mr. Cheema to brutal torture and incarceration without charges or trial. *See Cheema v. Ashcroft*, 383 F.3d 848, 850-51 (9th Cir. 2004). During several periods of extended illegal detention and torture between 1987 and 1990, Indian security forces beat Mr. Cheema with a wooden stick; stretched his legs apart until the muscles began to break; stretched him repeatedly on a pulley; rolled a solid steel roller over his thighs; and broke his leg twice in the same place. 383 F.3d at 850-51.
- 21. Mr. Cheema fled to Canada in August 1990 and entered the United States two months later.
- 22. Upon learning in February 1992 that his wife, still in India, was ill, Mr. Cheema returned to India. At the Bombay airport, Mr. Cheema was seized by the police and flown to Delhi. The Indian police brutally tortured Mr. Cheema by repeatedly applying electric currents to his tongue, lips, nostrils, and temples; racking him by pulley; and subjecting him to a mock execution. 383 F.3d at 851.
- 23. When Mr. Cheema was released three months later, he went into hiding. In May 1993, he and his wife fled to the United States where they sought asylum or other relief that would save them from being returned to India.
- 24. After twenty-six hearings, an Immigration Judge declined to grant Mr. Cheema asylum but determined that he was entitled to withholding of deportation and relief under the Convention Against Torture.
- 25. Both the INS and Mr. Cheema appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. "The Board found that Mr. Cheema had been brutally tortured by Indian authorities and that he 'is one of the few prominent pro-Khalistan leaders in the world who would be in danger if

returned to India." 383 F.3d at 853. The Board held that Mr. Cheema could be granted deferral of removal but not withholding of deportation.

- 26. On petition for review, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Board's holding that Mr. Cheema cannot be deported to a country where he is likely to be tortured. The Court affirmed the deferral of removal and the denial of full relief under the Convention Against Torture but remanded Mr. Cheema's petition for withholding of deportation and asylum because the Board had applied an incorrect legal standard in concluding that Mr. Cheema was not eligible for such relief. 383 F.3d 850.
- 27. By virtue of the Ninth Circuit's decision, Mr. Cheema's immigration case is again before the Board of Immigration Appeals. When the Board last considered Mr. Cheema's case, it took approximately two years to render a decision.
- 28. ICE has denied Mr. Cheema's requests for release, most recently in a letter dated October 14, 2004, from Defendant Alcantar, pending the outcome of his immigration case.

Detention and Restrictions on Plaintiff's Use of a Religious Headcovering

- 29. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (previously the INS) has confined Mr. Cheema to various detention facilities since November 3, 1997, while his immigration proceedings have been pending. Since September 2002, Mr. Cheema has been held at the Yuba County Jail in Marysville, California.
- 30. Yuba County Jail receives federal financial assistance to house immigration detainees such as Mr. Cheema pursuant to an Intergovernmental Service Agreement with the federal government.
- 31. Facilities, such as Yuba County Jail, that agree to house immigration detainees such as the plaintiff oblige themselves to comply with the federal government's Detention Standards, which set forth national standards and implementing procedures for facilities housing immigration detainees. The standards specify minimum living conditions appropriate for immigration detainees.
- 32. ICE is responsible for monitoring whether facilities housing immigration detainees are complying with the Detention Standards. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on

that information and belief alleges, that Defendants Garcia and Cerda are responsible for ensuring that ICE fulfills its duty to enforce compliance with the Detention Standards. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that information and belief alleges, that Defendant Alcantar is responsible for ensuring that facilities housing immigration detainees within her jurisdiction are in compliance with the Detention Standards.

- 33. The Detention Standard addressing Religious Practices directs: "Detainees shall have access to personal religious property, consistent with facility security." The corresponding implementing procedure provides: "Religious headwear, notably kufis, yarmulkes, turbans, crowns, and headbands, as well as scarves and head wraps for orthodox Muslim and Jewish women, is permitted in all areas of the facility, subject to the normal considerations of security and good order, including inspection by staff."
- 34. Prior to Mr. Cheema's detention at Yuba County Jail, immigration officers in the San Francisco office responsible for Mr. Cheema's detention were informed of Mr. Cheema's religious observance needs.
- 35. Upon learning that he would be transferred to a new facility, Mr. Cheema informed an immigration officer in the San Francisco office of his concern that he be able to continue using a religious headcovering upon being transferred to Yuba County Jail. The officer assured Mr. Cheema that he would not face any problems in relation to his use of a religious headcovering at the new facility.
- 36. Upon arriving at Yuba County Jail, Mr. Cheema informed Defendant Mark Chandless and other Jail officers that his religion requires that he keep his head covered at all times. When he arrived at Yuba County Jail, Mr. Cheema was using the headcovering that he wore while detained in Bakersfield. One Yuba County Jail officer threatened to use force if Mr. Cheema did not remove his headcovering.
- 37. Shortly after his arrival at Yuba County Jail, Mr. Cheema was informed that he would not be allowed to keep his head covered except under the most limited circumstances. Specifically, on or about September 27, 2002, Mr. Cheema was instructed to sign a document (hereinafter "the September 2002 Memorandum") that provided as follows:

This memo is to confirm our conversation this afternoon concerning your being approved by Capt. Chandless to wear a religious head garment. We have approved for you to wear a cloth garment covering [your] head <u>ONLY</u> while at your bunk/bed 1. Praying, 2. Reading your religious book or 3. Eating. It <u>SHALL NOT be worn otherwise</u> or away from your bunk. I have provided the white cloth from your personal property which you shall maintain and use for this purpose. If you violate this agreement, it may be taken away.

By signing this, Inmate Cheema acknowledges that he understands our agreement and agrees to follow the aforementioned stipulations to possessing the cloth garment.

- 38. Believing he had no other choice, Mr. Cheema signed the document as directed.
- 39. The policy set forth in the September 2002 Memorandum, though understood by Mr. Cheema to be temporary when it was instituted, was never modified.
- 40. After the institution of the policy restricting Mr. Cheema's use of a religious headcovering, the same immigration officer who had assured Mr. Cheema that he would not face any problems in relation to his use of a headcovering once transferred to Yuba County Jail visited the Jail. When Mr. Cheema saw the officer, he informed him of the severe restrictions that the Jail had imposed on his use of a religious headcovering, but no change was made thereafter.
- 41. While detained at Yuba County Jail, Mr. Cheema has been using a towel to cover his head.
- 42. While some Yuba County Jail officers demonstrate respect for Mr. Cheema's religious practices and articles of faith, others do not.
- 43. In October 2003, Defendant Chandless, accompanied by two other Jail officers, came upon Mr. Cheema with his head covered away from his bed. Mr. Cheema was directed to uncover his head. When Mr. Cheema complied, Defendant Chandless and the other officers laughed at him.
- 44. In response to this incident, Mr. Cheema filed a grievance with the Yuba County Jail.
- 45. In response to Mr. Cheema's grievance, Defendant Chandless initiated a short conversation with Mr. Cheema, during which Defendant Chandless told Mr. Cheema that he had been given all the accommodations he was going to receive with respect to his use of a headcovering.

- 46. Mr. Cheema was not satisfied with the response and asserted that he should be allowed to cover his head at all times in accordance with the INS Detention Standards.
- 47. As retaliation, Mr. Cheema was placed in segregation. The segregation began at night on the same day that Mr. Cheema and Captain Chandless discussed Mr. Cheema's grievance.
- 48. Other prisoners at the Yuba County Jail respect and support Mr. Cheema. When Mr. Cheema was held in segregation, numerous fellow prisoners requested that he be returned to his dormitory where he has served as a trustee for the other prisoners.
- 49. In a letter dated November 20, 2003, Mr. Cheema's immigration attorney wrote to the Director of the Office of Detention and Removal, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), indicating: "Mr. Cheema would like to present his grievance regarding his solitary confinement and the denial of his religious freedom." In the letter, Mr. Cheema's immigration attorney explained the religious importance of a headcovering for Mr. Cheema, recounted the history of interference with this aspect of Mr. Cheema's religious exercise, and requested that ICE take action to ensure respect for Mr. Cheema's rights. A copy of this letter was sent to Defendant Chandless.
- 50. Mr. Cheema was held in segregation at the Yuba County Jail for approximately one month.
- 51. Since his return to his regular Yuba County Jail dormitory, Mr. Cheema has been subject to the Jail's policy restricting his use of a religious headcovering to the circumstances specified in the September 2002 Memorandum.
- 52. The restrictions on Mr. Cheema's use of a religious headcovering are the source of significant injury to him. In prohibiting Mr. Cheema from covering his head away from his bed, the Jail authorities effectively exact, as the price for Mr. Cheema's compliance with his faith, confinement to his bed. By way of example, Mr. Cheema is forced to eat on his bed because his religion requires that he have his head covered while eating. And when Mr. Cheema must be away from his bed without a religious headcovering, he feels debased and defiled.

- 53. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on such information and belief alleges, that while restricting Mr. Cheema's use of a religious headcovering to instances in which he is on his bed, Yuba County Jail permits other prisoners to cover their heads without imposing such a limitation.
- 54. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on such information and belief alleges, that Defendant Chandless was directly responsible for establishing the restrictions imposed by the policy embodied in the September 2002 Memorandum. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on such information and belief alleges, that Defendant Black was aware of and responsible for the policy embodied in the September 2002 Memorandum.
- 55. Defendant Alcantar has been informed of the restrictions on Plaintiff's use of a religious headcovering.
- 56. Defendants Alcantar, Cerda, and Garcia have failed to ensure compliance with the Detention Standards and have failed to ensure that Yuba County Jail refrains from violating Mr. Cheema's right to religious exercise.
- 57. Defendants have acted, or failed to act, intentionally or with reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiff's rights.
- 58. Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm as long as he is subjected to the restrictions that Defendants have imposed on his use of a religious headcovering.
- 59. Plaintiff is willing to use as a religious headcovering a turban that is smaller than that which is typically worn by an adult male *Amritdhari* Sikh, and he is willing to submit to reasonable searches of his religious headcovering.

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ALLEGATIONS

60. An actual and substantial controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendants as to their respective legal rights and duties. Plaintiff contends that Defendants' restriction on his use of a religious headcovering is illegal. On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants contend that the restriction is valid.

1	61. If not enjoined by the Court, Defendants will continue to restrict Plaintiff's ability		
2	to comply with his religious obligation to cover his head, in violation of his rights. This restriction		
3	will impose irreparable injury on Plaintiff. Plaintiff has no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at		
4	law.		
5			
6	FIRST CLAIM		
7	Violation of Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq.		
8	(Against Defendants Black and Chandless)		
9			
10	62. Paragraphs 1 through 61 are incorporated as if set forth fully herein.		
11	63. Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000		
12	(RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, "No government shall impose a substantial burden on the		
13	religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution even if the burden		
14	results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition		
15	of the burden on that person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and		
16	(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."		
17	64. By severely restricting Plaintiff's ability to cover his head, Defendants have		
18	imposed on Plaintiff's religious exercise a substantial burden, which neither furthers a		
19	compelling governmental interest nor is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling		
20	governmental interest.		
21	65. Defendants have accordingly violated Plaintiff's rights under RLUIPA.		
22			
23	SECOND CLAIM		
24	Violation of Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.		
25	(Against Defendants Alcantar, Garcia, and Cerda)		
26			
27	66. Paragraphs 1 through 65 are incorporated as if set forth fully herein.		
28			

- 1					
1	67. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1,				
2	dictates: "Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the				
3	burden results from a rule of general applicability," unless "it demonstrates that application of				
4	the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is				
5	the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.				
6	68. By severely restricting Plaintiff's ability to cover his head, Defendants have				
7	imposed on Plaintiff's religious exercise a substantial burden, which neither furthers a				
8	compelling governmental interest nor is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling				
9	governmental interest.				
10	69. Defendants have accordingly violated Plaintiff's rights under RFRA.				
11					
12	THIRD CLAIM				
13	Violation of the First Amendment				
14	(Against All Defendants)				
15					
16	70. Paragraphs 1 through 69 are incorporated as if set forth fully herein.				
17	71. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Congress shall				
18	make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof "				
19	72. By severely restricting Plaintiff's ability to cover his head, Defendants have				
20	denied, and continue to deny, Plaintiff his right to the free exercise of his religion as guaranteed				
21	by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.				
22					
23	FOURTH CLAIM				
24	Violation of First Amendment				
25	(Against Defendant Chandless)				
26					
27	73. Paragraphs 1 through 72 are incorporated as if set forth fully herein.				
28					
I					

1	PRAYER FOR RELIEF	
2	Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests that the Court enter a judgment including but not	
3	limited to:	
4	1. A declaration that Plaintiff is entitled to wear an appropriate religious headcovering,	
5	subject to reasonable security requirements;	
6	2. An injunction restraining Defendants from continuing to restrict Plaintiff's use of an	
7	appropriate religious headcovering and restraining Defendants from taking any retaliatory action	
8	including but not limited to segregation or a facility transfer, against Plaintiff for exercising his	
9	constitutional and statutory rights;	
10	3. Compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial;	
11	4. Punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial;	
12	5. Costs and reasonable attorneys' fees;	
13	6. Such additional and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.	
14		
15	Dated: May 16, 2005 WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI Professional Corporation	
16		
17	By: /s/ Mark Parnes Mark Parnes	
18	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
19	HARPÅL SINGH CHEEMA	
20		
21		
22 23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		
1	.1	